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Preface
This study is an interpretive description of internationalism
in nineteenth and twentieth century Hawaii, a significant but
little-known movement that revolves about the persistent efforts
of a succession of Island leaders to forge a uniquely conse-
quential role for Hawaii in the international affairs of the Pacific
Basin. Founded upon hopes and aspirations far more ambitious
than any warranted by the Islands’ physical attributes, this
movement involves undertakings ranging from efforts to create
a confederation of Polynesian nations to dreams of generating
a grand synthesis in East-West philosophy and cannot, thus, be
characterized simply as a grandiose version of conventional in-
ternational politics. Its origins lie more in a state of mind than
in geo-politics, and its strategies are more akin to those of the
crusader than those of the diplomat, soldier, or entrepreneur.
Hence, while this study discusses diplomacy, warfare, and eco-
nomics, it is fundamentally about the ways of thinking basic to
an “ism.”
A word on sources is necessary. As the chapter notes in-
dicate, numerous different materials have been consulted.
These range from secondary works, newspapers, and period-
icals readily available in most public libraries to dissertations,
government documents, institutional papers, and diaries lo-
cated in the Archives of Hawaii, the East-West Center, the
Hawaii International Services Agency, the Hawaii Visitors
Bureau, the Hawaiian Mission Children’s Society Library, the
Hawaiian and Pacific Collection in Hamilton Library at the Uni-
versity of Hawaii, the Legislative Reference Bureau, and the
YMCA of Honolulu. In addition, the papers of the Institute of Pa-
cific Relations, the Pan-Pacific Union, and the Peace Corps/Asia
Training Center located in the University of Hawaii Archives are
of particular significance. Finally, interviews, some conducted
by the author and an assistant and available through the author,
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and others conducted as part of the John A. Burns Oral History
Project and available through Hamilton Library are likewise im-
portant.
While the descriptive portions of this book are based upon
standard historiographical perspectives and require no special
comment, the interpretive portions may arouse some uncer-
tainty. The statements here proceed from the assumption, docu-
mented but perhaps still open to argument, that the generative
urge behind the movement lies in value-laden beliefs and per-
ceptions—social myths—more so than in economics, geography,
politics, and the other more conventional elements of analysis.
Accordingly, art, literature, music, poetry, television, and other
mediums associated with the expression of values figure promi-
nently in the work. Although common enough in recent schol-
arship, this approach has seldom been employed in Hawaiian
studies and may be unfamiliar to some readers. As a footnote,
it should be mentioned that the mythic aspect of the Island his-
torical experience appears to be of considerable scope and that
this approach may warrant more attention than it has so far at-
tracted.
Very few scholarly works are completed without assistance
from others. As this study is no exception, I have incurred nu-
merous debts that I want to acknowledge. In general terms, my
interest in the subject is the outgrowth of friendships and aca-
demic opportunities that have come during the course of some
twenty rewarding years in the Islands. I wish it were possible
to thank all those who helped make this such a rich experience.
At the same time, it is both possible and a pleasure to mention
a number of individuals who have contributed more directly. In
the first instance, I want to say that I am indebted to Jason Horn
for his sound scholarship on nineteenth century Hawaiian diplo-
matic history. Often cited but seldom accorded special recog-
nition, his unpublished thesis, “Primacy of the Pacific Under the
Hawaiian Kingdom,” is unquestionably the basic reference on
Island internationalism during this period, and I have made ex-
tensive use of it. I also want to note my indebtedness to Mona
Nakayama and Sharon Narimatsu for their sustained research
assistance and to the Atherton Family Foundation for a grant
that facilitated the initial research.
Many others offered valuable assistance and encour-
agement during the research and drafting stages, and I want
them to know that I truly appreciate their help. They are David
Bertelson, Stuart Gerry Brown, Daniel Boylan, George Chaplin,
Gavan Daws, Donna Ikeda, James Hall, Mark Helbling, Frances
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Jackson, Pauline King Joerger, Damaris Kirchhofer, David Kit-
telson, Seymour Lutzky, and Dennis Ogawa. Still others were
just as helpful with the final preparation of the manuscript, and
I likewise want to express my gratitude to them. They are Eliz-
abeth Bushnell, Sanna Deutsch, Freda Hellinger, Doris Lutzky,
Judith Masuda, Mary Mitsuda, Masao Miyamoto, Laila Roster,
Charlene Sato, Danielle So Mai, and John Thomas. Last, I want
my parents, Charlotte and Dallas Hooper, and my wife, Gloria
Hooper, to know how much I appreciate their many thoughtful
comments, long hours of proof reading, and unfailing support.
To all, mahalo nui loa.
Finally, it goes without saying that those who have been so
helpful should not be held accountable for questions of fact,
judgment, and style. These are my responsibilities.
Honolulu
October 1978
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I
A New Pacific Era
CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONALIST VISIONS
Shortly after eleven o’clock on the morning of February 20,
1969, John A. Burns, then governor of Hawaii and long the dom-
inant figure in Island politics, entered the crowded House of
Representatives chamber in the new state capitol to deliver the
traditional “State of the State” address before a joint session
of the legislature. Following a brief but warm introduction, he
took the Speaker’s podium, momentarily surveyed the packed
floor and gallery, and then turned to his subject. Speaking in
the clipped, almost gruff tone that had become so familiar over
the years, he opened with a discussion of fiscal problems. It
was evident, however, that there were more pressing matters
on his mind. Hurrying the financial review to a conclusion, he
paused briefly to consult his text and then began anew with the
declaration that a “Pacific Era is unfolding—even against resis-
tance from those unwilling to give this due recognition” and
that great and vigorous dreams must be pursued “if we are to
attain the greatness that is so patently the destiny of Hawaii and
its people.”
“This is a new beginning,” he continued. “This is a time for
great expectations of greater things to come.” Citing the un-
veiling of statues of King Kamehameha I and Father Damien
in Washington, he proclaimed that these men represent all the
“cherished ideals and traditions of Hawaii” which make it pos-
sible to speak of such a destiny, “a commitment to dynamic
leadership; a compassion for the downtrodden and hospitality
toward all; an openness to change; and a burning zeal to im-
prove the human condition through patient effort and the inspi-
ration of exemplary lives.”
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Developing the theme, Burns told his audience that “the
tremendous power of Hawaii as a source of inspiration which
leads to righteous revolutionary improvement in this world”
must never be underestimated. As evidence, he cited the
journals of Cook, Vancouver, Kotzebue, and other early ex-
plorers and spoke of how they had changed Europe’s entire per-
ception of the Pacific. He noted Father Damien’s inspirational
sacrifice among the victims of leprosy on Molokai. He discussed
Sun Yat-sen and Syngman Rhee and weighed the influence of
extended stays in the Islands upon their revolutionary philoso-
phies. Turning to more recent events, he recalled the heroism
of military personnel from the Islands who fought so valiantly
against America’s World War II enemies. Finally, and with great
feeling, he spoke of racism in Hawaii during the years prior to
the war and how ordinary citizens arose during the 1940s and
1950s to destroy it. In sum, he declared, “Hawaii has been the
home and headquarters of magnificent men of many races and
many nations, whose vision of the Pacific swept into the decades
and centuries to come.”
What all of this means, Burns concluded, is that the Islands
have “become the young, living, throbbing Heart of the Pa-
cific—no longer merely the inanimate hub, or step-stone, or
bridge, or languid tropical resort—but an example of vibrant life
at its best, and an inspiration to millions … [for in this Heart]
there lies a deep empathy for the many moods of the world
and an intuitive appreciation of the yearnings and desires of all
mankind…. We are unique in human society in our mid-ocean
location, in our wonderfully progressive economic, social, and
political structures, in our harmonious, multi-racial family life,
and in our desire to be a leader in all that is good in the Pacific
Community of Nations.”1
While the scattering of visitors in the audience must surely
have wondered how the people of such a small and distant
group of islands could even dream in the ambitious terms Burns
outlined, few of the Islanders present found the governor’s talk
in any way incongruous. They had applauded similar talks in
the past and they did so again on this occasion. The legis-
lators, for example, were quiet and intent during the speech but
rose together in a lengthy ovation at its conclusion. Speaking
to reporters afterward, Burns’ fellow Democrats were clearly
enthusiastic, and their comments about the “great speech” and
the “excellent speech” were prominent in subsequent news-
paper and television reports. The Republicans were almost as
generous. Aside from expressing the wish that certain pending
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legislative matters had been more directly addressed, they too
lauded the talk. Fred Rohlfing, a Republican leader in the
Senate, stated that he would “have to agree that … [Burns]
isolated all those things we should be concerned about con-
cerning the future of Hawaii,” while Buddy Soares, a Repub-
lican leader in the House of Representatives, enthused that “it
was the greatest lesson I’ve ever had in Hawaii[an] history.”2
Elsewhere the response was as positive if less exuberant.
Newspaper and television reporters described the speech in
the sober, matter-of-fact fashion reserved for events of conse-
quence. Likewise, others familiar with local politics—lobbyists,
legislative aides, and political observers—found it an excellent
statement of proper and desirable hopes.3 Finally, and in-
dicative of the degree to which Burns spoke for the entire
local establishment on this point, U.S. Senator Hiram L. Fong,
the effective head of the local Republican party, chanced to
speak before a businessmen’s gathering later the same day and
his comments were essentially a paraphrase of the governor’s
earlier talk. In calling for a broader recognition of Hawaii’s
ability to provide the nation with counsel regarding decisions
about Asian and Pacific relations, he warned that the Islands
“dare not permit the ‘Eastern Establishment,’ so heavily ori-
ented toward Europe, to dominate or neglect U.S. policy toward
Asia and the Pacific.” Hawaii, he declared, is a “natural” for
leadership in the Pacific and must become the “spokesman”
for American policy throughout the Pacific Basin.4 Different
from Burns’ speech only in its style and emphasis, Fong’s talk,
coming as it did at this particular juncture, dramatizes the
fact that this vision of Hawaii’s Pacific and global destiny has
long had support from all sectors of the local establishment.
While there have been dissenters—“agnostics” as one observer
termed them in wry comment on the sometimes doctrinal prop-
erties of this vision—they have generally been in the minority
just as surely as they were on this particular day.
MAJOR PERIODS OF INTERNATIONALIST
ACTIVITY
Understanding the local establishment’s enthusiasm for this
perspective despite its readily apparent geopolitical contradic-
tions is largely a matter of understanding the history of the
Island internationalist movement, a fascinating but seldom-dis-
cussed phenomenon based upon an optimistic perception of the
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Hawaiian socio-cultural experience that dates back well over a
century and involves the persistent efforts of a long succession
of leaders to forge a unique, supra-diplomatic role for Hawaii
in Pacific affairs. During the nineteenth century, most activity
centered around attempts by the monarchy to transform Hawaii
into a Pacific islands political power. Undertakings ranged from
a well-intended plan for a “Polynesian Confederation” under
Hawaiian leadership to an aggressive “Primacy in the Pacific”
policy designed to revive flagging Island self-esteem through
the creation of a mid-Pacific Hawaiian empire. These were in-
teresting if less than productive ventures. Among other things,
they resulted in the momentary annexation of a distant South
Pacific island group and an actual threat of war from Germany.
An equally ambitious if rather different surge of interna-
tional activism came in the first half of the twentieth century.
During these years, the Pan-Pacific Union and the Institute
of Pacific Relations were formed by local internationalists as
the foci of a concerted and eventually widely-known effort to
encourage greater political and cultural understanding
throughout the Pacific. These organizations sponsored an im-
mense number of activities involving regional conferences,
scholarly research, political lobbying, and international
consciousness-raising. Still another burst of activity followed
the conclusion of World War II. In this instance, political leaders
and government agencies took back much of the initiative they
had earlier yielded to the private sector and launched a vast
array of programs in international education, scientific coop-
eration, and commercial development. Still underway, these
activities constitute the contemporary phase of the movement.
In light of such continuity of vision and persistence of en-
deavor, it becomes clear that the Island internationalist
movement is more than simply a series of loosely related un-
dertakings. Rather, it is an authentic historical tradition and
must be viewed accordingly. Indeed, unheralded as it may be, it
is probably the most consistent single tradition in the modern
Hawaiian historical experience.5 This said, it must also be noted
that it is one thing to describe a tradition and quite another to
explain its being. Adequate descriptions can be extracted from
resource materials with far greater ease than plausible inter-
pretations. Yet it is the latter question that must ultimately be
addressed if a holistic understanding is, as it should be, the
final objective. Description alone cannot achieve this. Hence,
whatever it is that has led the people of this tiny and remote
group of islands to generate such ambitious hopes must be
A New Pacific Era
4
ascertained. Whatever it is that has caused them to translate
these hopes into goals despite all that has so long been under-
stood about the realities of international power and influence
must be identified. Finally, whatever it is that has inspired them
to cling to these goals year after year in the face of constant
rebuff must be determined. Both of these ends—description and
explanation—have been important considerations in the prepa-
ration of this study, and each has been addressed, the former
through a traditional historical survey of the movement itself
and the latter through a more speculative exploration of the
various patterns of thought and perception underlying it.
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II
The Summer Isles of Eden
MYTH, REALITY, AND ACTION
Contrary to prevailing opinion, the roots of the internationalist
tradition in Hawaii encompass far more than simply the Islands’
fabled role as a Pacific “crossroads.” Aside from a location
midway between East and West and a cosmopolitan citi-
zenry—factors which have doubtless contributed to the growth
of the tradition but which do not in themselves account for its
existence—the Islands lack virtually all the physical attributes
associated with centers of international activity elsewhere in
the world. Physically remote, they have never shared the diplo-
matic stage with such international centers as Washington,
London, Paris, and Tokyo, nor experienced the degree of eco-
nomic activity characteristic of such entrepôts as New York,
Rotterdam, and Singapore. Similarly, their lack of abundant
population and vital natural resources has always denied them
a sustained position of fundamental importance in global stra-
tegic considerations.1 Indeed, the only substantial argument
that can be made on behalf of a physical explanation for the
internationalist tradition seems to be that island soci-
eties—particularly if they are at once cultural crossroads and
dependent upon outside resources for much of their
livelihood—tend to be more sensitive toward international
issues than continental societies, and even this explanation is
as much the consequence of imagination as of geography. In
sum, physical—or “material,” to use the more proper
term—explanations of this tradition are less than convincing.
Such traditions do not, however, have to be explained solely
in terms of existing economic, political, and geographic forces.
As one scholar put it, they sometimes spring from “the analogy-
perceiving, metaphor making, mythopoeic power of the human
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mind….”2 Once created, they assume a life of their own that is
not dependent, at least in any precise or direct fashion, upon
surrounding material realities. Allowing for the ever-present ex-
ception, such ideas reflect the more basic values that people
in a given society live by and for, and that hold the society
together, sustaining its existence, satisfying its needs, and
enhancing its growth. They are, thus, social myths—value-im-
pregnated beliefs and notions—that depict the dominant
thought forms of that society and thereby influence its collective
perception of external reality. As such, they are the generative
force underlying virtually all forms of that society’s high cul-
tural expression and popular thought.3
It appears that ideas of precisely this nature were basic to
the rise of the Hawaiian internationalist movement during the
nineteenth century. More specifically, recent research suggests
that the original governing elite, a select group of missionaries
and businessmen largely from New England that dominated
the Hawaiian monarchy during most of the nineteenth century
and took direct control of the Islands at the turn of the twen-
tieth century, came to view Hawaii as a physio-social paradise
that, because of its superior character, was destined both to
assume a leadership role in Pacific Basin affairs and to serve as
a model for multicultural societies elsewhere around the world.
Elevated to mythic status over the years, this belief led the elite
to sponsor an immense and continuing variety of internationally
oriented activities in an effort to transform theory into practice.
In the process, such a persuasive rationale for international ac-
tivism was established that the people of Hawaii have come to
accept it as simply another part of Island cultural life. Myth,
thus, led to action.
As is frequently the case with interpretations inspired by
social myth, this view of the Hawaiian experience often clashes
with the actual historical record, in the process glossing over
a host of events and developments that are considerably more
hellish than paradisal. Beginning in the early years of the nine-
teenth century, for example, native Hawaiians watched with
growing distress as a white-dominated government deprived
them of much of their land and most of their traditional culture.
Labor disputes throughout the first half of the twentieth century
produced intense antagonism between the white sector of the
community and the Japanese and Filipino sectors. A
government-led effort to control foreign language schools
during the 1920s convinced many Japanese that they would
never achieve equal treatment so long as the white estab-
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lishment remained in power.4 The sensational Massie rape and
murder case during the 1930s generated intense racial hostility
that eventually came to involve all segments of the community.
The list goes on, but the point is clear. There is a striking con-
trast between the elite’s mythic perception of the Island ex-
perience and the actual record which raises some perplexing
questions about the very foundations of local internationalism.
Significantly, these questions were seldom raised in
practice. In fact, successive generations of internationalist
leaders studiously avoided them. While this is perhaps pre-
dictable in earlier instances where the leaders had a vested in-
terest in maintaining the status quo, it does not seem likely that
the new, multiethnic establishment that came to power during a
post-World War II wave of political reform would elect to follow
a similar course. Motivated in large part by this very contrast
between rhetoric and the record, this group had every reason
to reject internationalism and the internationalist movement
as simply another of the old elite’s defeated and discredited
policies. Yet, it did not. As is evident in the foregoing remarks
of Burns, the key figure in the postwar reform movement, the
new leaders embraced internationalism with all the fervor of
their predecessors. This illustrates both the staying power and
persuasiveness of paradisal imagery in local thought and, more
generally, the fact that reality can indeed be as much a matter
of imagination as of material circumstances.
NINETEENTH CENTURY ISLAND IMAGES
Illustrations of the origin and development of the paradisal
myth abound. Soon after the first Western explorers touched
Hawaii late in the eighteenth century, laudatory accounts of the
Islands began to appear. Although they produced only a limited
commentary themselves, the original observers were followed
by a host of others who generated a seemingly endless stream
of enthusiastic statements on the Islands. Celebrating first the
richness of the landscape and later the superiority of the so-
ciety, they employed virtually every medium available and, as
a consequence, influenced an immense number and variety of
people around the world as well as in Hawaii.
During the nineteenth century, favorable characterizations
of the Islands dealt primarily with aspects of the physical land-
scape. In this respect, the observations of James Jackson Jarves,
a journalist, historian, and novelist prominent in Hawaii before
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the middle of the century, are representative. In a descriptive
account of the Islands published in 1843, he termed them the
“garden-spots of the earth” and commented at length on their
beautiful flora, brilliant coral reefs, abundant fruits, and de-
lightful people.5 In all, he concluded, the Islands are “like giant
guardians of the Ocean. They break at once upon the voyager
with a suddenness and a grandeur that excites his surprise
and admiration. Providence seems just so to have placed them,
that they shall serve as a great ocean hotel—an oasis in the
boundless waste of waters—a spot where men of all races can
meet on neutral and hospitable ground, and there raise their
anthem of praise for deliverance from the dangers of the
treacherous deep, and petition for protection for the future.”6
Similar observations are found in the works of many trav-
elers who visited Hawaii during the middle years of the nine-
teenth century and returned to Europe and America to record
their impressions of the then little-known land, Isabella Bird
[Bishop], an observant Englishwoman who spent some time in
the Islands during the 1870s, is one who wrote such a work.
Calling Hawaii the “Summer Isles of Eden,” she filled her
journal with evocative descriptions of crescent bays, black lava
islets, golden sand beaches, musical streams, waving palms
towering above lush greenery, boundless supplies of fresh fruit,
and soaring mountain peaks.7 No doubt as intended, the reader
comes away feeling that the Islands must indeed be an Eden.
A few years later, Charles Warren Stoddard, an otherwise
respected writer of the era, took this genre to its logical if
rather trite conclusion. In a book sponsored by a steamship
company then serving Hawaii, he reduced the inspired descrip-
tions of Jarves, Bishop, and others to commercial slogans.
Larded with references to “the Paradise of the Pacific,” “the
gems of the Pacific,” and “the most romantic island Kingdom in
the world … where summer is fragrant and perpetual,” his work
set the pattern for modern tourist advertising.8 Not content
with slogans alone, he introduced his chapters with a style of
saccharine poetry that likewise found its way into subsequent
descriptions of the Islands. One example is sufficient:
O Waikiki! O scene of peace!
O home of beauty and of dreams!
No haven in the Isles of Greece
Can cord the harp to sweeter themes;
For houris haunt the broad lanais,
Elusive Destiny
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While scented zephyrs cool the lea,
And, looking down from sunset skies,
The angels smile on Waikiki.9
Even Mark Twain, inclined as he may have been to look on
the grimy rather than the glorious side, found Hawaii something
of an Eden. Although he made little reference to this theme
in the items he wrote while residing in the Islands during the
1860s, his subsequent works contain a number of noteworthy
passages. Best known is his widely quoted description of Hawaii
as “the loveliest fleet of islands that lies anchored in any ocean,”
but there are others. In 1884, for example, he began a novel
on Hawaii that opened with a lengthy characterization of the
Islands as “a calm and beautiful haven where rest and peace
awaited those battered by the vagaries of life elsewhere.”10
Finding even this description too mild, he subsequently told a
New York audience that the Islands are a place “where life is
one long slumberless Sabbath, the climate one long delicious
summer day, and the good that die experience no change, for
they but fall asleep in one heaven and wake up in another.”11
Travelers and writers were not the only ones to find nine-
teenth century Hawaii an enchanting land. The early mission-
aries, despite a tendency to see sin and abomination in every
corner, acknowledged the beauty of the landscape. Even Hiram
Bingham, perhaps the most rigid of all of these frequently in-
flexible puritans, was moved to note in his memoirs that some
found at least portions of the Islands to be “like the delights of
an Eden.”12 However, more in keeping with his general view of
Hawaii, he went on to note that “East of Eden” would perhaps
be a more apt description.13
While undoubtedly less influenced by the Edenic theme than
Westerners, native Hawaiians of this period were nonetheless
aware of the special physical attributes of their homeland. This
feeling is evident in the content of certain traditional chants
and, even more so, nineteenth century poetry. A poem from the
1830s entitled “Beautiful Land of Hawaii” illustrates:
You are pleasant toward strangers;
You are kind and loving,
Your nights have no rain, it is calm also,
A safe refuge art thou for ships;
You give them rest in their troubles.
Hawaii has gained a victory, yet only an island,
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“Danse des Femmes dans les Isles Sandwich.” Lithograph by Louis
Choris. Honolulu Academy of Arts collection and reproduction
Bare above, nothing growing,
Jehovah caused things to grow,
He produced the growing plants.
Beautiful and lovely are the isles,
He distributes benefits;
The soil is rich;
Every plant is growing well,
The taro, the potato, the yam,
Whereby hunger is appeased.
The water-melon and the cane are good,
They are desirable products;
The cotton is good,
It brings riches to men,
Hope for Hawaii’s future.
Have a mind to go there,
The people are kind, not angry,
It is finished to crumbling.14
The same sentiment is found in more recent poetry. In some in-
stances the point is made by favorably contrasting Hawaii with
lands elsewhere, and on other occasions it is made more di-
Elusive Destiny
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rectly.15 A poem by Princess Likelike extolling the beauty of
Aina-hau, her famed Waikiki residence, is representative of the
latter instance:
So beautiful is my home
Aina-Hau in a paradise
Swaying leaves of coconuts
Verdant beauty and fragrant flowers
My home, my home paradise.16
Art was as important as literature in the creation of a par-
adisal interpretation of the Islands. Among the best early ex-
amples in this respect is a series of watercolors and sketches
by Louis Choris, a draftsman with the Russian Kotzebue expe-
dition which stopped in Hawaii in 1816 and again in 1817. His
works depict an enchanting tropical land peopled by handsome,
noble beings.17 In the years following, a succession of artists
visited Hawaii and recorded their similarly enthusiastic impres-
sions. Among the more prominent were Robert Dampier, who
was aboard H.M.S. Blonde when it returned the bodies of Li-
holiho (Kamehameha II) and Kamamalu in 1825 following their
deaths in England; Charles Furneaux and Jules Tavernier, who
painted landscape scenes in the Islands during the 1880s; and
Joseph Strong, Robert Louis Stevenson’s son-in-law who came
to Honolulu in 1882 with a commission to do a painting for the
Spreckels Sugar Company and stayed on, alternately painting
and drinking, until the end of the decade when he accompanied
Stevenson to Samoa.18
While most of the favorable nineteenth century commen-
taries on Hawaii concern only the physical characteristics of the
Islands, the first glimmerings of a similarly positive social char-
acterization did make their appearance. For instance, Albertine
Loomis notes in her story of the early years of the Protestant
missionary effort in Hawaii that this group made at least some
effort to establish the concept of a classless, multiethnic broth-
erhood among whites and Hawaiians.19 Her reconstruction of
the first sermon preached in Hawaii has the minister telling
his listeners that it is “the command of the one true Akua
[god] that they live together—brown and white, kings, chiefs
and commoners, whether from the windward islands or the
leeward—loving one another like brothers.”20 For a variety of
reasons, not in the least the doubts of many of the missionaries
themselves, this effort was not especially successful, but it did
at least help introduce the notion into Island life.
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“View Near Honolulu, Oahu.” Aquatint by Robert Dampier. Honolulu
Academy of Arts collection and reproduction
Richard Henry Dana, author of Two Years Before the Mast,
was impressed with what he took to be the observably superior
character of Hawaiian people. Discussing some Hawaiian
sailors he had known on the West Coast during the 1840s, he
remarked that he would have entrusted his life and fortune to
Hawaiian hands and, had he asked a favor of them, would “have
expected to have seen it done before my own countrymen had
got half through counting the cost.”21
Still others were impressed by Hawaiian society during
these years, finding it gentle and simple and, hence, a welcome
contrast to life in the more dynamic Western nations. A case in
point is Charles Nordhoff who spent some time in the Islands
during the 1870s and later wrote of his experiences. In the
course of his remarks, he observed that he did “not know …
where else in the world you would find so kindly, so gracefully
hospitable, and, at the same time, so simple and enjoyable a so-
ciety as that of Honolulu.”22
Lunalilo, in his first address to the Hawaiian legislature fol-
lowing his election to the throne in 1873, stated his belief that
Island society was not only pleasant but superior. “This nation,”
Elusive Destiny
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“Hawaiian Landscape.” Pastel by Jules Tavernier. Hon-
olulu Academy of Arts collection and reproduction
The Summer Isles of Eden
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“Honolulu 1886.” Oil by Joseph Strong. Hawaii State Archives col-
lection and reproduction
he said, “presents the most interesting example in history of
the cordial co-operation of the native and foreign races in the
administration of its government, and most happily, too, in all
the relations in life there exists a feeling which every good man
will strive to promote.”23 His successor, Kalakaua, expressed
similar feelings in poetic form when he wrote “The Pearl” in
1881 following his return from a trip around the world. After
pondering the various advantages enjoyed by his fellow mon-
archs, he argued that Hawaii, while perhaps not a major force
in global politics, was nonetheless a nation and a society to be
admired. His rationale lies in the concluding lines:
Yet one thought came to me of which I may boast,
that of all the beauties locked within the embrace of these
shores,
one is a jewel more precious than any owned by my fellow mon-
archs.
I have nothing in my Kingdom to dread.
I mingle with my people without fear.
My safety is no concern, I require no bodyguards.
Mine is the boast that a pearl of great price has fallen to me
from above.
Mine is the loyalty of my people.24
Elusive Destiny
15
In Kalakaua’s mind, this was far more than simply idle musing.
As discussed later, much of his foreign policy derived from the
the perception of Hawaii’s place in the world implicit in these
lines.
TWENTIETH CENTURY ISLAND IMAGES
The tendency to find unique and often superior characteristics
in the social makeup of Hawaii increased with time and by the
early decades of the twentieth century had become the principal
theme in acclamatory commentary.25 Local audiences were time
and again reminded of the special qualities of Island society
by such figures as newspaperman, and later governor, Wallace
Rider Farrington, and an irrepressible publicist and organizer
named Alexander Hume Ford.26 Through their efforts, others of
national and international stature discovered the theme. Among
the first to do so was Jack London. While visiting the Islands
shortly after the turn of the century, he became intrigued with
the perception of Hawaii as a synthesis of Asian and Western
cultures and devoted considerable time to speaking on behalf
of Ford’s efforts to promote transcultural understanding
throughout the Pacific.27 Perhaps because of his white su-
premacist views, London never commented on this aspect of
Hawaii in his stories, but he was interested enough in it to lend
his time and support to Ford’s endeavors.28 Ford later acknowl-
edged this with the slightly exaggerated observation that it
was London and others “who first got together and talked of a
Pan-Pacific Movement, and for ten years [now] each of us has
worked heart and soul toward its attainment. Jack London was
one of its sponsors, and to the end one of our co-workers.”29
Somerset Maugham was likewise intrigued by Island society.
Following a visit during World War I, he wrote a number of
short stories which spoke of Hawaii as “the meeting place of
East and West.” He found the juxtaposition of old and new cul-
tures “singularly intriguing,” and the mix of people, with their
different languages, thoughts, religions, and values, possessing
an “extraordinary vitality.”30 While he was apparently as much
amused as impressed by this, his portrayal of the Islands was
nonetheless complimentary and, more to the point, read by au-
diences the world over.
London’s and especially Maugham’s acclamatory
characterizations of Hawaiian society attracted the attention
of still others, and by the end of the 1930s a goodly number
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of writers had paused in the Islands long enough to gather
material for their own increasingly enthusiastic commentaries.
Indeed, as the following selection from one such work illus-
trates, the rhetoric they employed was as laudatory as any
ever associated with descriptions of the physical landscape.
“Here,” the author declared, “are mingling the streams from
along the four skyroads known to the ancient Polynesian nav-
igators. Here the peoples of the six continents and the many
islands blend their bloods, bringing true both prophecies: that
of the overwhelming flood [into the Islands] and that of the re-
plenishment [through intermarriage]. And the spirit of Kameha-
meha, looking upon them from the Polynesian spirit-world, will
hail them as the golden race, the new people.”31 True or not,
in terms of literary imagery Hawaii had become a social as well
as physical paradise. While later writers—in particular James A.
Michener—would develop this characterization more fully in the
years after World War II, it is writers like Maugham from the
earlier period who must be credited with initiating it.
In the meantime, local writers, artists, religious leaders,
educators, publicists, politicians, and even architects reacted
enthusiastically to the growing acceptance of this characteri-
zation and redoubled their own efforts to reinforce it. Maui-
born novelist Armine von Tempski’s works are a case in point.
Opening her autobiography with the observation that “attaining
Paradise in the hereafter does not concern me greatly. I was
born in Paradise,” she wrote page after page on the aloha spirit,
love, the blending of races, ethnic harmony, and the general
joy for life that she found in Hawaii.32 Island people, she con-
cluded, simply obeyed the commandment to love one another
and thereby created their own paradise.33
Poets joined in hailing Island society. Saccharine as they
may be, the many poems by Don Blanding—Hawaii’s best-
known popular poet—suggest that Island life is somehow more
satisfactory.34 The same is true of many serious poets.
Genevieve Taggard, one of the most critically acclaimed poets
from Hawaii, recalled the happy society of her childhood days
in a work entitled “The Luau”:
Now I am back again. I can touch the children:
My human race, in whom was a human dwelling,
Whose names are all the races—of one skin.
For so our games ran tacit, without blur.
What brings me back with giant steps to them?
Elusive Destiny
17
What was the feast that woke this fabulous thirst?
What was the summer fruit we found and ate
Boldly, with the children of Adam?35
Still other poets addressed the same theme. For example,
Bess Heath Olmstead’s “The Flowery Isles” speaks of East and
West meeting in a favored land and concludes:
And the old Pacific slyly smiles
When the great ships reach the shore,
For she sees in the distance, greater good
To the human race, and brotherhood
Close by, by an open door!36
Throughout the twentieth century, a host of popular song-
writers have likewise lauded Hawaii. In most instances,
however, they have been content to address simply the physical
attributes of the Islands. Charles E. King, a prolific and much-
loved lyricist who wrote during the early decades of the twen-
tieth century, is in large part responsible for establishing this
trend with such works as “Song of the Islands” and “My Dear
Hawaii.” The former deals simply with beauty, describing the Is-
lands in terms of golden sunlight, balmy air, sparkling rainbows,
and azure seas.37 The latter utilizes much of the same termi-
nology but concludes that these qualities constitute nothing
less than a paradise.38 Predictably, this theme found acceptance
beyond the realm of popular music and is now evident in the
lyrics of even various alma maters.39
As was earlier the case among novelists, there has been an
inclination among songwriters during recent years to shift at-
tention from the land to the people. In this respect, the many
lyrics of Kui Lee are perhaps most noteworthy, and among his
works “My Hawaii,” a powerful if little-known celebration of the
Islands, is probably the best example:
If someday your wand’ring soul bids you South where trade-
winds blow,
Listen to your heart, my friends, Once it lied but not again.
Fill the sails, fly on to my Hawaii nei.
There’s a golden child of earth at play, Where the rainbow
stripped his hate away,
Tis the dawn of a new-born day, From the rugged canyons of
Waimea,
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To the slopes of mighty Mauna Kea. You can climb the cliffs of
the Koolaus and gaze at the endless sea.
And there in the veil of morning mist, That miracle unwinds
’fore thee.
See the isle in the morning sun, Molokai we’re Southeast
bound, and the cliffs that shore Lanai, From blue depths
reach for the sky, Travel on and on and there ’neath cloud
rimmed skies, Maui looms before my homesick eyes,
There’s Lahaina where in my love lies, All of this is par-
adise.40
Artistic comments on twentieth century Hawaii have fol-
lowed a similar course. For the most part restricted to
paintings, they retained a nineteenth century concern for the
landscape during the earlier years of the century and then
began to probe the social realm. The many landscapes and
scenic vistas of David Howard Hitchcock, the first local-born
painter of note, are representative of the earlier period. As is
the case with nineteenth century works, they depict the physical
beauty of the Islands. During the 1930s this began to change,
particularly with the work of Madge Tennent. Employing bold
strokes and lively colors, she celebrated the goodness and joie
de vivre of native Hawaiians. Subsequently, other artists ap-
peared sounding similar themes, in the process declaring the
uniqueness of Island society. Jean Chariot is perhaps the best
known of these artists, although others such as Juliette May
Fraser, John Kelly, and John Thomas are of considerable impor-
tance.41
While many individuals working in a variety of media have
contributed to the growing enthusiasm for Hawaiian society, it
is unlikely that any have been so influential as the producers
of motion pictures and television shows. From the standpoint
of physical imagery, films set in the Islands have consistently
emphasized the beauty of the land. All the major motion pic-
tures—from pop star spectaculars like Blue Hawaii to serious
dramas such as From Here to Eternity—and all the noteworthy
television series—principally “Hawaiian Eye” and “Hawaii
5-0”—dealing with Hawaii have unfailingly utilized towering
peaks, tranquil lagoons, lush foliage, and breathtaking vistas as
backdrops. As a consequence, millions upon millions of viewers
throughout the world have been shown in the most literal sense
that the Islands are indeed an Eden. While other media have
projected the same message, none has been able to reach such
vast audiences with such graphic force.
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“Improvision on an Imagined Early Hawaiian Photograph.”
Charcoal and pastel by Madge Tennent. Honolulu Accdemy of
Arts collection and reproduction
The contribution of these productions to the characteri-
zation of the Islands as a social paradise is somewhat less
obvious. Of the numerous major motion pictures concerning
Hawaii, only Diamond Head made a serious effort to discuss
contemporary social issues. Although its message does emerge
in a positive fashion (racial bigotry is rejected and transcultural
understanding is advocated), it was not well received and
cannot be cited as particularly influential. It is likely that Blue
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“Relation of Man and Nature in Old Hawaii.” Fresco by John Charlot.
University of Hawaii photo
Hawaii, a film that was never intended as serious commentary
but one that attracted huge audiences because of its star—Elvis
Presley—and its evocative title, had a greater impact upon
popular impressions of the Islands than any other film ever
made. In a sense, this is regrettable, as its portrayal of Hawaiian
society, while blandly complimentary, is a blurred amalgam of
Hawaiian, Samoan, and Tahitian culture overlaid with borrowed
Southern notions of hospitality, aristocracy, leisure, and race.42
Despite these shortcomings, however, it does project an essen-
tially paradisal interpretation and stands, thus, as a major factor
in the popularization of this view of the Islands.
Television productions dealing with Hawaii have reached
even larger audiences than motion picture productions and are,
thus, of even greater significance as creators of popular impres-
sions. ABC’s “Hawaiian Eye” series which ran during the late
1950s and early 1960s, and CBS’s “Hawaii 5–0” series which
began during the 1968–1969 season are most important in this
respect. The former attracted a respectable if not massive au-
dience for several years, and the latter—now the third longest-
running show in American television history—has consistently
been one of the more popular shows in the nation.43 In addition,
it is shown on numerous foreign television networks and has ac-
quired immense popularity abroad.
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Detail of “Makahiki Ho‘okupu.” Fresco by Juliette May Fraser. Con-
temporary Arts Center of Hawaii photo
The first impression a viewer is likely to gain from these
productions is that Hawaii is an exceedingly beautiful place.
There is, however, more. Providing one ignores the implication
that crime is the principal feature of life in the Islands (the
“Hawaiian Eye” series was based on the exploits of several
private detectives and “Hawaii 5–0” revolves about the activ-
ities of an imaginary state police force), both suggest rather
clearly that Hawaiian society is uniquely multiethnic, harmo-
nious, and tolerant. Instructions in “Hawaiian Eye” scripts, for
instance, frequently and consciously emphasized the impor-
tance of showing “all races and nationalities” as well as spec-
tacular scenery.44 The same has been true of “Hawaii 5–0”
productions, and on several occasions episodes have dealt di-
rectly with transcultural understanding and tolerance.45 Hence,
while not always readily apparent, the paradisal theme has been
as much a part of television’s message as that of other media.
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“Boy with Goldfish, No. 3 for Sight.” Oil by John
Thomas, 1977. State Foundation on Culture and the
Arts collection and reproduction
If the message in motion pictures and television series has
on occasion been unclear, there is another dimension of the
film medium where clarity has not been a problem. This is tele-
vision advertising. Commercial messages, prepared largely for
local consumption, have taken the notion of Hawaii’s special
characteristics to extremes. Acclamatory scenarios and slogans
abound, offering viewers such fare as an ethnically mixed group
walking arm-in-arm along a spectacular mountain ridge singing
a jingle that relates cultural harmony to the services offered by
a local airline, and a series of vignettes on the desirability of
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life in various towns and districts throughout the Islands that
always concludes with the comment, “We [the sponsoring bank]
wouldn’t want to be the bank of anywhere else in the world.”46
In short, television commercials constantly portray Hawaii’s
physical and social environment as superior to whatever may
exist elsewhere, and no viewer can escape the message that he
or she is living in a worldly paradise.47
Much the same can be said of advertising directed at po-
tential tourists. Dating from the first organized efforts to
promote tourism late in the nineteenth century, the industry
has consistently advertised the Islands as a beautiful, tranquil,
and unique Eden that no traveler can afford to miss. While
this theme has remained constant over the years, the style and
format have changed considerably. In the beginning, advertis-
ers were inclined to make verbose and exaggerated claims to
attract attention to Hawaii. Two examples, both scenic pho-
tographs with captions, illustrate. The first, a picture of a
railway running through a palm grove fronting the ocean,
states, “Only the Riviera in Italy and the famous Amalfi Drive
can compare with the wonderful ride over the Hamakua Ex-
tension Line of the Hilo Railway on the Island of Hawaii. It is
nothing short of marvelous.”48 The second, a very ordinary view
of workers harvesting sugar, observes that Hawaii possesses
“the Twelve Scenic Wonders of the World: The largest active
volcano, the largest quiescent crater, the highest Island peak,
the most gorgeous fish, the only expert surf-riders, the most
varied and marvelous canyons, [the] most beautiful waterfalls,
moonlight rainbows, Pa’u riders, the most extensive pineapple
fields and the richest sugar cane. Come to Hawaii!”49
During the 1920s and 1930s, this approach gave way to a
more modern style. The long descriptions were replaced with
catchy slogans such as “tropic climes,” “enchanting isles,” and
“aloha spirit,” and the technique of enticing prominent editors
and travel writers to Hawaii in order to obtain editorial publicity
was refined. Consequently, more than a few adulatory articles
appeared in The Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s, Vogue, The New
Yorker, and other magazines of similar quality.50 In addition,
radio came into use during this period as still another means
of encouraging tourism. In 1935, the famed “Hawaii Calls”
program was initiated and over the following years reached mil-
lions of listeners worldwide with a well-honed invitation to visit
the Hawaiian paradise.51
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Following World War II, the industry began to inject a
limited amount of social commentary into its advertisements.
While the earlier emphasis on physical beauty was maintained,
there was increasing reference to the Islands’ various social
attributes. A recent series of Hawaii Visitors Bureau adver-
tisements represents this tendency. Under the unifying slogan
“Hawaii: More than a Pretty Place,” a number of different,
fetchingly illustrated advertisements discuss such topics as cul-
tural diversity, ethnic festivals, churches and religions, and local
customs.52 The attractive pictures and enthusiastic commentary
clearly suggest that the Islands are an oasis of harmony and joy
as well as beauty.
As noted previously, some of the original contributions to
a positive characterization of the Islands came from the early
Christian missionaries. With certain noteworthy exceptions, the
social message from Island pulpits followed this theme in the
years thereafter, and religious leaders became as important
as those from other sectors in promoting an acclamatory view
of local society. Albert W. Palmer, a well-known minister of
the missionary-founded Central Union Church, summarized this
perspective in a poem entitled “Fair Hawaii,” which he wrote
during the 1920s as part of a book on Hawaiian race relations:
Fair Hawaii, we thy children
Our aloha pledge to thee,
New-found brothers from all races
Gathered here in unity.
O thou God of peace and justice,
Help us in true love to dwell
Make our thoughts and deeds fraternal
Earth’s great brotherhood foretell.53
For Palmer, Hawaii was already a model Christian brotherhood
and the rest of the world would profit by following its example.
A synthesis of these sentiments with the Hawaiian concept
of “aloha” often appears in the sermons and statements of
Abraham Akaka, the best known contemporary religious leader
in Hawaii. “Aloha,” as he put it in his “statehood sermon” in
1959, “is the power of God seeking to unite what is separated
in the world—the power that unites heart with heart, soul with
soul, life with life, culture with culture, race with race, nation
with nation. Thus when a people … live in the spirit of Aloha,
they live in the spirit of God….”54 He concluded with the propo-
sition that Hawaiian statehood would have—or at least should
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have—worldwide implications. “Today,” he argued, “one of the
deepest needs of mankind is the need to feel a sense of kinship
one with another. Truly all mankind belongs together, for from
the very beginning all mankind has been called into being, nour-
ished, watched over by the love of God who is aloha. The real
Golden Rule is aloha. This is the way of life we must affirm….
Thus may our becoming a state mean to our nation and world …
‘Fear not, for behold I bring you good tidings of great joy, which
shall be to all people.’”55
The influence of religion on the development of an enthusi-
astic view of Island society has long extended far beyond the
church proper. This is particularly true of the literature inspired
by various religious undertakings and the schools founded by
certain religious groups. Literary works such as Samuel B.
Harrison’s The White King, a fictionalized biography of the
famed medical missionary Gerrit Parmele Judd, have argued
that Hawaii, due in large part to the influence of Christian mis-
sionaries, has set an example for all the world with respect to
interracial understanding and brotherhood.56 Elementary and
secondary schools established by local religious groups have
encouraged similar perspectives. Mid-Pacific Institute, a con-
glomerate of several multiethnic schools founded during the
nineteenth century by missionary families, is perhaps the out-
standing example in this respect. As Helen Gay Pratt observed
in her history of the institution, “The more one ponders Mr.
[Francis Williams] Damon’s [the school’s principal founder] pas-
sionate expressions of his belief in the important part a Hon-
olulu school could play in the Far East and in promoting in-
ternational understanding, the more one realizes that he was
imaginatively devoted to an ideal that was in advance of his
time.”57 She also notes that Damon’s notions were later influ-
ential in the growth of international activism at the University
of Hawaii and concludes quite properly that Damon was one
of the first of many who believed it was the Islands’ destiny to
bring East and West together through educational innovation.58
So it is that multicultural education is yet another factor in the
mythic equation.
As Pratt suggests, the University of Hawaii has indeed
played an important role in the development of a complimentary
view of Island society. Beginning during the 1920s, the insti-
tution undertook an array of transcultural activities that even-
tually led to such specific achievements as the creation of the
East-West Philosophers’ Conference, the development of one of
the nation’s outstanding Asian studies programs, and the es-
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tablishment of important transcultural training programs for
the Peace Corps and the Agency for International Development.
Highlighted by the opening of the East-West Center in 1960,
these activities have contributed immensely to the assumption
that Hawaii is indeed a hybrid society embodying the best of
East and West.
This assumption has been reinforced over the years by
university-inspired research. To illustrate, David L. Crawford,
president of the school between 1927 and 1941 and an early ad-
vocate of the notion that Island society might serve as a model
for multicultural societies elsewhere, wrote that “Hawaii is a
real human laboratory. Experiments in race relations of world-
wide significance are in progress, not of less value because
they were not deliberately set up as experiments.”59 Andrew W.
Lind, a respected sociologist and something of a skeptic as re-
gards the model society argument, was nonetheless impressed
enough with the idea to observe that “Hawaii’s claim to the title
of ‘the racial melting pot of the Pacific’ is derived from the fact
that a new racially hybrid population is gradually emerging….
The cumulative effect of these mixed marriages seems likely to
create in Hawaii a distinct local type—a new race.”60 Ralph S.
Kuykendall and A. Grove Day, noted scholars who jointly au-
thored a general history of Hawaii in the early 1960s, placed
special emphasis upon this interpretation of Island society
through the use of such terms as “melting pot” and “Paradise
of the Pacific” to describe developments dating back as far as
the early years of the nineteenth century.61 Day, in a later book
of his own, was even more emphatic. “Trite but true it is,” he
wrote, “that Hawaii has become a Pacific melting pot, in which
folk of a dozen national origins have become intermingled in
a new amalgam. Here can be found an attitude of race toler-
ance unequaled anywhere else in the world. Hawaii,” he con-
tinued, “is a good example of heretosis, which can be defined
as hybrid vigor in human beings that brings out superior qual-
ities, mental as well as physical. Historically, human melting
pots have often been centers for exciting cultural changes.” The
point is, he argued in conclusion, that “Hawaii has a special
interest in everything that goes on in other parts of the vast
Pacific as well as in Asia, with which it has many personal
ties. The fiftieth state prides itself on being a ‘bridge’ between
the mainland United States and the Orient, the great stage on
which the main international drama of the twenty-first century
may be enacted.”62
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Perhaps social historian Lawrence Fuchs’ observations can
be read as an indication of the general acceptance of this theme
among academicians. Writing in Hawaii Pono, a superb study
of twentieth century Island life published in 1961, he opened
with the observation that “Hawaii is no longer an experiment in
race relations or colonial administration. In the Islands, peoples
of many races and cultures, largely only two or three gen-
erations from illiterate, peasant life, present the world’s best
example of dynamic social democracy.”63 Some five hundred
pages later, he concluded with the statement that the essence
of the Hawaiian experience is a promise to the nation and the
world “that peoples of different races and creeds can live to-
gether, enriching each other, in harmony and democracy.”64
This perception of the Hawaiian socio-cultural experience
became an article of faith in local thought during the middle
years of the twentieth century and thereafter has been evident
in all manner of expression. Promotional journals like the Par-
adise of the Pacific came to refer matter-of-factly to Hawaii
as a model for societies in the Pacific and elsewhere.65 News-
papers began to write editorials based on Farrington’s turn-of-
the-century theme and started carrying stories predicting the
Islands’ emergence as a world leader.66 Even their editorial car-
toons occasionally addressed the issue.67
Political leaders did likewise. While Burns’ previously cited
“State of the State” address is perhaps the most eloquent ex-
pression of this theme within the political arena, it is by no
means the first or only time he broached the subject. To illus-
trate, more than a decade earlier during testimony before a con-
gressional committee during the statehood debate, he argued
that
Hawaii’s people are thoroughly American. More than this, they
are American in an entirely unique way. Democracy, American
democracy, is practiced in Hawaii as it is practiced nowhere else
in the world. People of the most diverse racial strains and cul-
tural backgrounds and of all creeds live together harmoniously
and fruitfully, and in a way that brings out the best in each of
these strains and backgrounds and creeds, and so increases and
enriches the well-being of all the others…. The diverse makeup
of Hawaii’s people is a decided strength both in itself and as
an example and a guide for all peoples…. Hawaii is living proof
that peoples of all races, cultures and creeds can live together in
harmony and well-being.68
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Hawaii State Capitol.
Indeed, in the years following World War II politicians from
both parties have made it a point to include at least passing
reference to Hawaii’s destiny as a Pacific leader in their floor
speeches, public addresses, and talks at political rallies. It is no
accident, for example, that the statehood inaugural address by
William F. Quinn, a Republican and Hawaii’s first elected gov-
ernor, was built in large part around this theme. “The man of the
Pacific,” he declared, “Hawaii’s citizen, stands like Atlas astride
the ocean joining East and West. He is as Western and up-to-
date as the San Francisco Giants. And yet, … he understands
the culture and thinking of the East. Our importance as a cul-
tural link is heightened by our location. We sit at the hub of
the great circle of the Pacific—at the center of a wheel with
spokes connecting all the great nations on the mighty ocean.
Our destiny as the Pacific center has not yet been achieved.”69
In certain instances, even recent architecture has come to
reflect this perception. Far and away the most significant ex-
ample in this respect is Hawaii’s new capitol. Completed in
1969, it is the nation’s newest and most imaginative capitol
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structure. Rising out of a large reflecting pool, slender columns
bound a vast atrium and reach upward past several floors of
interior offices to the uppermost levels. There, fanning out
palmlike, they support the remaining two floors which extend
outward over the pool. Thus, the entire structure appears to
hang suspended over the pool and court. Completing the
structure, two massive half-cones housing the legislative
chambers flank the atrium on opposite sides.
Structurally impressive as it may be, the building is also
symbolically significant. Clearly it represents the Hawaiian
landscape. The pool, the court opening to the sky, the palmlike
columns, and the conical chambers symbolize the Islands’ vol-
canic origins in the sea, their distinctive flora, and their mild
climate. More subtly, these same features also symbolize
Hawaii’s cultural characteristics. Burns spoke of this in the
course of his 1968 “State of the State” address. “The open
sea, the open sky, the open doorway, open arms and open
hearts—these are the symbols of our Hawaiian heritage,” he
said. “In this great State Capitol, there are no doors at the
ground entrances which open toward the mountains and toward
the sea. There is no roof or dome to separate its vast inner court
from the heavens and from the same eternal stars which guided
the first voyagers to the primeval beauty of these shores. It is,”
he concluded, “by means of the striking architecture of this new
structure that Hawaii cries out to the nations of the Pacific and
of the world, this message: We are a free people … we are an
open society … we welcome all visitors to our Island home.”70
As descriptive of the origins and development of the par-
adisal myth in Hawaii as the preceding illustrations may be,
none touches the essence of this perception quite so forcefully
as James A. Michener’s epic novel, Hawaii. Laden with refer-
ences to Hawaii’s Edenic landscape and model society, the book
states the case with persuasive eloquence. The opening chapter
clearly suggests that the Islands began as a physical paradise
and would with time become a social paradise. From the out-
set, Michener declared, Hawaii was “unique, alone, apart, … an
authentic natural paradise where each growing thing had its
opportunity to develop in its own unique way, according to the
dictates and limitations of its own abilities. There was then,” he
continued, “as there is now, no place on earth that even began
to compete with these islands in their capacity to encourage
natural life to develop freely and radically up to its own best po-
tential.71 Taking this perspective to its logical end, he concluded
many pages later that “in Hawaii a new type of man was being
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developed. He was a man influenced by both the west and the
east, a man at home in either the business councils of New York
or the philosophical retreats of Kyoto, a man wholly modern and
American yet in tune with the ancient and the Oriental. The
name they invented for him was the Golden Man … [and he is
the] bright, hopeful man of the future … [the] unique contri-
bution of Hawaii to the rest of the world, … a product of the
mind … a way of thought….”72 A more forceful representation
of the paradisal myth is difficult to imagine. Truly, Michener’s
novel speaks for all the proponents of this view of Hawaii and
the Hawaiian experience.
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III
Colossus of the Pacific
INTERNATIONALISM AT THE OUTSET
There are tantalizing hints that the first glimmerings of inter-
nationalist activism in Hawaii came shortly after the Islands
were first unified early in the nineteenth century. Although the
supporting evidence is nebulous, there is some indication that
Kamehameha I, the architect of Hawaiian unification and the
first king of the new nation, dreamed of extending his realm
beyond Hawaii to other less advanced island groups of Poly-
nesia. It is said that he once considered using a fleet of war
canoes to invade and conquer Tahiti as the first step in creating
a Polynesian empire but abandoned these plans in favor of a
more peaceful approach involving arranged royal marriages be-
tween several of his offspring and children of Tahiti’s Pomare
II.1 It is also said that he hoped to extend the Islands’ sphere
of influence by gaining control over the profitable sandalwood
trade of the era. Evidence for this contention lies in a set of
orders he gave to the captain of the Kaahumanu in 1817 di-
recting him to chart the location of sandalwood islands in the
Pacific while on a voyage to China.2 Substantive or otherwise,
these claims have been cited by later internationalists as prece-
dents for their own activities and are thus of some consequence
in the subsequent development of international activity in the
Islands.
A related but better documented venture began late in 1829
during the reign of Kamehameha III when Boki, then governor
of the island of Oahu, sailed with the Kamehameha and the
Becket for the New Hebrides, where abundant supplies of san-
dalwood had been reported. This expedition is the source of
several mysteries. Both ships are known to have arrived safely
at the island of Rotuma (north of Fiji) on the western leg of the
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journey. After departing Rotuma, the Kamehameha with Boki
aboard simply disappeared and was never heard from again.
After a horrifying journey that brought disease, starvation, and
death to most of the crew, the Becket completed its circuit and
returned to Honolulu in 1830, but without a clue as to the dis-
appearance of the Kamehameha. To this day, there is no satis-
factory explanation of the fate of Boki, his ship, or his crew.3
There is an even more fascinating question with respect to
the expedition’s actual purpose. It may be, as is generally as-
sumed, that Boki, deeply in debt and unhappy over his political
status, saw the undertaking as simply an opportunity to im-
prove his financial lot while temporarily escaping his political
problems. At the same time, it has also been suggested that his
goal was considerably more ambitious. Prior to the expedition’s
departure, he and the king signed a document which appears
to be a set of formal instructions dealing, among other things,
with the annexation of “certain Islands in the South Seas.”4 This
suggests, of course, that the expedition was undertaken for al-
together different purposes, although there is not sufficient ev-
idence to convincingly prove the point. Whatever the proper
explanation, Boki’s expedition came to play a role in Hawaiian
internationalism much like Kamehameha I’s alleged plans for
empire. In the minds of later internationalists, it was further
precedent for action.5 Hence, shadowy as these episodes are
from traditional historical perspectives, they are nonetheless
factors in the origin and development of the Hawaiian interna-
tionalist tradition.
ROOTS OF THE MOVEMENT
Hawaii’s first thoroughly documented venture into the interna-
tionalist realm came during the 1850s. On December 20, 1851,
an ambitious Australian newspaper reporter named Charles St.
Julian, a man at once fascinated with Polynesia and anxious
to enhance his own status, addressed a note to the Hawaiian
government proposing that he be appointed its official rep-
resentative to the various independent Pacific island nations
and territories and that he be made responsible for promoting
Hawaiian political and economic leadership throughout the re-
gion in order to guarantee these nations and territories a “re-
spectable and respected” independence.6 As he later and more
succinctly put it, he wanted to help create a Polynesian con-
federation with Hawaii “as the guide[,] the guardian and the
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natural leader … occupying … a position not dissimilar from
that which is filled by Austria in connection with the small
German States.”7 St. Julian offered to serve without pay so long
as he was accorded a proper commission of office and the corre-
sponding authority. It should be noted, however, that he may
have overstated his concern for Hawaii’s role in Polynesian af-
fairs as his proposal came only after a similar one addressed to
Great Britain had been rejected.
The response to this proposal is interesting. Kamehameha
III, as would be the case with the remainder of the Kamehameha
line, was not anxious to expand the Islands’ sphere of influence,
and Foreign Minister Robert Crichton Wyllie, in discussions
with the king and the Privy Council, treated the proposal as
a minor affair requiring no prompt action. Other matters—in
particular the negotiation of a series of treaties with various
Western powers guaranteeing Hawaii’s independence—were
clearly of greater concern. Consequently, during 1852 and early
1853, Wyllie paid little attention to the proposal, merely noting
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its receipt in his annual report for 1852 with the observation
that it could “do no harm, whilst it promises to place the King’s
Government in possession of much valuable information, and
may open new channels of trade, of great benefit to these Is-
lands, and conducive to the civilization of others.”8
The proposal must have fascinated Wyllie more than his
written response indicates, however, because he kept it before
the Privy Council until it was approved during the summer of
1853 and St. Julian was commissioned, somewhat awkwardly,
as “His Majesty’s Commissioner, and Political, and Commercial
Agent to the Kings, Chiefs and Rulers of the Islands of the
Pacific Ocean, not under the protection or sovereignty of any
European Government.” Wyllie then proceeded to issue instruc-
tions to accompany the commission which indicate, despite his
earlier comments, a good deal of enthusiasm for the under-
taking. In addition to requesting physical and social data on
Polynesia, he in effect ordered St. Julian to undertake the estab-
lishment of Hawaii’s moral leadership throughout the area:
1. You will place a copy … of Your Commission … in the hands
of the King, or ruling Chiefs [in all the places you visit], taking
every pain to make known that King Kamehameha is a sovereign
of their own race, recognized as such by the Great Nations of
the World, in friendly relations with them, living in peace, wor-
shipping the only true God, who made Heaven and Earth and who
is the Common Father of all the races of Men that inhabit the
Earth; you will endeavor to explain the number and position of
these Islands; the hospitality with which He [Kamehameha] re-
ceives the ships and Commerce of all Nations, and the benefit that
from that policy accrues to Himself and His subjects.
2. You will assure such King or ruling Chiefs that King
Kamehameha III desires their welfare; and that he has sent you
among them as a friend, to assure them of His Majesty’s
friendship, to give them good advice, and to inform Him of every-
thing relating to their condition, that He may know if He can send
them anything that would be of use to them, or buy anything from
them that would be of use to His own Subjects.
3. You will state to such King or ruling Chiefs, that King
Kamehameha will receive in a friendly way any of them, or any
Deputies that they may send to His Islands—that He will show
them how He governs His people how He has taught them the
knowledge and arts of white men—how white men live among His
native subjects, under His authority as friends and brethren—how
they worship one God, obey the same laws, receive the same
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justice and enjoy equal protection, without fighting with each
other or stealing from each other, so that such Deputies may see
things with their own eyes, and afterwards go back among their
own people, and show to them the advantage of living and acting
in the same manner.9
Viewed in the light of subsequent international develop-
ments, certain aspects of these instructions take on consid-
erable importance. In general, they demonstrate that Wyllie,
regardless of any doubts on the part of Kamehameha III, was in
fact excited about the possibilities of St. Julian’s proposal and
took it upon himself to instruct the Australian to pursue a rela-
tively vigorous course. While it doubtless went unrecognized at
the time, these instructions lent formal sanction to unconven-
tional international activism and thus established a distinct and
firm precedent for related activities in years to come. It might
also be noted that this consequential development came as the
result of what was essentially an act of insubordination.
That Wyllie was willing to act with such indepen-
dence—some would say arrogance—comes as no surprise. A
native of Scotland who found a haven in Hawaii and readily
agreed to become a Hawaiian citizen when offered the post
of foreign minister in 1845, he was guided by an unwavering
faith in the correctness of his own Anglican perceptions and
an equally fervent dedication to protecting and enhancing the
status of his adopted homeland and sovereign. He was not, in
other words, a man who would permit doubts on the part of
anyone to scuttle programs that he believed would serve both
the designs of his god and the self-interest of his nation.
More specifically, Wyllie’s instructions to St. Julian illu-
minate a conflict of intent which in turn reveals a great deal
about the motives of both men. It is clear from the original
proposal that St. Julian was fundamentally interested in Pacific
Basin politics and the creation of a political institution within
the region that would increase the power of the independent
states and, not incidentally, enhance his own stature. In con-
trast, Wyllie appears in his instructions to be a person largely
concerned with establishing Hawaii as a model that other Pa-
cific island peoples could emulate in planning their own futures.
The difference between the aims of the two men is further
evident in their correspondence subsequent to the initial ex-
change of documents. For example, St. Julian’s first commu-
niqué after receiving his commission dealt exclusively with
problems relative to his rank and his reception by other
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diplomats stationed in Australia. He made no mention what-
soever of the more substantive aspects of his appointment.10 In
other correspondence over the years he did, of course, discuss
such issues, but his comments invariably centered on conven-
tional politics and opportunities for Hawaii to assume a more in-
fluential political position in the Pacific. An early letter to Wyllie
illustrates. “It is my conviction,” he wrote, “that, as the first and
greatest of the Polynesian states, the Kingdom of Hawaii is, in
its relationship with the states and tribes of the various arch-
ipelagos and Islands of the Pacific[,] to be classed as a ‘great
power’ in the most complete sense of the term.”11 Subsequently
he made the same point even more forcefully, observing that “I
shall be able, if God spares my life and health and if I retain the
confidence of His Majesty and yourself, to carry into practice
my theory (which I dare say you once thought exceedingly vi-
sionary) of a strong Polynesian Union with Hawaii at its head:
one sufficiently powerful to speak with a voice Imperial in the
councils of the world.”12 And so it went over the years.
Wyllie, on the other hand, was always more interested in
developing the Islands’ image than in pursuing St. Julian’s
various political schemes. He saw Hawaii as a good and
decent—and in all likelihood superior—nation representing the
civilizing potential of Christianity and ideally situated to
function as a model for traditional island cultures seeking to
advance their own development. His concern was for moral
rather than political leadership. As a contemporary once ob-
served, Wyllie “desired beyond all things that the Hawaiian is-
lands should be known. The publicity of their existence in the
world he looked upon as essential to their being and their in-
dependence; and he wished that they should stand fair and
justified with their great compeers. As to the nation itself, he
laboured for its wealth, development, and moral condition; for
universal justice and intellectual culture. If he did not actually
select the motto adopted in the national arms [The Life of the
Land Is Preserved in Righteousness], he at least was a thorough
believer in the sentiment it expresses.”13
Wyllie himself was not inclined to put such thoughts to
paper. His responses to St. Julian’s grand designs, the logical
place for him to expound, invariably took the form of precise in-
structions bereft of any stated philosophy or sentiment. There
are, nonetheless, sufficient examples of his thinking as regards
Hawaii and Hawaiian society to suggest that the preceding as-
sessment is correct. To cite one instance, shortly after he ar-
rived in the Islands in 1844, he wrote several articles for The
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Friend, a missionary-founded publication, that demonstrate his
favorable, if somewhat paternal, view of local society. “There
are,” he declared,
few towns of the same extent [as Honolulu] where a deep reli-
gious feeling more prevails…. Yet all this exists without any of
that gloom and ascetic severity which existed in the early days
of presbyterianism in Scotland and of puritanism in England and
Connecticut…. Another virtue eminently pervades the society of
Honolulu, and that is temperance. During [the] eight months that
I have been here, I have not seen one native intoxicated; and what
will excite surprise in Europe and America, I have not seen one
beggar!
Nor ought I to omit here a tribute of praise to the honesty
of the natives. It is very seldom indeed, that a case of theft is
heard of and then it is only of a very petty description. As for
robbery, assault or any other acts of violence, unprovoked by the
aggression of whites, I believe they are almost unknown in any of
the islands.14
None of Wyllie’s initial enthusiasm dimmed with the passage
of years. A toast he proposed on St. George’s Day in 1864,
one year before his death, illustrates. Answering the doubts of
some of his former countrymen about the wisdom of resettling
in Hawaii, he said, “The land we have come to, and in which
we live, is a good land [replete with numerous blessings]. It
is therefore clear, that we have come to a land, not only good
but, beautiful, a land where our own lives and property are
secure and well protected, and where we are governed by a
King, liberal, enlightened, and just….”15 It is reasonably clear,
then, that Wyllie felt Hawaii’s proper role lay in providing an
example of Christian civilization that others in the region might
profitably follow. He perceived Hawaii as a superior society with
an obligation to provide moral leadership in the Pacific and at-
tempted to act accordingly.16 In doing so, he established both
the precedent and the basic rationale for subsequent interna-
tional activism.
None of this had much effect upon St. Julian. Despite
Wyllie’s obvious desire to pursue a different course, the Aus-
tralian persistently engaged in activities designed to annex ter-
ritory in the Pacific for Hawaii, promote the formation of a Poly-
nesian confederation under Hawaiian leadership, gain recog-
nition for Hawaii’s “moral protectorate” over independent Pa-
cific islands, and enhance Hawaii’s reputation in Australia.17 He
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was, as he once told Wyllie, as confident of achieving these ends
as he was of the “Sun’s rising.”18 In the process, he went to
such lengths as appointing his own resident agents in particular
island groups, designing his own diplomatic uniform, and even
creating his own order of merit.19
While many of St. Julian’s undertakings were clearly friv-
olous and self-serving, others were at least potentially of some
consequence. Working through his resident agents during the
mid-1850s, he devoted considerable energy to the creation of
an arrangement whereby Tonga and Samoa, then independent
but increasingly threatened by various European powers, would
call upon Hawaii for advice and support in their effort to remain
free of foreign control. He proposed constitutions for both, at-
tempted to negotiate a treaty of “Friendship and Reciprocity”
between Tonga and Hawaii, tried to arrange a state visit for the
Tongan king to Hawaii, and endeavored to establish a Hawaiian
protectorate over then war-torn Samoa. However, in the face of
Hawaii’s decided lack of enthusiasm for such overtly political
undertakings (the proposed state visit was flatly rejected, for
example), he ceased his efforts during the latter part of the
decade.20
Needless to say, St. Julian was not happy with Hawaii’s re-
sponse to his efforts. He told Wyllie that “I have no right to
complain of my plans not having been adopted. If it is thought
better that Hawaii should remain as she is, than that her domain
should be doubled and her power and influence quadrupled,
I am bound to assume that it is wisely so decided. But I do
complain that my energies have been wasted. The complete
success which was within my reach for Hawaii, might have been
attained and followed up by another course and for another
purpose.”21 Wyllie, in keeping with his essentially nonpolitical
perspective, responded with the observation that Hawaii was
not necessarily opposed to these efforts but, lacking the re-
sources and the power to act effectively, simply could take “no
interest in the matter whatever, except a moral one.”22
Despite the futility of his efforts to join Hawaii with Tonga
and Samoa and thereby lay the foundation for a Polynesian con-
federation, St. Julian did succeed in convincing the Hawaiian
government to annex the Stewart Islands, a tiny atoll originally
known as the Stewart’s Islands lying some 2° north of San
Cristobal Island in the Solomons and composed of three prin-
cipal islets (Sikaiana, Faore, and Matuavi) with a population of
approximately one hundred people. While this little-known in-
cident eventually ended in failure, it involved the momentary
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acquisition of distant territory by Hawaii and is, thus, an inter-
esting if ultimately inconsequential part of the Island interna-
tionalist record.
The episode began at mid-century when two Australian
adventurers—Benjamin Boyd and John Webster—sailed into the
Solomons searching for territory they might acquire as the seat
for a new South Seas republic and, perhaps more to the point,
the center of a new trading enterprise. In 1851 they came
across the Stewart Islands and obtained full title to them by
supplying the ruling chief with some $1,000 worth of assorted
goods. Shortly thereafter, Boyd was killed on nearby Guadalca-
nal while negotiating a similar arrangement, and Webster re-
turned to Australia seeking to establish a foreign protectorate
over the islands in order to render them safe for economic de-
velopment. Apparently he had abandoned the notion of forming
a new island nation. In any event, he found that Great Britain,
at the time opposed to further territorial expansion, was not
interested in his plans but that St. Julian, whom he met upon
his return, felt Hawaii might be. After some discussion, St.
Julian and Webster signed an agreement on February 10, 1855,
whereby the latter ceded his control of the islands to Hawaii
and pledged to develop them as a trading depot and supply
center in return for Hawaii’s acceptance of protective responsi-
bility and promise not to levy taxes. The document, calling for
Hawaiian approval within six months in order to be valid, was
forwarded with St. Julian’s covering letter stating that accep-
tance would boost Hawaii’s Pacific and international prestige
and encourage civilization throughout the area. This letter also
contained St. Julian’s offer to oversee the administration of the
islands under the terms of his position with the Hawaiian gov-
ernment.23
When Wyllie received this document in mid-1855, he put
it before the Privy Council for consideration and discussion.
Action was delayed as the council wanted additional infor-
mation about the likely impact of annexation upon the spread of
Christianity and civilization in the area, the government’s only
apparent interest in the proposal. Wyllie underlined this point in
his reply to St. Julian. He wrote, “You are to understand that the
King having only recently escaped the danger of Annexation, for
his own Kingdom [in the Paulet affair of 1843], has no desire to
apply the principle to the Territory of others; but His Majesty
most ardently desires to extend Education, Christianity and Civ-
ilization among the barbarous tribes of Polynesia, and if He can
be persuaded that by accepting the cession of the Stewart’s Is-
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lands He can confer those blessings upon the Inhabitants of the
Solomon Islands, the moral argument will have great weight in
deciding His Majesty to accept the cession.”24
Wyllie made the same point with even greater clarity in his
annual report for 1855. He observed that “The proximity of
the Stewart’s Islands to the Solomon Group, the Duff Islands
and others, renders them a central point, from which the lights
of education and Christianity (the only sure elements of civi-
lization) might radiate in all directions. Therefore, it is a grave
question with the King and His Government, whether the accep-
tance of the Sovereignty of [the] Stewart’s Islands would not be
conducive through missionary cooperation to the attainment of
these results, for the benefit, not only of the inhabitants of that
small group, but of those of large and more populous groups
which be in close adjacency.”25 While the Hawaiian leaders
were clearly interested in providing a moral example, they were
also nervous about the prospect of expanding their political
domain.
Nervous or not, when St. Julian responded to Wyllie’s cau-
tionary note with a declaration that annexation would indeed be
of fundamental importance to the progress of Christianity and
civilization in the area, Hawaii made the decision to annex. It
came during a Privy Council meeting on February 15, 1856. The
bland minutes of that meeting fail to portray the doubts that
must have preceded it. They read, “Mr. Wyllie submitted his
Report to the Privy Council, recommending the King to accept
the Cession of the Sovereignty of the Stewart’s Islands. After
some discussion the King was pleased to express his pleasure
to accept the Sovereignty, but solely for the good of the Natives
of these Islands and of the Solomon Islands, and without any
pecuniary or other responsibility.”26 Fourteen days later this de-
cision was made final and Hawaii entered the ranks of the im-
perial powers!
Ironically and perhaps fortunately, Hawaii never actually as-
sumed control over the islands. Wyllie made no move to for-
malize the arrangements as he was awaiting an extension of
the long-expired six-month deadline in the original document of
cession. When St. Julian requested an extension from Webster
during the summer of 1856, he found that Webster had aban-
doned the project and wanted St. Julian to assume responsibility
for the islands. Not averse to such arrangements, St. Julian ac-
cepted Webster’s title in October and attempted to reopen an-
nexation negotiations with Hawaii.27 Casting aside his previous
justification of annexation on the grounds that it would carry
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civilization to a barbaric area, he returned to his original po-
sition and argued that Hawaii would—and should—gain a place
among the world powers by establishing its control over the
atoll. Hawaii, however, remained deaf to such arguments and
simply let the matter lapse, thus ending the imperial era as in-
conspicuously as it began.28 Wyllie wrote the conclusion to this
episode in his annual report for 1858 with the observation that
the islands were not strategic so far as the civilizing effort was
concerned, that their distance rendered effective administration
nearly impossible, and that annexation would serve no good
purpose.29
There is an amusing footnote to this incident. With annex-
ation negotiations at an end, St. Julian became the legal sov-
ereign of the islands. Although there is no indication that he
ever planned to assume an interest in their future or even to
visit them, he did utilize the privileges of his new position to
satisfy his own long-felt need for rank and recognition. For some
time previous, he had unsuccessfully urged Wyllie to grant him
an appropriate award in recognition of his service to Hawaii. As
sovereign of his own land, he remedied this slight by creating
his own order of merit—the Order of Arossi (the local name
for nearby San Cristobal Island)—and convincing Hawaii to
sanction it. Needless to say, he was among the first of very few
recipients. However, this order was to be of some significance
later as it became the model for a similar one—the Royal Order
of the Star of Oceania—which was established in Hawaii during
the Kalakaua era.30 To further assuage his long frustrated ambi-
tions, St. Julian also used his new position to justify signing
himself “Charles, Muara [Chief] of Arossi and Sovereign Chief
of Sikyana [Sikaiana].”31
By the early 1860s, St. Julian had given up hope of drawing
Hawaii into an active international role and when Wyllie, the Is-
lands’ principal mid-century advocate of internationalism, died
in 1865, there was little reason for him to believe that even
the limited activism of the preceding years would continue.
This, however, was not to be the case. For reasons unclear,
St. Julian resumed his Hawaiian contacts during 1870 with an
exploratory letter to Charles C. Harris, Wyllie’s successor as
foreign minister, proposing that the effort to forge a more sub-
stantial Island role in Pacific affairs be revived. More specifi-
cally, he suggested that Fiji, then interested in obtaining foreign
protection, might welcome an overture from Hawaii. No doubt
to St. Julian’s surprise, Harris responded with praise for his past
efforts and interest in his current proposal. Furthermore, Harris
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renewed St. Julian’s official status vis-à-vis Hawaii, appointing
him “His Majesty’s Chargé d’Affaires and Consul General to the
Kings and Ruling Chiefs of the Independent States and Tribes in
Polynesia South of the Equator” and, concurrently, as Hawaii’s
consul general for Australia.32
Following these appointments, Harris wrote St. Julian,
stating that “Your zeal on the subject of Polynesian establish-
ments is worthy of the greatest praise, and not only I myself but
His Majesty the King and those of my Colleagues who have been
with us from the beginning have occasion to regret that your
suggestions and even solicitations in that behalf have not met
with better seconding from here before.”33 Still later, Harris
sent what, for St. Julian at least, was probably the most im-
portant communiqué in the entire correspondence between the
Hawaiian government and the Australian. He wrote that he
was awarding St. Julian a Cross and Diploma as a Knight Com-
mander of the Order of Kamehameha, an established Hawaiian
order of merit.34 This pleased St. Julian immensely and he wrote
back, ever the opportunist, that the award would enable him to
term himself “Sir Charles” and that this would be beneficial in
his various undertakings.35
Excited by the renewed interest, St. Julian forwarded a
number of enthusiastic and increasingly ambitious proposals re-
garding not only the suggested role for Hawaii in Fiji but also
the possibility of annexing Samoa and creating a protectorate
over certain islands near New Guinea.36 Harris, a good deal
more cautious when discussing specific responsibilities than
when awarding accolades, responded with the comment that
Hawaii was generally interested in such ideas but would not be
willing to expend any funds “unless that expense should be re-
turned with increase in the near future.”37 St. Julian replied that
something immediately profitable might indeed be arranged in
at least Fiji if Hawaii would send him there to negotiate. Harris
and his colleagues agreed, and in May of 1871 St. Julian was
appointed “Special Commissioner for the Fiji Islands,” given
instructions to offer such advice and assistance as the Fijian
leaders might request, and provided with travel funds.38 Hence,
the Australian, who had conducted all his prior business from a
Sydney office, embarked upon his first actual visit to Polynesia,
and Hawaii seemed poised on the brink of another internation-
alist adventure.
In fact, the trip produced nothing so far as Hawaii was con-
cerned, but it was profitable for St. Julian. During the course of
his preparations for the journey, a new government was formed
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in Fiji and the search for a foreign protector was temporarily
ended. Thus, when St. Julian arrived during the summer of
1871, he found no opportunity to pursue his official mission.
Frustrated on this front, he used his time to ingratiate him-
self with the new Fijian leaders (as well as with the previous
leaders who might return to power should the new government
collapse) and then returned to Australia where he prepared a
pamphlet on Fiji’s international status. His efforts were soon re-
warded. In the spring of 1872, Fiji offered him the post of chief
justice of the court system and, untrained for the task as he was,
he accepted it. He resigned his Hawaiian commissions and went
again to Fiji where he spent most of the remaining two years
of his life presiding over the courts in a scarlet judicial robe
and full wig, no doubt feeling that he had finally been accorded
proper recognition.39
Apparently Harris and the Hawaiian government were not
embittered by this turn of events. Indeed, the Order of Kame-
hameha award was granted to St. Julian only shortly before he
was named chief justice, and Harris wrote him a warm letter
of congratulations when the news of his appointment reached
Hawaii. “I cannot but congratulate them [Fiji] on obtaining your
Services,” he wrote, “and I think very earnestly that your task
will be much facilitated by a visit of a month or two here be-
fore commencing your duties. I cannot but think that such a visit
would be of inestimable value to the people of Fiji…. Our Leg-
islature is now in Session, and I wish I had [you] by my side in
the House, that I might show you by experience how easily[,]
practically and good naturedly we conduct the business here.”40
A few months later, he wrote again in a similar vein, “As I have
said before,” he counselled, “I think it will be a great benefit
to Fiji if you can spend a little time in this Country, more espe-
cially with one or two of your more intelligent Native Chiefs.”41
These paternal notes suggest that Harris, despite his rather im-
perial rhetoric and gesturing, shared Wyllie’s views regarding
Hawaii’s policy in the Pacific. He, too, was more concerned
about setting a moral example than in establishing a political
empire.
For all practical purposes, St. Julian’s resignation of his
diplomatic posts put an end to the Islands’ mid-century venture
in the international realm. Although he recommended a suc-
cessor, Edward Reeve, who was in fact appointed consul general
for Australia (but not to the other posts), no business of con-
sequence was conducted. When Kamehameha V died some six
months later and Lunalilo was elected to the throne, he ap-
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pointed a new cabinet in which Charles R. Bishop replaced
Harris as foreign minister.42 A thoroughly practical busi-
nessman, Bishop promptly put an end to the unproductive ven-
tures in Polynesia. He left Reeve at his post in Australia but
otherwise eliminated the various Polynesian posts and ceased
all related activities.43 The era was over.
Internationalist activism during this period produced few
substantive results other than an incredible volume of diplo-
matic correspondence and St. Julian’s Fijian judgeship. It
changed nothing as regards Hawaii’s leadership status in Poly-
nesia, and it did not alter the status of the various Polynesian
countries and territories. Further, it is not likely that such con-
clusions would have to be adjusted even if Hawaii had made a
more concerted political effort along the lines so persistently
urged by St. Julian. The Islands were simply in no position
to counter Great Britain’s resistance to changes in the Pacific
status quo.
Nonetheless, it was a consequential era. The very fact that
Hawaii did become involved during this period created a
precedent for international activism that has since been cited
regularly and has been a factor in encouraging any number
of more substantial activities. Even more important, the expla-
nation for internationalist involvement which originated at this
time—the notion that an advanced and superior Hawaii has a re-
sponsibility to become involved and provide at least exemplary
leadership for other Pacific island cultures—established a ra-
tionale that, with certain refinements, has been used to justify
virtually every internationalist venture undertaken since that
time. In other words, the union of thought and action basic to
the local internationalist movement owes its existence to this
period.
GRAND HOPES AND DESIGNS
The eclipse in international activism that began with Bishop’s
appointment as foreign minister was shortlived. Lunalilo died
little more than a year after assuming the throne and was suc-
ceeded by Kalakaua who, as part of a determined effort to
buttress the position of the monarchy vis-à-vis the growing in-
fluence of the foreign elite and at the same time rekindle cul-
tural pride among native Hawaiians, initiated a more vigorous
Colossus of the Pacific
46
Kalakaua. Hawaii State Archives
internationalist program than even St. Julian had envisioned.
Indeed, in certain respects, internationalist endeavors during
his reign reached a level unsurpassed to this day.
These undertakings did not, however, come immediately.
Kalakaua was elected to the throne in February 1874, but it was
the end of the decade before he embarked on any international
programs of note aside from the negotiation of an important
sugar trading agreement with the United States in 1876. The
decisive factor in the activist revival at the turn of the decade
appears to be the ascendance to a position of influence of a
charming Italian adventurer named Celso Caesar Moreno. Mo-
reno arrived in Honolulu late in 1879 with plans to start a
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shipping line between Hawaii and China, an impressive looking
but meaningless franchise for laying a telegraphic cable (then
nonexistent) between Hawaii and the United States, and, as one
historian noted, the ability to speak more than a dozen lan-
guages, including that of “confidential flattery.”44
Kalakaua was much impressed with Moreno and soon took
him into his confidence. By the following spring the newcomer
had become one of the king’s closest advisors, and in August
of that year Kalakaua prorogued the legislature and dissolved
his cabinet in order to appoint a new one in which Moreno,
as foreign minister, would be the dominant figure. This move
ended in disaster for Kalakaua and Moreno when the foreign
community, outraged at the latter’s rise to power, persuaded the
diplomatic community to refuse to deal with him, thus forcing
Kalakaua to withdraw the appointment. Moreno fled the Islands
shortly thereafter.45
Ephemeral as Moreno’s stay was, it is of internationalist
significance in that he apparently persuaded Kalakaua that he
might best achieve his nationalistic objectives through activism
on the diplomatic front. While it is difficult to show precisely
how Moreno accomplished this, several documents from the
era indicate that he did. Kalakaua himself once remarked that
Moreno “had shown himself to be a very entertaining com-
panion, a man of large and novel views in political and state af-
fairs [which often] … coincided with … [my] own.”46 In an open
letter to Kalakaua written a few years later, Moreno suggested
that he had indeed urged the king to undertake the elevation of
Hawaii’s international stature. He wrote of “the grand, humane
and generous idea of uniting under your scepter the whole Poly-
nesian race and make[ing] Honolulu a monarchical Washington,
where the representatives of all the islands would convene in
Congress.” He concluded by reminding Kalakaua that “the for-
mation of a Polynesian realm with Honolulu as the capital, you
should remember, was the principal theme of our many and long
conversations in… 1880.”47
Whatever the precise connection, Kalakaua did initiate a
series of ambitious diplomatic ventures at the turn of the
decade. His first undertaking in this respect was a world-
girdling tour, ostensibly to study immigration but in fact, or at
least as it turned out, to learn more of royal practices else-
where and to remind the rest of the world of Hawaii’s presence.
Traveling during most of 1881, he visited Japan, China, Hong
Kong, Siam, Singapore, Burma, India, Egypt, Italy (where he
was briefly reunited with Moreno), England, Belgium, Germany,
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Austria, France, Spain, Portugal, and the United States. Aware
that he was the first reigning monarch ever to circle the globe,
he endeavored to stage the tour in grand fashion, and largely
succeeded. Feted by emperors, kings, presidents, prime min-
isters, and the pope, he made a favorable impression upon most
of his hosts and effectively carried Hawaii’s name to places
where it had previously been little known. He returned to
Hawaii late in 1881 determined to rule rather than simply reign
and, as his poem “The Pearl” indicates, convinced that his
domain, though small, was of excellent and in some respects su-
perior character.48
Kalakaua did more during this journey than simply attempt
to impress Hawaii’s existence upon the minds of various world
leaders. Although he started the trip with intentions of traveling
incognito, he altered these plans and assumed a royal posture
upon arriving in Japan, the first formal visit on the journey. Re-
ceived as a head of state and entertained accordingly, Kalakaua
took the occasion to urge the emperor to join him in sponsoring
a “Union and Federation of Asiatic Nations and Sovereigns” de-
signed to advance the global position of the Asian and Pacific
nations.49 He further suggested that the two nations formally
ally and that they seal the relationship by arranging the mar-
riage of Princess Kaiulani of the Hawaiian royal line to Prince
Komatsu of the Japanese imperial family.50 Put otherwise, he
proposed that Hawaii and Japan take the initiative in chal-
lenging Western domination in the Pacific.
As it turned out, nothing of substance came of these
meetings. After pondering the proposals for almost a year, Japan
concluded that no action could be undertaken that might strain
her friendship with the United States and thereby imperil
American support for her efforts to eliminate the unequal treaty
system she had earlier been forced to accept.51 The Japanese
rejection was, however, extremely friendly and, although disap-
pointing, appears not to have offended Kalakaua. Regarding the
proposal for a regional organization, the emperor wrote:
While Your Majesty was in my capital, you have in [the] course of
conversation alluded to a Union and Federation of the Asiatic na-
tions and sovereigns. I highly agree with Your Majesty’s profound
and farseeing views. Your Majesty was also good enough to state
that I might be the promoter and chief of this Federation. I cannot
but be grateful for such expression of your love and confidence in
me.
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The Oriental nations including my country have long been in
a state of decline and decay; and we cannot hope to be strong and
powerful unless by gathering inches and treasuring foots grad-
ually restore to us all attributes of a nation. To do this our Eastern
Nations ought to fortify themselves within the walls of such [a]
Union and Federation, and by uniting their power to endeavor to
maintain their footing against those powerful nations of Europe
and America, and to establish their independence and integrity in
[the] future. To do this is a pressing necessity for the Eastern Na-
tions, and in so doing depend their lives.
But this is a mighty work and not easily to be accomplished,
and I am unable to foretell the date when we shall have seen it
realized…. I desire Your Majesty to understand that unworthy as
I am it is impossible to bear the great responsibility which the po-
sition of the promoter and chief of such a vast undertaking im-
poses.5
After listing a number of Japan’s internal problems, he con-
cluded: “In the face of the internal administration of my gov-
ernment being of such a pressing nature I have not a heart
to turn my face from it…. However, I ardently hope that such
Union may be realized at some future day….”53
The marriage proposal met with a similar fate. Prince Ko-
matsu responded to Kalakaua, ever so politely stating that “I
was informed of your generous kindness, in asking me, if it
would be my happiness to be united to your Royal niece in mar-
riage, I am at a loss to express fully my appreciation of this
honour as I am still under age, I have consulted my father, and
I am very reluctantly compelled to decline your distinguished
proposal for the reason that I am already betrothed to my future
companion in life; so I sincerely trust that your Majesty will not
be disappointed at what duty compels me to do.”54 However
great Kalakaua’s disappointment, it was not, as subsequent
events would soon demonstrate, sufficient to dissuade him from
his quest for international recognition.
As an aside, it is interesting to note that one of the earlier
examples of this quest took Kalakaua beyond diplomacy and
into the realm of architecture and ceremony. This involved the
construction of an impressive royal palace between the years
1879 and 1882 and the staging of an elaborate coronation cer-
emony upon its completion. As both the palace and the coro-
nation were inspired by European royal examples, they are
evidence of his determination to call the world’s attention to his
kingdom and to his reign. Although the foreign business com-
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Iolani Palace shortly after completion. Hawaii State Archives
munity in Hawaii, far more concerned with good management
and profits than international stature, grumbled over the cost
and pretense, it did nothing of consequence to discourage
either the projects or the increasingly regal aspirations they
represented.55 So it is that America’s only royal palace and
coronation pavilion now stand near the center of Honolulu’s
otherwise modern and utilitarian central business district.
Had the business community been able to foresee the future,
it might well have taken a stronger stand against Kalakaua at
this point, for the next effort in his internationalist quest in-
volved a series of undertakings far more ambitious than any of
his prior endeavors, and which took the kingdom once again to
the fringes of the imperialist movement and, unbelievable as it
may seem, to the brink of armed confrontation with Germany.
These undertakings were not, however, solely the product of the
king’s fertile imagination. In large part, they were conceived
and directed by Walter Murray Gibson, still another adventurer
who found favor in Kalakaua’s court.56
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Opportunistic and demagogic but also sophisticated and im-
mensely able, Gibson arrived in Honolulu during the summer of
1861, enroute to the Dutch East Indies where he was to act as
a representative of the Mormon church which he had recently
joined. He lingered some weeks in the Islands, speaking before
several gatherings on the challenge of bolstering “commerce
and civilization” in the East Indies and ousting the Dutch.57 Ap-
parently liking Hawaii, he stayed on and became involved with
the local Mormon community which had grown up during the
previous decade when the church first sent missionaries to the
Islands.58 Within a few months, he succeeded in drawing a good
number of local Mormons (almost exclusively native Hawaiians)
to the island of Lanai where earlier Mormon missionaries had
endeavored to establish a settlement which Gibson, with church
funds, attempted to revitalize. Always the visionary, he spoke
enthusiastically of the time it would be a massive and pros-
perous agricultural commune centered around a great new
city.59
His motives in this venture were mixed. On occasion, his
diary entries indicate noble hopes apparently inspired by the
physical and cultural attributes of his newly adopted homeland.
“The Hawaiian Islands,” he wrote soon after his arrival, “take
the place of the Malay Archipelago [his term for the Dutch
East Indies] in my thoughts of which I have been thinking; so
long; so long since first I sailed on the great ocean; and looked
with love and hope upon the islands, and the island race.”60
An entry several months later hints at less altruistic aims but
is still couched in fundamentally visionary terms. “The seed of
Oceanican organization is in Lanai…. This is the nucleus of de-
velopment. Lines of power, of influence shall radiate from this
shining crater. I set up my standard here and it goes hence to
the islands of the sea. Lanai shall be famous in Malaysia, in
Oceancia. It shall give birth to a better hope for humanity in
Polynesia…”61 Still other entries celebrated the physical beauty
of Lanai:
There never was a calmer and cheerfuler life than mine now.
The valley smiles like a lover. I want to lay an arm around those
browery blue mountain tops, delicately curtained with cloud
gauze…. I might say furthermore so much balmy air, so much
shining sea, such a rare scooped out valley, a great basin of milk
and honey, such wooing leafy coverts on the hillsides, and such
hills, with such a happifying view I am content when I sit upon
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them. My heart is full when I look over the island and the ocean.
My soul is soothed. I say this is my haven, my shelter from the sad
storms of life.62
However, at the very time he was penning these sentiments,
Gibson was also writing in a considerably more opportunistic
fashion. An entry from late 1861, prior to the preceding two ci-
tations, illustrates. “I could make a glorious little kingdom out
of this, or any other such chance, with such people; so loving
and obedient; I would make a port and a commerce; a state
and a civilization. I would make millions of fruits where one was
never thought of. I would fill this lovely crater with corn and
wine and oil and babies and love and health and brotherly re-
joicing and sisters kisses and the memory of me for evermore
[emphasis added].”63 If the experience of the Mormon church
is an indication, this entry more accurately describes Gibson’s
true motives and hopes. In 1864, a group of church officials
visited Hawaii only to discover that Gibson’s revitalized colony
on Lanai, worked by local Mormons and improved with their
funds, was registered in Gibson’s name and that the church had
no legal hold over it or him. Although promptly excommuni-
cated, he still controlled the island “kingdom,” and the church
had no choice but to depart Lanai and seek lands elsewhere in
the Islands.
Following this episode, Gibson shifted his interest from the
settlement to Hawaiian politics. As might be expected, he did
so in flamboyant fashion. After gaining a near-perfect fluency in
the Hawaiian language, he developed extremely close ties with
the Hawaiian community (closer than perhaps any other for-
eigner of his day) through publication of a Hawaiian language
newspaper, and nurtured a reputation as a vigorous defender
of Hawaiian interests. At the same time he became an advocate
of immigration as a means of strengthening the local economy
and soon attracted enough attention to gain appointment as an
immigration official. Although the government apparently took
little note of it, his principal achievement in this position was
the manipulation of an assignment to Singapore as the occasion
for a sixteen-month visit to the United States.64 Rounding out
his political skills, he also honed a talent for flattery. A note to
Kamehameha V illustrates. “I am,” he purred, “comforted and
reassured with the conviction, that in Your Majesty’s Person,
will be found those humane, patriotic, and Kingly attributes,
which have made illustrious the throne of the Kamehamehas;
and are so well fitted to advance Polynesian Civilization.”65
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Walter Murray Gibson. Hawaii State Archives
Gibson used his growing influence within the Hawaiian
community to help elect Lunalilo in 1873 and then Kalakaua
in 1874. In 1878, no longer content with backstage politics, he
moved to the political forefront by standing for election as a leg-
islative candidate from the island of Maui. With the support of
the Hawaiian community, he won by a sizable majority and em-
barked upon a vocal career as an elected official. The timing
was propitious. Kalakaua, seeking still other ways to increase
his authority at the expense of the business establishment, dis-
solved his cabinet in May 1882 and asked Gibson to form a new
one with Gibson himself serving concurrently as premier and
foreign minister. Gibson accepted and thereby initiated one of
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the most colorful political periods in Island history.66 He had
gained his “kingdom” and he would indeed be remembered for
“evermore.”
For present purposes, Gibson’s foreign policy is of para-
mount interest. Long concerned with the subject, he made pe-
riodic statements from the time he first arrived in Hawaii to the
effect that the Islands’ unique characteristics warranted a more
active international stance. The passages from his diary and his
interest in immigration (which led him to form the Hawaiian Im-
migration Company in 1872 despite his earlier problems with
the Singapore appointment67) are illustrative.68 This outlook is
likewise evident in his speeches to his Hawaiian constituents.
His oft-cited “Address to the Hawaiian People,” delivered in
1876, is a case in point. “We can,” he said,
enliven once more the now silent shores of Hawaii with a
thronging and a busy people. And then when an electric cable
unites us to our neighboring continent, and to the rest of the
world; and when the fleets of the Pacific rendezvous in our port of
Honolulu, and the trafficking and traveling nations fill our marts
with wealth gathered from all quarters of the globe,—then may
little Hawaii the least, be one of the most blest of the family of na-
tions; and being strong in her Christian, moral, and enlightened
attitude, sit royally as the Queen of the great ocean, and shine
forth as a proud and redeemed state before an admiring world!69
After entering the legislature in 1878, Gibson sounded this
theme with increasing frequency and force. A legislative reso-
lution that he introduced and guided to passage in 1880 exem-
plifies:
Whereas the Hawaiian Kingdom by its geographic position, and
political status is entitled to claim a Primacy in the family of Poly-
nesian States; and,
Whereas it owes a duty in view of this Primacy to set the ex-
ample of national enlightenment and integrity in all its relations
with Polynesian races; and,
Whereas Complaints have reached the Government of im-
proper actions under the Hawaiian flag in the South Seas;
Therefore,
Resolved that it is the sense of the Assembly, that a Royal
Commissioner be appointed by His Majesty who shall be styled a
Royal Hawaiian Commissioner to the States and Peoples of Poly-
nesia, who shall investigate the sources of immigration for Hawaii
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nei, in Central and Western Polynesia; and who shall be instructed
to represent the enlightened, humane, and hospitable spirit of
our Government and People to the Kindred States of the Pacific
Ocean.70
Although nothing came of the resolution at the time of its
passage, it is nonetheless important. In the first instance, it is
an early and near-perfect example of the use of an acclamatory
characterization of Hawaii to justify internationalist activity. Re-
flecting the union of internationalist thought and action, it is
a harbinger of much that would follow. Indeed, Gibson himself
used it to justify a number of the policies he initiated as the
leader of the cabinet after 1882. Secondly, while most people
paid little attention to the resolution when it was passed, a few
noticed its adoption and commented upon its implications for
future policy with some consternation. Among this group was
the United States Minister in Honolulu who reported back to his
superiors that “it is not generally known but I know from con-
versations with the King which I believe to have been entirely
unique, that his imagination is inflamed with the idea of gath-
ering all the cognate races of the Islands of the Pacific into a
great Polynesian Confederacy, over which he will reign.”71 Fi-
nally, and important from causal perspectives, the resolution
represents an unfolding of the course of action initiated by
Wyllie. Gibson was to be but the first of many inspired to action
by the deeds of that determined Scotsman.72
Still further insight to Gibson’s internationalist views comes
from the pages of the Pacific Commercial Advertiser. He pur-
chased the newspaper in 1880 and thereafter ran editorial after
editorial urging a more active role for Hawaii in Pacific affairs.
Commenting on Kalakaua’s return from his global journey in
1881, for example, he observed that “Kalakaua by his world
wide range and observation, has acquired the character of a
cosmopolitan king; and it will be fitting; as his beneficent Gov-
ernment harmonises and assimilates within the Archipelago,
the people of Europe and America; and of China, Japan, Hin-
dustan, and other countries, that Kalakaua the foremost Man
of the Pacific shall become the Sovereign of a glorious cos-
mopolitan Pacific State.”73 Several weeks later he argued that
the policy of this kingdom should be to assist … to preserve the
independence of all those communities of Polynesian race which
have not already been driven by circumstances to seek the pro-
tection of foreign Powers…. The moral support too of Hawaii
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should be extended to them in no half-hearted way. Hawaii holds
the first position among the native states in the Pacific, and
should recognise a duty as attaching to that position. The people
of the Southern groups are her people, united with her by no
distant ties of race and kindred.74
As if to remove any lingering doubts, he repeated the message
again the following month, concluding that “this Hawaiian State
is in all respects fit to take upon itself the responsibilities of an
advisor, a referee, or a mediator in the affairs of the weaker but
still independent divisions of the Polynesian race.”75
In light of these statements, it is predictable that Gibson,
as premier, foreign minister, and principal advisor to an already
interested Kalakaua, would initiate an ambitious foreign policy
once he took office. It is equally predictable that he would base
this policy upon the assertion that the superior nature of so-
ciety in Hawaii both justified and destined such a policy. While
there is some reason to wonder how deeply he believed this ar-
gument, the point remains that he was impressed enough with
it to make serious use of it, thereby contributing mightily to
its adoption as a standard part of the mainstream Island world
view.
THEORY PUT TO PRACTICE
Although Gibson’s appointment to the cabinet in May 1882
meant that Hawaii would soon embark upon a more vigorous
international course, it is important to note at the outset that
the prevailing Pacific Basin political and diplomatic climate was
anything but favorable for such an undertaking. During the
earlier period of international activism, most of the various
Western nations with Pacific island interests were not, owing
largely to Great Britain’s anti-expansionist posture, actively
seeking to expand their spheres of influence. Hence, St. Julian’s
and Wyllie’s undertakings threatened no one. By the time
Gibson took office, however, the New Imperialism had arisen
and fundamentally altered circumstances in the Pacific. France,
although defeated in the Prussian War of 1870–1871, was ex-
panding into the New Hebrides. Germany, now unified, rel-
atively secure in Europe, and anxious to establish an overseas
empire, was seeking outposts in New Guinea, the Solomons,
Samoa, and Micronesia. Great Britain, alarmed at these devel-
opments and under increasing pressure from Australia and New
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Zealand to expand her domain, annexed Fiji in 1874, part of
New Guinea shortly afterward, and then assumed a position of
dominant influence in eastern Micronesia. The United States,
while not yet ready to join the imperialist rush, was concerned
enough about trade routes and harbors to arrange for rights to
Pago Pago Harbor in Samoa in 1878. Germany and Great Britain
hurriedly negotiated similar arrangements the following year.
Thereafter Samoa became a major source of contention among
the big powers as all sought to increase their influence in the
divided and faction-ridden islands.76 It is clear, thus, that any at-
tempt on Hawaii’s part to assume a more active diplomatic role
was destined to involve complications. Nowhere was this more
true than in the Samoan case, but Samoa, it goes almost without
saying, is where Gibson would ultimately make his move.
Assuming actual responsibility for Hawaii’s foreign policy
does not appear to have moderated Gibson’s ardor for activism.
His newspaper continued publishing editorials similar to those
previously noted, often with an even greater sense of urgency
and a more pronounced tone of moral superiority than before.
Time and again, they discussed such matters as the need to
cease being “a mere nominal state,” “the superior order of Gov-
ernment and society,” “the especial political advantages” of the
Islands, the responsibilities of the “national head and leader of
all the Pacific States,” and “Hawaiian interests … [which], in
the very nature of things, [are] superior to interests created by
brute force.”77 On still other occasions, they openly advocated
direct intervention abroad even if it should mean confrontation
with the Western nations. An 1883 column, for example, dis-
cussed the tide of big power annexations and encroachments
throughout the region and concluded, more bravely than wisely,
that “if any one is to interfere to prevent further aggrandization
of foreign and distant powers in the Pacific, Hawaii ought to do
it.”78
Fired by such beliefs and apparently oblivious to the new re-
alities of power politics in the Pacific, Gibson wasted no time
in establishing an activist foreign policy. His first opportunity
came little more than a month after he assumed the office. At
that time a chief from Butaritari, one of the Gilbert Islands,
requested that Hawaii establish a protectorate over the island
and send a delegate to negotiate the arrangements. Responding
somewhat indirectly and certainly less vigorously than might
have been expected, Gibson sent a gift and a letter saying that
Hawaii recognized the existence of a community of interest
among all the lands of Polynesia and that he looked forward
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to closer relations between Hawaii and Butaritari. He sent the
gift and letter through Isaiah Bray who captained the Morning
Star, a ship serving the missionaries of the Hawaiian Evan-
gelical Association stationed in Micronesia and the Marquesas
Islands, and Bray returned with similar requests from two other
Gilbertese chiefs. These requests were answered with invita-
tions to come to Honolulu at government expense for
Kalakaua’s pending coronation as well as for diplomatic negoti-
ations. For reasons unknown, the chiefs never made the journey
and the matter was dropped.79
Innocuous as this debut of Gibson’s foreign policy was, it
nonetheless caused his opponents to denounce it as an indi-
cation of the dire consequences in store for Hawaii should
similar ventures occur. The opposition Daily Bulletin editori-
alized that
Hawaii’s true policy is to confine her attention to herself, and
strive to “take rank with nations that command respect and con-
sideration” [quoting from Gibson’s editorials] by enlightened and
judicious management of her own affairs and the development of
her own resources. Patient and faithful adherence to this policy
will ultimately result in the Hawaiian Kingdom becoming “no
longer a mere nominal State” [quoting Gibson again], whereas a
Napoleonic policy of conquest and acquisition would most likely
end in “vaulting ambition overleaping itself and falling on the oth-
erside” [quoting anonymous sources].80
In fact, both the Bray mission and the editorial criticism proved
to be indications of things to come.
The next major episode came on July 31, 1883, when, in
an act clearly inspired by the Wyllie-St. Julian era but justified
by the language of the 1880 resolution, Gibson commissioned
Alfred N. Tripp as Hawaii’s “Special Commissioner for Central
and Western Polynesia” and instructed him to travel among the
Micronesian islands promoting friendly relations with Hawaii
and providing advice on governance. The choice of Tripp for this
position represents either extreme naiveté or remarkable insen-
sitivity on Gibson’s part, as Tripp was (and remained) captain
of the schooner Julia, a vessel that regularly visited Micronesia
in search of contract laborers to be carried back to Hawaii.
Despite this, Tripp did succeed in arranging discussions with
a number of Gilbertese chiefs and several of them requested
advice and assistance. One, in fact, went so far as to request
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Hawaiian military assistance in a war he was waging with a
neighboring chief. The mission ended abruptly, however, when
the Julia was wrecked in the Gilberts early in 1884.
Although Tripp’s mission produced little more than the
added cost of retrieving the crew, it was nonetheless a source
of controversy. When Gibson reported on it to the legislature in
1884, heated and sustained criticism arose and he was forced
onto the defensive, a circumstance that would be increasingly
common during the remainder of his tenure in office.81 An ed-
itorial from the Hawaiian Gazette, another opposition news-
paper, illustrates.
The recent publication of a so-called report of the Commissioner
at large in the South Pacific demands attention, not from the in-
trinsic value of the precious document and its appendices, but
from the utter absurdity of it and from certain extraordinary
statements, which more suo, the Government apologist [Gibson]
has managed to group around his central idea…. The opponents
of this stupid scheme … pursued a legitimate course in laughing
at a huge joke which the unfortunate tax payers will have to foot
a bill for…. For results of this valuable expedition, we have a
wrecked vessel and a bundle of letters, signed by half a dozen
unbreeched barbarians who, thanks to the educating influence of
the Hawaiian Envoy, burst forth into full blown Kings.82
Gibson initiated another and more noteworthy venture at
the same time he commissioned the Tripp mission. Prompted
generally by the continued maneuverings of the Western powers
in the Pacific and specifically by Australia’s annexation of
eastern New Guinea on behalf of Great Britain in April 1883, he
obtained the approval of the cabinet in August to prepare a note
of protest coupled with a defense of Polynesian independence to
be presented to the offending nations. Generally known as the
“Protest of 1883” or, more dramatically, as the “Monroe Doc-
trine of the Pacific,” the document opened with strong words:
Whereas His Hawaiian Majesty’s Government being informed
that certain Sovereign and Colonial States propose to annex
various Islands and Archipelagoes of Polynesia, does hereby
solemnly protest against such projects of annexation, as unjust
to a simple and ignorant people, and subversive in their case of
those conditions for favorable national development, which have
been so happily accorded to the Hawaiian Nation.83
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An appeal followed:
His Hawaiian Majesty’s Government, speaking for the Hawaiian
people, so happily prospering through national independence,
makes earnest appeal to the Governments of great and en-
lightened States, that they will recognize the inalienable rights of
the several native communities of Polynesia to enjoy opportunities
for progress and self-government, and will guarantee to them
the same favorable opportunities which have made Hawaii pros-
perous and happy, and which incite her national spirit to lift up a
voice among the Nations in behalf of sister islands and groups in
Polynesia.84
Copies of this spirited document were sent to all the im-
perial powers and a number of others with no Pacific
interests—twenty-six in all—but only the United States took
enough interest in it to deliver an even remotely meaningful re-
sponse. Secretary of State Frelinghuysen noted simply that the
United States supported the notion of self-government but since
the territory in question was outside the realm of American in-
terests, no action would be taken. He also added that Hawaii
was in error for terming the document a protest rather than
an appeal.85 Gibson was not cowed, however. Two years later
in 1885 when Western meddling in Samoa was at a peak and
there was talk of a big-power conference to resolve the issue,
he issued a similar protest. The second document dealt largely
with Samoan independence and was sent to the United States,
Germany, Great Britain, France, and the Netherlands. Again,
the response was nil, and Gibson concluded that he would have
to find more effective ways of promoting Hawaii’s influence in
the Pacific.86
In retrospect, the principal importance of these protests
lies in the fact that they caused several of the European
powers—particularly Germany which was emerging as the dom-
inant power in Samoa—to wonder whether or not the United
States was using Hawaii as a foil for her own ambitions in the
area. The Germans simply could not believe that tiny Hawaii
was serious.87 Neither, for that matter, could Gibson’s increas-
ingly nervous local opponents. As one newspaper put it, “It does
seem as if the Empire of the Calabash [the opposition’s term
for Gibson’s internationalism] were still a distant dream. That
‘protest’ which caused so much amusement here and was so
cavalierly treated … [elsewhere], seems to have been singu-
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larly unsuccessful. The Foreign Policy of the Government has
not been crowned with laurels, but has been rather smothered
with snubs.”88
Gibson’s next move was appropriately dramatic. He used the
proposal for a big-power conference on Pacific problems as the
occasion to attempt the creation of a federation of independent
Polynesian nations under Hawaiian leadership. Late in 1885,
he dispatched Hawaii’s minister to the United States, Henry A.
P. Carter, on a tour of the European capitals with instructions
to gain a seat for Hawaii at the pending conference (although
it turned out that discussion of the conference was premature
and that no such gathering was under serious consideration
at the time), to propagandize on behalf of Samoan indepen-
dence, and, above all, to seek European support for a Hawaii-led
Polynesian federation. Carter, a loyal but also realistic official,
agreed with the first two instructions but tried to persuade
Gibson to withdraw the third directive. He knew it would not
be viewed favorably by the major powers as they scrambled
for control over various island groups. He argued that Hawaii’s
only believable and defensible position vis-à-vis the other Pacif-
ic islands was one emphasizing concern for the civilizing and
Christianizing efforts of the Hawaii-sponsored Micronesian mis-
sionary effort, and that anything more adventurous would end
only in embarrassment or disaster.89 It soon became evident
that he was correct.
Gibson, however, refused to be persuaded and Carter pro-
ceeded with the mission. He conferred with the various foreign
offices and attempted to gain support for the positions outlined
in his instructions. Predictably, he was unsuccessful. Returning
to Washington early in 1886, he wrote Gibson, “Though I was
too late to accomplish what His Majesty had hoped, I think
that His Majesty’s good intentions and generous proposals have
added to the high esteem in which His Majesty and His Gov-
ernment are held by Foreign Powers.”90 Even this modest at-
tempt to find something positive to report is probably over-
stated. If a dispatch from James H. Wodehouse, then Great
Britain’s commissioner in Hawaii, is any indication, the
diplomats viewed Gibson’s foreign policy in much the same
fashion as did his local opponents. He reported to the Foreign
Office that “Mr. Gibson’s policy in this direction … finds no echo
… here, Hawaiians being content to manage their own affairs,
without involving themselves in disputed questions with other
powers and striving after ‘an Hawaiian Supremacy in the Pa-
cific’ which is the darling object of Mr. Gibson’s ambition.”91
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The local press, moving from amused and then nervous
dissent to bitter hostility, could not have agreed more. As one
editorial on the Carter mission put it, “If all the visionary ex-
ploiting of our Foreign Office was done at the private charges of
the man or men who are carried away by the prospective honors
accruing therefrom, the matter might be dismissed with a smile
at the matured vanity projecting it. But these foreign embassies
after will-o’-the-wisps are using up the scant revenues of this
kingdom, while the most necessary and important domestic ser-
vices entrusted to the Government are starving and decaying
for want of the means of sustenance.”92
Nonetheless, Gibson persevered. He ordered Carter to make
one more attempt to persuade the European powers to accept
the three proposals. When the effort again came to naught,
he initiated an even more forceful strategy on behalf of Poly-
nesian, and particularly Samoan, independence.93 Preparations
for this undertaking came to a head on December 23, 1886,
when Kalakaua, ever fond of an elaborate ceremony, commis-
sioned John E. Bush, a former cabinet member, as Hawaii’s
“Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near His
Majesty the King of Samoa,” “Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary near His Majesty the King of Tonga,” and “Our
High Commissioner to the Sovereign Chiefs and Peoples of Poly-
nesia.” Three days later, Bush and his staff (which included
Robert Louis Stevenson’s artist son-in-law, Joseph Strong)
sailed from Honolulu with secret instructions to negotiate a
treaty of confederation between Hawaii and Samoa wherein
Hawaii would protect the latter’s independence by assuming
control over its foreign policy, to negotiate the participation of
Tonga and the Cook Islands in the confederation once it was es-
tablished, and to annex territory in the Gilbert Islands should
the opportunity arise.94
The instructions to Bush are more ludicrous than bold when
viewed within the context of current affairs in Samoa, the key
to the strategy. Great Britain, the United States, and especially
Germany were seeking to establish a greater measure of control
over the islands and, in accord with their earlier refusal to se-
riously consider the 1883 and 1885 protests or the subsequent
pleas of Carter, were not inclined to look with favor upon the
Hawaiian venture. To further complicate matters, Samoa was
divided into two warring camps as rival chiefs struggled to es-
tablish control over the island group, and one camp, under the
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leadership of Chief Malietoa, was supported by Great Britain
and the United States, while the other, under a chief named
Tamasese, had the backing of Germany.
Apparently these circumstances did not faze Gibson. He
ordered Bush to deal exclusively with Malietoa and blandly
informed the Western powers that the purpose of the Bush
mission was not to meddle but rather to assist in the search for
a diplomatic solution to the problem. Understandably, this dis-
claimer proved to be unpersuasive, and the mission, whatever
its real purpose, came to be viewed by the big powers as an
overt case of intervention. The United States, after briefly ac-
cepting Gibson’s assurances, took a position disapproving the
mission. Great Britain did likewise, interpreting it as an attempt
to create trouble and confusion. More ominously, Germany
chose to regard it as a direct threat to her interests in the
area and, incredible as it sounds in retrospect, took preliminary
steps toward preparing for war with Hawaii. An indication of
the intensity of German feelings on this point is contained in
a remark by Count Herbert Bismarck, Germany’s foreign min-
ister, to one of his colleagues during the summer of 1887. “We
should not,” he observed, “have [to] put up with [the] inso-
lence of the Hawaiians any longer; if a German squadron were
at anchor before Samoa, it could sail for Hawaii, and King
Kalakaua could be told that, unless he desisted from his insolent
intrigues in Samoa, we should shoot his legs in two, despite
his American protection.”95 Clearly, Gibson was on the verge of
overplaying his hand.
This, however, came later. In the meantime, Bush proceeded
with the mission according to instructions. He arrived in Samoa
early in January 1887, and immediately extended formal recog-
nition to Malietoa by presenting him with the Grand Cross of
the Royal Order of the Star of Oceania, an order inspired by
St. Julian’s Order of Arossi which Gibson and Kalakaua had
created a few weeks earlier. This completed, he proceeded to
fete Malietoa’s followers with such a round of entertainment
that one chief later remarked, “If you have come here to teach
my people to drink, I wish you had stayed away.”96 In spite
of this, the negotiations were successful and on February 17,
1887, Malietoa and Bush signed a treaty binding Samoa and
Hawaii together in confederation. The document was then sent
to Hawaii where it was ratified the following month. It should
be noted, however, that the ratification was conditional. Gibson,
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The Kaimiloa flying her ensign. Hawaii State Archives
now nervous about anticipated Western reactions to the union,
inserted a clause making the treaty subject to any limitations
imposed by any treaties Samoa might previously have signed.
When news of this treaty reached the various Western cap-
itals during April and May, unanimous opposition developed de-
spite the conditioning clause. The United States reacted with
“surprise and regret.” Great Britain, for reasons of realpolitik
now sympathetic with Germany’s Samoan aspirations, viewed
it as “a most audacious and unscrupulous attempt by American
adventurers in the pay of King Kalakaua, to foment anarchy and
disorder.” Germany simply laughed at the document and said
it would be ignored.97 Trying at once to bolster the status of
the mission and Malietoa’s faltering courage in the face of such
opposition, Gibson initiated what would be his final ploy in the
adventure–gunboat diplomacy. On May 18, he dispatched the
Kaimiloa, the Hawaiian navy’s sole armed vessel, to Samoa.
This decision represents something less than genius. In the
first instance, the Kaimiloa was not a ship to inspire awe. A
hastily converted 171-ton copra and guano trader capable of
no more than five knots at full steam and armed only with
four six-pound brass cannons and two Gatling guns, she was
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something less than a match for American, British, and German
warships. Perhaps the most impressive thing about her was
a striking flag sewn by Joseph Strong’s wife.98 More to the
point, the vessel was commanded by George E. Gresley Jackson,
a drunkard with only limited naval experience, and manned
largely by young inmates from Honolulu’s Industrial and Re-
formatory School where Jackson, prior to his selection as com-
mander, had been the supervisor. During the first eleven days of
the voyage, Jackson stayed in his cabin drinking, and, as he was
the only person aboard capable of navigating, it is remarkable
that the ship even reached Samoa. In fact, it almost did not. She
was more than one degree of longitude off course upon reaching
the area in mid-June.99
This was only the beginning. After several weeks of cruising
among the islands under the observation of a German naval
vessel, the Kaimiloa put in at Apia. Following a night of revelry,
part of the crew mutinied and the German ship came alongside
to quell the uprising. This, it turns out, was the extent of the
threatened military clash between the two nations. Further, had
the Germans not assisted, it is likely that the mutineers would
have fired the powder magazines. In a perverse sense, it is un-
fortunate that this did not happen as, in the absence of such
a spectacular finale, there is almost nothing grand that can be
said of the Kaimiloa’s voyage. As Stevenson later remarked,
“The Kaimiloa was from the first a scene of disaster and di-
lapidation; the stores were sold; the crew revolted; and for the
great part of a night she was in the hands of mutineers, and the
Secretary [of the Bush mission] lay bound upon the deck.”100
Following this disaster, the Samoan mission came to a rapid
conclusion. Prior to the Kaimiloa’s arrival, Gibson issued orders
recalling Bush, whose crudeness and liberal use of gin as a
diplomatic tool had caused protest, and replacing him with
Henry F. Poor, the mission’s secretary. At the same time, he
also issued orders recalling the Kaimiloa as he had become
fearful of the likely consequences of her presence. Perhaps
Poor could have brought some dignity to the mission and ob-
viously the recall of the Kaimiloa would have prevented the
sorry spectacle that ensued, but Gibson’s orders were unfor-
tunately delayed in transit and did not arrive until mid-July.
By that time his opponents in Hawaii had forced his removal
from office in the so-called Bloodless Revolution of 1887. A
new government was formed that immediately closed the mis-
sion and ordered it home aboard the Kaimiloa. This was for-
tunate timing. A few weeks later, a German squadron with some
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seven hundred marines aboard arrived in Samoa with instruc-
tions to establish Tamasese as king (which it did, in the process
deporting Malietoa) and to make war on Hawaii should the
mission still be present.101 Thus ended the Islands’ most extra-
ordinary plunge into the international arena.
While no doubt there were sighs of relief in most quarters
following Gibson’s dismissal, they were surely most pronounced
in Honolulu. Where his policies had caused a certain annoyance
abroad, they had engendered persistent ridicule and even
hatred among local critics. It is not likely, for example, that
any foreign critic assessed the era with the same venom as the
local editorialist who wrote that it was nothing short of “rotten.”
“We presume,” he wrote, “no better word could be applied to
the Hawaiian Government of the day. Yes, the Hawaiian Gov-
ernment is rotten, and rotten to the core. What has the King
around him but rottenness. What care have those, who whisper
in his ear, for the future? None. To them it is vogue la galere, let
the boat swim, no matter whether down a waterfall or through
a rapid.”102 Neither is it likely that any foreign critic ever took
the time, as one local critic did, to compose ridiculing doggerel
as a means of expressing his dissatisfaction with the era:
How prospered the alliance grand
Among the Chiefs of Isles of sand
By the eternal trade winds fanned;
How there amid the breaker’s dash
Is planted, now with armed clash
The Empire of the Calabash!103
No matter how amusing and ultimately dismaying the
Gibson era in Hawaiian foreign policy may have been, it was
still a time of extraordinary significance so far as subsequent
Hawaiian undertakings in the internationalist realm are con-
cerned. While there would be no further ventures akin to those
he sponsored (due in no small part to the fact that such ac-
tivities can be more readily initiated by independent nations
than political dependencies and Hawaii was soon to become
the latter), he nonetheless contributed immensely to the notion
that Hawaii has an internationalist destiny and an obligation
to pursue it. In spite of contemporary opposition, he used the
precedent for international activism established by Wyllie and
St. Julian so effectively that it became, with time, simply another
part of the Island definition of proper civic interest. It is no
coincidence that virtually every subsequent local venture into
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the international realm has cited—perhaps with amusement and
perhaps with chagrin but always with clear intent—the example
of his endeavors.
Equally salient, Gibson also contributed heavily to the
further development of the rationale for international activism.
Almost without fail, he described his policies as instruments de-
signed above all to pass on the experiences and accomplish-
ments of a superior Hawaiian society to those less advanced
societies elsewhere in the Pacific. Whether or not he actually
believed this is, as noted, debatable. The fact that he consistent-
ly reiterated the notion and thereby helped establish it as a re-
spectable theme in local thought is not. Ill-advised and perhaps
even ill-motivated, his efforts nonetheless popularized as never
before the kinds of ideas that lie at the root of the Island inter-
nationalist tradition.
Finally, it should also be noted that the internationalist
undertakings of this era were at least partially successful in
achieving Kalakaua’s original objective of rekindling pride in
the Hawaiian tradition. While such things are difficult to assess,
the fervor with which Hawaiians defended the monarchy even
after its fall and the extent to which the Kalakaua era has
become a symbol in the contemporary effort to revive Hawaiian
consciousness suggest that the undertakings of the period may
be as noteworthy in socio-political terms as they are in interna-
tionalist terms.
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IV
Our New Geneva
TURN-OF-THE-CENTURY REVIVAL
The collapse of the Gibson cabinet in 1887 marked the be-
ginning of a lengthy eclipse in Island internationalist activity.
With his authority almost completely eroded by a new consti-
tution forced upon him as part of the ouster of Gibson, Kalakaua
was in no position to initiate further ventures, and his new
cabinet, firmly controlled by his business-oriented opponents,
was concerned almost solely with reestablishing a fiscally sound
domestic policy.
When Kalakaua died in 1891, his sister Liliuokalani assumed
the throne, intent upon regaining the authority he had been
forced to yield. Had she been successful, it is conceivable that
she would have initiated policies similar to those of the Gibson
era. This was not, of course, to be the case. Largely as a result
of her determination to revive the stature of the crown, a revo-
lution was instigated in 1893 and she was overthrown. This put
an end to the Hawaiian monarchy and ushered in the shortlived
Republic of Hawaii whose leaders were intent on arranging the
annexation of the Islands by the United States and ending, for
once and always, the spectre of a Hawaiian-led government
embarking upon ventures contrary to commercial interests. Fi-
nally successful in 1898, the leaders of the Republic became the
leaders of the new Territory of Hawaii. It goes without saying
that events of these years discouraged all forms of internation-
alist activity.
Significantly, however, interest in internationalism survived,
and by the early 1920s the movement was flourishing once
again. A new group of activists, in this instance largely from
the private sector, succeeded not only in reviving interest in
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the movement but also in setting it on a course that carried it
toward far more meaningful, if less flamboyant, ends than had
been the case during the nineteenth century.
The first important indication of this revival came in 1910
when Alexander Hume Ford began publishing a monthly journal
entitled Mid-Pacific Magazine. Ford’s original hopes for the
publication are not clear. He announced in the first issue
(January 1911) that it would be essentially a literary magazine
containing fiction, poetry, and highly illustrated informational
articles on all the lands of the Pacific Basin, and that it would
belong to “the entire Pacific” rather than simply Hawaii.1
However, the magazine never developed along these lines.
Aside from occasional poems, its only attempt at literary
achievement came in Ford’s own serialized “tale of the South
Seas” entitled “Sabacco” which appeared throughout most of
1911.2 He was, it turns out, no literary giant. His friend Jack
London later told him that “Sabacco” was “the poorest novel …
[I] ever read.”3 Perhaps for this reason, the magazine was com-
posed more like a travel guide with correspondingly brief and
bland articles extolling various tourist attractions in Hawaii and
elsewhere in the Pacific. On occasion, there were also articles
of a more social nature that usually reflected the then popular
“white man’s burden” perspective.4 Considering its tone and
format, it is not surprising that a group of leading Honolulu
businessmen found the new magazine a worthy “mouthpiece of
Hawaii and the Pacific” following their review of the first issue.5
Despite this, Mid-Pacific Magazine was not to become
simply another promotional journal. Interested in world affairs
as well as literature and travel, Ford modified the thrust of the
publication in subsequent issues and eventually turned it into
a journal concerned almost solely with internationalist causes.
In a fashion analogous to the evolution of the acclamatory char-
acterization of the Islands, earlier issues of the magazine cel-
ebrated the local landscape while later issues took up the ar-
gument that Hawaii’s destiny as a regional leader was assured
by the unique and superior nature of local society. Once de-
veloped, the latter theme remained the principal focus of the
magazine until its demise shortly before World War II.
An enchantment with the physical beauty of Hawaii is ev-
ident in the magazine from the time of the first issue. As the
author of an early article, representative of many to follow, put
it “the Paradise of the Pacific remains the choicest heritage of
the American people. Here there is rest for the weary, and the
troubled quickly cease from worrying; it is the little oasis in all
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America that never disappoints; he who has not seen Hawaii
cannot say, ‘I have known perfect rest—I have seen the most
beautiful thing in the whole world!’”6 However, while the mag-
azine’s never-flagging adoration of the Islands’ physical charac-
teristics is interesting, its evolving view of Hawaiian society and
Hawaii’s proper role in Pacific affairs is more important so far
as the internationalist movement is concerned. In this respect,
an editorial that appeared in mid-1915 illustrates the extent to
which Ford had already come to believe that Hawaii was des-
tined to lead the entire Pacific Basin—the nations of both the
Pacific rim and the Pacific islands—toward a new era of trans-
cultural understanding and cooperation. “Hawaii,” he observed,
“may well be termed the ‘experimental melting-pot of the Pa-
cific.’ Here we may study at first-hand those things that go to
make friendly feeling between the people of all races, and here
is being born a Pacific Patriotism, a patriotism that in time it is
believed will bind all the peoples of the Great Ocean together in
a united movement to achieve the greatest destinies that belong
to the peoples of the Pacific, who number more than half the
population of the Globe.”7 In short, Ford’s commercial “mouth-
piece” was on the way to becoming the most impassioned ad-
vocate of internationalism yet witnessed in Hawaii.
Ford’s proclivity toward international activism soon led to
an involvement in a series of new undertakings. One of the first
and most significant of these endeavors came early in 1911
when he formed a group called the Hands-Around-the-Pacific
Club. Drawing key members from a government committee on
tourism that he had earlier helped organize, Ford built the new
group around a nucleus of prominent local citizens, put it to
work upon a variety of internationalist tasks, and subsequently
transformed it into the Pan-Pacific Union, an organization that
would bring Hawaii to the attention of governments and civic
leaders throughout the region.
From the time the group first met on March 17, 1911, am-
bitious goals were in evidence. As T. F. Sedgwick, one of the
founding members, put it,
There is one great thing that all this must lead to and that is uni-
versal peace. If all of us [from around the world] get together
and talk matters over we learn a great deal about each other’s
country. When the movement spreads and grows large enough for
each of the countries we come in contact with to come to know
more of each other, then our work must lead toward universal
peace. A better knowledge of each other’s manners and customs
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will lead toward the breaking down of old traditions, and once
these are severed and we find out that with the exception of a few
minor details, we are only the same as the other fellow after all,
then there will be an end to all talk of war, and we will live to-
gether side by side in peace.8
The group’s formal statement of purpose embraces a similar
perspective. The essential portions are the following:
To spread abroad around the Pacific a knowledge of Hawaii and
to secure from each other and from around the Pacific a better
knowledge of the lands in and about the great ocean and the ob-
jects, aims and ambitions of their respective peoples.
To aid in securing cooperation on the part of the many Pacific
governments in worthy objects looking toward the attraction from
Europe and America of tourists, immigrants, businessmen and
all whose presence in Pacific lands will be a distinct gain to the
common interests of all who live about the Pacific.
To take an active part in any movement directed toward the
betterment of Hawaii as a place of residence or a land to visit.
To keep alive a pride in the land we live in as well as the land
from whence we came, and to do all we can to make both more
worthy of that pride.9
Thereafter variations of this perspective appeared regularly.
In some instances the emphasis was on world peace through un-
derstanding. Percy Hunter, an Australian participant, addressed
this point when he wrote, “We desire that the various great
nations bordering … [the Pacific] should live together in true
amity, that they should come to know each other better, that
they should trade and travel and join in industrial and com-
mercial activity and know no cause of quarrel or bitterness. The
basis of peace is knowledge and the best way to encourage the
amity of nations is to ensure a knowledge … among the na-
tionals of each country.”10 On other occasions, attention was di-
rected at the Hawaiian transcultural experience. A comment by
Jack London, speaking on behalf of the group, illustrates. “The
tendency of the age … [is],” he argued, “for a closer under-
standing between nations and between races, and … the time
… [is] approaching when just such conditions … [will] prevail
all over the world as now prevail in these jewels of the Pacific
[i.e., Hawaii], where many different peoples live together in har-
mony, finding that the more they try to harmonize, the more
they … [better] their own conditions.”11 In still other cases,
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these themes were syncretized, as in the following excerpt from
a club resolution urging the convening of a world peace con-
gress in Hawaii:
Whereas: In these Islands as nowhere else has rational race
contact regardless of color or other adventitious circumstances
resulted in that ideal dwelling together in unity, the complete re-
alization of which on a worldwide scale is being hastened as never
before, and
Whereas: These Islands are situated midway between the Eastern
and Western Hemispheres at the center of the prophesied
greatest theater of the world’s future activities, the Pacific, which
should be kept, true to its name, an arena of peaceful contests and
conquests; Be it resolved [that a world peace congress be urged
to convene in Hawaii].12
In sum, these men sought world understanding and peace and
believed the Hawaiian model pointed the way toward achieving
it.
As during the preceding century, ideas generated action. An
early indication of this lies in Ford’s attempt to build a network
of Hands-Around-the-Pacific Clubs throughout the Pacific Basin
and thereby create a lobby with sufficient influence to achieve
the group’s objectives.13 He began auspiciously enough by per-
suading a number of prominent Pacific leaders—among them
the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand—to serve
as honorary officers of the club, thus providing it with an im-
mediate element of respectability.14 Attempting to capitalize on
these accomplishments, he embarked on an ambitious orga-
nizational drive late in 1913. Although concentrating his ef-
forts in Asia and the United States, he circled the globe in
search of organizations willing to join his crusade for peace
and brotherhood.15 Unfortunately, the results were marginal.
Although a fair number of the existing groups he approached
pledged their affiliation and support, they in fact remained
more committed to their own goals than to his internationalist
ends. For example, the Million Club of West Australia, one
of the new affiliates, retained its primary commitment to se-
curing “a million white population for the state,” while the City
Club of Manila, another new affiliate, maintained its concern
for assisting “all races of people in the Philippines to work
together for the advancement of the Philippines.”16 Similarly,
a number of chambers of commerce and “ad” clubs in the
western United States were listed as affiliates simply because
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they promised to host an annual Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club
banquet.17 Further, there is no indication that he was able to or-
ganize a single new group in support of his goals. Nonetheless,
he was pleased with the outcome. Ever the optimist, he inter-
preted his generally friendly reception abroad as the portent
of a great regional movement toward a new international con-
sciousness and believed that Hawaii was destined to lead it.
Hence, upon returning to the Islands, he announced that the
movement was underway and that Mid-Pacific Magazine would
be its official organ.18
While the newly affiliated organizations may not have taken
their internationalist charge seriously, the original group in
Hawaii did. It was active over the years sponsoring meetings,
exhibits, discussions, and a host of other activities related to
internationalism. One of the more interesting of these under-
takings was the formation of a group known as the 12-12-12
Club that periodically invited twelve representatives from
several of the Islands’ various ethnic groups to dine together
and discuss points of racial grievance and misunderstanding in
much the same fashion employed in contemporary encounter
therapy. An ongoing part of Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club ac-
tivities after 1911, these gatherings attracted considerable at-
tention in 1915 when Jack London praised them in a speech
before a visiting congressional delegation and later published
his remarks in an article entitled “The Language of the Tribe.”19
A number of the Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club’s other ac-
tivities during the 1911–1917 period are likewise of interest The
forerunner of Hawaii’s present Aloha Week festival, known first
as the Floral Parade and later as the Mid-Pacific Carnival, was
given an international flavor during this period when the club
persuaded the sponsors to include a “Pan-Pacific Day” as part
of the scheduled activities. In a related development, during
September 1915, Liliuokalani, the former queen, initiated an
event variously known as Pacific Day and Balboa Day which
featured flag ceremonies performed by representatives from
Hawaii’s different ethnic communities. Ford publicized this fes-
tival through Mid-Pacific Magazine and launched a campaign to
make it an annual event observed around the Pacific as part of
the Hands-Around-the-Pacific movement. He succeeded in per-
suading numerous Pacific Basin cities to sponsor ceremonies,
but interest waned with the coming of World War I.20 In what
was perhaps the most noteworthy outcome of the effort, Lili-
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uokalani returned to the throne room of Iolani Palace in 1917,
the first time she had done so since her overthrow in 1893, to
preside over that year’s festivities.
Inspired by the excitement of the 1915 congressional visit,
Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club members and supporters (in-
cluding Korean nationalist leader Syngman Rhee, who then
resided in Honolulu) conceived the idea of establishing a per-
manent Pan-Pacific Club to facilitate regular meetings and other
special events.21 Castle and Cooke, a local business firm, do-
nated space in an office building and in mid-1916 the club was
opened.22 Although its location was changed several times, it
served as the site for international dinners, displays, and gath-
erings over the next two decades. Encouraged by the club’s
initial success, Ford attempted to establish similar facilities
throughout the Pacific as a means of strengthening the
movement, but little came of the effort at the time.23
In 1915 San Francisco hosted the Panama-Pacific Interna-
tional Exposition and immediately thereafter San Diego spon-
sored the Panama-California Exposition. The Hands-Around-the-
Pacific Club and the Hawaii Promotion Committee, a prede-
cessor of the present Hawaii Visitors Bureau, staged an exhibit
at the latter event. As might be anticipated, Ford concluded
that Hawaii should sponsor a similar gathering. He broached
the suggestion in early 1916 and by the middle of the year was
enmeshed in the planning. A site near Liliuokalani Gardens in
central Honolulu was selected, and an architect was retained to
design the needed structures.24 As Ford saw it, the purpose of
the exposition was no less than the creation of a new era in Pa-
cific relations. “From a Pan-Pacific beginning in Hawaii,” he ed-
itorialized,
we may yet teach the whole world the lesson that the fruits of
cooperation are sweeter far than those that grow in the garden
of competition. It is for us to forward a movement that will tend
to lift all to higher things, to strive together to attain a loftier
standard in the material life for all the peoples of the Pacific, so
that each and all will benefit, no matter what their race, nation-
ality or country … [and] … to this end Hawaii invites her sisters of
the Pacific to a cooperative Pan-Pacific Exposition and Congress
of Pacific People….25
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Although hopes for the exposition were shattered by the advent
of World War I, Ford persisted in his belief that Hawaii could
become an international conference center and, as discussed
below, he was eventually proved correct.
As the turn-of-the-century revival of internationalism was
essentially a function of the interaction between efforts to de-
velop a local tourist industry and Ford’s own internationalist
visions and ambitions, a word of background on each factor
is necessary. With respect to tourism, developmental activities
date from the last decades of the monarchy. As early as 1875
tourist guidebooks were appearing and by the 1880s some five
to eight hundred tourists were visiting Hawaii annually. In 1888
a promotional magazine entitled Paradise of the Pacific was
founded and it lured visitors with its depiction of Hawaii as a
land of spectacular vistas, sunlit lagoons, and beautiful women
until it folded during the middle of the twentieth century.26 The
Islands’ first official bid for tourists came in 1892 with the for-
mation of the Hawaiian Bureau of Information, but events sur-
rounding the overthrow of the monarchy and the creation of
the republic disrupted its activities. In 1903 the Hawaii Promo-
tion Committee was established under the joint direction of the
Honolulu Chamber of Commerce and the Honolulu Merchants’
Association, organizations that merged in 1913 to form the
present Chamber of Commerce of Honolulu, to replace the de-
funct Bureau of Information. Funded by contributions from the
business community and an appropriation from the territorial
legislature, the organization opened offices in the Alexander
Young Hotel and immediately launched a nationwide adver-
tising campaign.27 Supported by the business sector and the
legislature over the years, this organization evolved into the
widely known Hawaii Visitors Bureau of the present era.28
Both commercialism and internationalism are evident in the
early activities of the Hawaii Promotion Committee. It spon-
sored exhibits at such events as the 1904 St. Louis Exposition
and the 1909 Alaska-Yukon Exposition in Seattle and built a per-
manent display at Atlantic City, then a major tourist center.29
Utilizing a mainland American public relations firm, it placed
advertisements in leading periodicals, prepared pamphlets for
travel agents, and engaged lecturers to speak on Hawaii in hun-
dreds of cities throughout the mainland. It prepared other pam-
phlets extolling Hawaii as a place of residence and mailed great
numbers of them to potential immigrants. In 1913, for example,
some five hundred thousand such items were mailed, making
the committee the largest single user of the Honolulu Post
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Hawaii Promotion Committee headquarters in the Alexander Young
Building. Bishop Museum
Office.30 Additionally, it played a key role in establishing trans-
Pacific yacht racing, initiating the Floral Parade, attempting to
attract national conventions to Honolulu, supporting civic beau-
tification projects, and lobbying mightily, if unsuccessfully, to
have Congress name a battleship after Hawaii.31
At the same time, the committee was engaged in other ac-
tivities that were considerably more internationalist in nature.
Most important in this respect was its interest in joint promo-
tional activities involving other countries. An incident involving
Ford that occurred during 1907 illustrates. Although a recent
arrival, he detected the interest in joint promotional ventures
and urged Walter F. Frear, soon to be named as the territory’s
third governor, to commission him as an official representative
of the Islands during a forthcoming trip to Australia and New
Zealand and empower him to negotiate arrangements whereby
Hawaii would join the Australasian governments in establishing
a “Pan-Pacific Tourist and Information Bureau” with offices in
New York and other large cities.32 While Frear was not as yet
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governor and had no authority to grant the request, Ford still
embarked upon the journey and attempted to negotiate the pro-
posed arrangements.33
Despite the fact that the negotiations proved fruitless, this
episode is significant in that it characterizes the early rela-
tionship between tourism and internationalism and, even more
to the point, provided much of the incentive for Ford’s sub-
sequent involvement on the international front. He returned
to Honolulu in March 1908 and immediately began promoting
Hawaii as an international tourist center. He argued with some
passion that Pacific tourism could become a profitable industry
if local leaders would but expend the necessary promotional
energy.34 His fervor was rewarded late in March when Frear,
by then governor, named him to the Territorial Transportation
Committee that had recently been established to assist the
Hawaii Promotion Committee and to explore joint working
arrangements with Australia and New Zealand regarding the
promotion of tourism.35 As in previous cases, the consequences
of this action were indirect. The committee itself accomplished
little, but it did evolve into the Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club
which in turn became the Pan-Pacific Union. In all likelihood,
none of this would have come to pass had there been no interest
in tourism at the time.
The formation of the Outrigger Canoe Club, a well-known
private dining and sports club in Waikiki, likewise illustrates
the indirect but nonetheless real connection between tourism
and internationalism. When Ford arrived in Honolulu, he ob-
served that surfing—Hawaii’s unique contribution to the world
of sports as well as a potential tourist attraction—was on the
verge of disappearance. Disturbed by this, he sponsored a
series of meetings during the spring of 1908 which led to the
formal organization of the club in May, the development of
surfing and canoeing programs, and the erection of a clubhouse
containing entertainment facilities.36 While the club itself was
not organized with internationalist ends in mind (indeed, from
the time of its inception to the present it has, so far as can
be determined, refused to accept people of Asian ancestry as
members), Ford made use of it as a site for various international
gatherings, and it thus became a factor in the revival of the
movement. The most notable incident in this respect occurred
during the 1915 congressional visit. London’s previously cited
paean to Ford and the Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club came
during a party for this group sponsored by the club. Warren G.
Harding, then a senator, was among those present, and he was
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The Outrigger Canoe Club’s original facility. Bishop Museum
particularly moved by the talk. Thereafter, he lent Ford consid-
erable encouragement and support, which in turn contributed
to the later success of the Pan-Pacific Union. Had the club not
existed, it is conceivable that this important connection would
not have been established.37
Clearly, then, tourism was a factor in the revival of
internationalism during the early years of the twentieth century.
Ford himself put it best when he said that one of his earliest
goals was “to enter into a Pan-Pacific campaign to attract travel
to the Pacific area, inviting writers, investors, educators, and
scientists to study the Pacific lands and make their potential
possibilities for new enterprises known to the world.”38 At the
same time, however, it is easy to overstate the importance of the
relationship. While many of the people associated with tourism
during this era were indeed internationalists who saw tourism
as a means to international ends, in all likelihood most of them
were entrepreneurs who viewed the enterprise as simply an-
other form of business. Despite his strenuous efforts to asso-
ciate the two undertakings, even Ford eventually had to admit
that the connection was sometimes tenuous.39
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This being the case, the revival of the movement would
never have occurred without forceful and dedicated leadership.
Of all who were involved in the effort, Ford was the most im-
portant. This, however, is due largely to chance. Born April 3,
1868, in Charleston, South Carolina, to Frederick Winthrop and
Mary Mazy Hume Ford, both members of prominent Southern
families, his childhood was unremarkable. Like many of his
contemporaries, he attended a military school—Porter Military
Academy in his case—in preparation for college and a subse-
quent career in business. A developing interest in journalism
and the theatre changed all this.40 Foregoing college, he joined
the staff of the Charleston News and Courier with hopes of es-
tablishing himself in the arts.41 Years later, he claimed that he
was sufficiently talented as a youthful playwright to have at-
tracted the attention of Samuel L. Clemens, but details of the
relationship are vague.42
Leaving Charleston during the 1880s, he settled in New York
and achieved some acclaim when his play, The Little Confed-
erate, was produced on Broadway in 1889. During this time he
also developed what would subsequently prove a useful talent
for cultivating the rich and the powerful. Jay Gould and Cyrus
W. Field, for example, were among his New York friends.43
Still in pursuit of a career in the arts, Ford moved to Chicago
around 1890, where he was involved in the publication of
several “little magazines,” but the effort foundered on economic
grounds. Reverting to journalism, he joined the Chicago Daily
News Record where he worked for nearly a decade, in the
process becoming active in local social and political affairs. Dis-
tressed by Chicago’s bigotry and provincialism, he used his
newspaper stories to editorialize on behalf of a more cosmopoli-
tan point of view among his readers, formed a number of or-
ganizations designed to combat racial prejudice, and created
the Society for the Prevention of Crime to lobby for changes in
police tactics.44 In addition, he became interested in religious
matters and joined the Militant Church of Chicago, an organi-
zation known both for its decidedly temporal slogan (“Deeds
not creeds. Act in this world, theorize in the next”) and its ecu-
menical governing board, which included an unfrocked Catholic
priest, a Greek Orthodox priest, a Baptist minister, a Methodist
minister, a Unitarian leader, a rabbi, an Episcopalian, and the
celebrated orator, politician, and agnostic, Robert G. Ingersoll.
Despite its unorthodox makeup, however, the church was deeply
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involved in social reform and offered such services as legal
assistance and drug clinics long before most conventional
churches developed similar concerns.45
These years were also important in the development of
Ford’s internationalist inclinations. By chance, one of his col-
leagues at the Daily News Record was William E. Curtiss, an
early advocate of regional international organizations and sub-
sequently a leading official of the Bureau of American Re-
publics, the predecessor of the Pan-American Union.46 Ford
later noted that it was Curtiss who convinced him of the impor-
tance of international cooperation and that he must, therefore,
be credited with at least some of the inspiration behind the Pan-
Pacific Union.47 This understates the case. Of all the activities
and causes Ford supported through the Union, none was more
important to him than a continuing effort to turn the organi-
zation into a Pacific Basin version of the Pan-American Union
and to obtain, at the expense of all else if need be, direct gov-
ernment sponsorship for it. His preoccupation with this end,
while helpful in bringing his activities to the attention of govern-
ments and political leaders, also led him to substitute political
aspiration for institutional philosophy within the organization.
In the long run, this predilection caused a rigidity of purpose
within the organization that proved to be a major factor in its
ultimate collapse.
Although he apparently gained some stature in Chicago,
Ford departed the city as abruptly as he came to it. A casual
meeting with a Russian businessman at a turn-of-the-century ex-
position led to a job offer in Vladivostok with the M.S. Nicde
Company, a supply firm involved with the construction of the
Trans-Siberian Railway. Inexperienced in business matters
though he was, Ford immediately accepted the offer and de-
parted for Russia via the Pacific. In all likelihood, this journey
is the cause of his later move to Hawaii. Sailing between Cal-
ifornia and Hawaii, he became friends with George, William,
and James Castle of the noted Island missionary-business family
and was their guest during his brief layover in Honolulu.48 In-
trigued, he later commented, with what he heard and saw of
Hawaii during the visit, he vowed to return in the future.49
Ford’s new job in Russia was apparently less than satis-
factory for he soon left it and returned to journalism. Between
the turn of the century and 1907 when he arrived again in
Hawaii, he traveled much of the world writing for such pub-
lications as Century, Harper’s Magazine, and McClure’s Mag-
azine. At the time of his return to the Islands, he was writing for
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Hampton’s Magazine on problems of race relations and immi-
gration.50 There is little record of his career during these years
save certain indications that he was a witness to such great
events of the era as the Boxer Rebellion in China and the 1905
Revolution in Russia.51
While it was a worldly wise Ford who returned to Honolulu,
he was still less sophisticated and cosmopolitan than he would
doubtless have been willing to admit. For example, despite his
earlier work with various ethnic groups, he never completely
purged himself of racist views. “I was brought up in the South,”
he once remarked, “and inherited a racial prejudice. Yet, on the
Pacific, I find I can control that prejudice toward all other races,
save that one race.”52 In fact, if the pages of Mid-Pacific Mag-
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azine are any indication, he merely substituted paternalism for
prejudice. Year after year he unremittingly used such pejorative
generalizations as the “inscrutable Oriental,” and “the placid
expression of the Asiatic.”53
Further, advanced as Ford’s internationalist ideas may have
been, they were hardly as original as he liked to portray them.
Indeed, virtually all his ventures were variations of under-
takings initiated earlier, particularly the Hague conferences and
the Pan-American Union. He was, in contrast with the image
he cultivated, more an adaptor than an innovator. He was also
somewhat less prophetic than he cared to admit. When, for in-
stance, the 1917 Revolution began in Russia, he drew upon his
experience in that country to make the unqualified prediction
that it would fail and that the real revolution would come under
Greek Orthodox church leadership.54 Likewise, he consistently
misjudged events within the internationalist movement, as ev-
idenced by his conviction that he had converted various com-
mercial organizations around the Pacific into Hands-Around-
the-Pacific clubs and his subsequent belief that the Pacific gov-
ernments would assume responsibility for the Pan-Pacific Union
and thereby unite the region under a single political structure.
Ford also suffered a debilitating penchant for simplistic
generalization and extraneous detail. To illustrate, one of his fa-
vorite explanations for problems in the Pacific centered around
the notion that world peace was dependent on equalized living
standards and, thus, greater opportunities for international
travel and exchange. However, having once outlined his basic
theme, he invariably turned away from it and slid into a ram-
bling description of possible steamship and railway routes, pro-
posed fare structures, likely hotel designs, and other changes
necessary to accommodate more travelers.55 Similarly, he once
undertook to reform the local Chamber of Commerce. His man-
ifesto, an article in Mid-Pacific Magazine, addressed the central
question for several paragraphs and then shifted to the matter
of constructing a new headquarters facility, going so far as to
suggest a location, physical specifications, likely tenants, and
anticipated rental income. Needless to say, the reform issue was
never again mentioned and, more to the point, the effort accom-
plished nothing.56
Finally, Ford was an egocentric man who frequently over-
stepped the bounds of propriety in satisfying his vanity. As in
the case of his “commission” from Frear, he sometimes misrep-
resented his position in an attempt to attract the attention of
highly placed people and whatever accolades they might direct
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toward him. Further, he felt compelled to inform all who might
listen of his stature in the circles of power and of the praise that
came his way. Mid-Pacific Magazine is full of dropped names
and reprints of assorted tributes to its editor.57 In sum, while
it is clear that Ford contributed immensely to the development
of the local internationalist tradition and deserves much of the
praise he received, it is equally clear that he was as much a
Babbitt as a Wilson.
FORMATION OF THE PAN-PACIFIC UNION
During the course of his early efforts to rekindle Hawaii’s in-
terest in international undertakings, Ford apparently concluded
that the Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club was not an adequate ve-
hicle for the task and that a new and more sophisticated organi-
zation less directly associated with commercial endeavors was
needed. Accordingly, on May 28, 1917, he and six others who
had been active in the Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club filed ar-
ticles of incorporation for the Pan-Pacific Union.58 In doing so,
they created a new organization that would transform Island
internationalism from a frequently ineffectual, often commer-
cially oriented, and generally little-known effort into an au-
thentic international movement, fundamentally concerned with
political and cultural relations throughout the Pacific, and
known the world over. Through its own efforts and those of
similar groups that grew out of it, the Union would capture the
imagination of Hawaii’s leaders to such a degree that legisla-
tures would fund its projects and governors would work on
them. It would bring the movement to the attention of the
American government and press and, to a slightly lesser degree,
governments and presses abroad. Finally and perhaps most
significantly, its varied array of international programs would
create at least a vague sense of common cause among the
people of the Pacific.
It goes without saying that considerable enthusiasm and
hope surrounded the formation of the Pan-Pacific Union, and
much of it is captured in the statement of goals filed at the time
of incorporation. It reads:
1. To call in conference delegates from and representatives of
all Pacific peoples for the purpose of discussing and fur-
thering the interests common to Pacific nations.
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2. To maintain in Honolulu a bureau of information and edu-
cation concerning matters of interest to the people of the Pa-
cific, and to disseminate to the world information of every
kind of progress and opportunities in Pacific lands, and
to promote the comfort and interests of all visitors to the
Hawaiian islands.
3. To aid and assist those in Hawaii and from other Pacific com-
munities to better understand each other and to work to-
gether for the furtherance of the best interests of the land of
their adoption, and, through them, to spread abroad about
the Pacific the friendly spirit of interracial cooperation.
4. To assist and to aid the different Pacific races in Hawaii to co-
operate in local fairs, to raise produce, and to create home
manufactured goods.
5. To own real estate or erect buildings needed for housing ex-
hibits, dioramas, art galleries, or in taking care of visitors.
6. To maintain a Pan-Pacific Commercial Museum and Art
Gallery of Hawaiian and Pacific paintings.
7. To create dioramas, gather exhibits, books and other material
of educational or instructive value.
8. To promote and conduct in Honolulu, which is also called the
“Cross-Roads of the Pacific,” a Pan-Pacific Exposition of the
handicrafts of the people about the Great Ocean, and espe-
cially of their works of art and scenic dioramas of the most
beautiful bits of Pacific lands, as well as illustrating the im-
portant industries of the different countries of the Pacific.
9. To establish and maintain at the said “Cross-Roads of the Pa-
cific” a permanent college and clearinghouse of information
(printed and otherwise) concerning the lands, commerce,
people, and trade opportunities in countries of the Pacific,
and training young men in commercial knowledge of Pacific
lands.
10. To secure in furtherance of those objects, the cooperation
and support of Federal and State Governments, Chambers
of Commerce, City Governments, and of individuals.
11. To enlist for this work of publicity in behalf of Alaska, the
Territory of Hawaii, the Philippines, and other American
possessions in the Pacific, Federal aid and financial support,
as well as similar cooperation and support from all Pacific
governments, in establishing at the said “Crossroads” of
the Greatest of Oceans, to wit, the Pacific, a PAN-PACIFIC
UNION, to act as Bureau of Information to the world at large
and for Pacific lands and interests.
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12. To bring all nations and peoples about the Pacific Ocean into
closer friendly commercial contact and relationship.59
In an important step toward amassing the support necessary
to transform these objectives into programs, Ford put together
a slate of officers and trustees from the elite stratum of Island
society. Former Governor Frear accepted the position of pres-
ident and Frank C. Atherton, a powerful figure in business and
politics who would later emerge as an internationalist leader
in his own right, agreed to serve as the first vice president. C.
K. Ai, Frank F. Baldwin, William R. Castle, J. P. Cooke, Richard
Cooke, Syngman Rhee, and George N. Wilcox, likewise potent
figures within the community, were also on the list of initial of-
ficials. Ford modestly settled for the position of corresponding
secretary.60 However, while it is true that the organization’s
chances for success were greatly enhanced by the support of
such leaders, it should also be noted that this group was in no
fashion representative of the local populace. Perhaps there was
no practical alternative at the time, but the fact remains that the
Union’s leadership was drawn almost exclusively from the gov-
erning elite and that multiethnic participation—surely of basic
importance given the group’s stated aims—was at best limited.
If Ford was aware of potential problems in this respect, he
did not show it. In a newspaper interview several days prior to
incorporation, he fairly bubbled with enthusiasm over planned
activities. He was especially excited about the prospects for an
international commercial college and was anxious to see work
begin on a complex of museums and meeting halls that would
form the nucleus of a permanent “Pan-Pacific” exposition site.
He also waxed enthusiastic about Hawaii’s role as a model so-
ciety—a “natural experiment station” as he put it—and how
local progress in interracial cooperation could be publicized
throughout the Pacific.61 Whatever else may be said about his
powers of prediction, he was remarkably prescient in his se-
lection of these examples. Disregarding the commercial em-
phasis, his rationale for the college is not significantly different
from that which led to the creation of the East-West Center
some forty years later; his call for a major conference center
was realized when the Honolulu International Center (now Neal
S. Blaisdell Memorial Center) was completed during the 1960s;
and his comments upon the unique attributes of local society
have since become standard references in publicity about the
Islands.
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For all the support and enthusiasm, the public paid scant
attention to the Union during the first years of its existence.
The newspapers gave it little subsequent notice (for example,
the Honolulu Star-Bulletin, the principal evening paper, barely
noted its formation and then only to comment that it might lend
some support to an ongoing food preservation campaign62), and
few people rushed to its standard. As a consequence, it accom-
plished little during these years. Indeed, its only recorded ac-
tivity during the 1917 period was the preparation of a “service
flag” containing the names of Outrigger Canoe Club charter
members serving in the military.63 On reflection, none of this
is surprising. By incorporating at the very time America was
preparing to enter World War I, Ford had selected the worst
possible moment. Patriotism and nationalism, not visionary in-
ternationalism, were the order of the day.
By mid-1918 talk of peace and the formation of the League
of Nations changed the local climate of opinion. Newspapers
at last took serious note of the Union, endorsing its plan for
an international commercial college as well as its proposal for
a postwar “peace exposition” in Honolulu. The prime ministers
of Australia and New Zealand—William M. Hughes and W. F.
Massey, respectively—endorsed the latter project which in turn
brought it to the attention of the American national press.64
During May of that year, Secretary of the Interior Franklin K.
Lane visited Hawaii and was persuaded by Ford to attend a
Union-sponsored Pan-Pacific celebration that ended with repre-
sentatives of various ethnic groups presenting Lane with the
flags of their ancestral homelands and asking that he present
them to President Wilson.65 Lane was so moved by the event
that he delivered an impromptu speech endorsing the Union, at-
tended a specially called Union meeting, and agreed to become
the honorary president of the Pan-Pacific Association, a short-
lived organization designed to complement the work of the
Union.66 To further celebrate the occasion, Prime Ministers
Hughes and Massey and President Wilson were named as hon-
orary presidents of the Union itself.67 When Lane left Hawaii, he
did so as Ford’s friend and the Union’s advocate, a development
that would prove to be of great subsequent importance.
Throughout these months of renewed activity, Ford also paid
attention to the more ordinary aspects of the Union’s program.
He scheduled regular meetings, one of which attracted over
four hundred people including Prince Jonah Kuhio Kalanianaole,
at the time Hawaii’s delegate to Congress, and had to be moved
from the organization’s new headquarters in the University
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Club to the Alexander Young Hotel’s rooftop garden.68 In ad-
dition, he organized a series of special events such as the week-
long “Inter-Island Pan-Pacific Conference” held during Sep-
tember 1918. Called to discuss “service to Hawaii and the
world,” this gathering was attended mainly by representatives
of commercial interests from the various islands who spent most
of the time debating local economic matters.69 Only one day was
actually devoted to the Union and its objectives, but even this
was too visionary for some. The Maui delegation objected that it
had come to Honolulu to discuss sugar and that delegates best
take care not to dream of schemes which might jeopardize the
status of that crop.70 Ford was not discouraged, however. With
some justification he felt that the fact such individuals even at-
tended was a significant step forward.
Aided by continued newspaper support, Ford maintained
the organization’s momentum despite a momentary lapse of in-
terest following the relatively frantic round of activities during
1918. Meetings were held regularly. Civic improvement projects
ranging from parks to low-cost housing developments were dis-
cussed if never undertaken.71 Efforts were made to create a
Pacific-wide federation of clubs by transforming the groups that
had earlier affiliated with the old Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club
into a union of Pan-Pacific Clubs. Although this met with failure
everywhere except Tokyo and, of course, Honolulu, it kept the
group’s name before the public. Proposals for international con-
ferences ranging from banking to youth work were developed
and publicized. Finally, a new publication entitled the Bulletin
of the Pan-Pacific Union was initiated as a supplement to Mid-
Pacific Magazine.72
These efforts bore results. The superintendent of Hawaii’s
public school system took note of the Union and pledged to add
an internationalist perspective to the school curriculum.73 The
Nippu Jiji, a leading Japanese-language newspaper, endorsed
the Union as the best hope for improving race relations in
Hawaii.74 Most important, in 1919 the territorial legislature, re-
sponding to the rising tide of internationalist activism, appro-
priated $10,000 to assist the Union in starting its long-planned
conference program.75 This led to a series of conferences during
the 1920s that in turn brought attention and fame to both the
Union and Hawaii.
Prior to the convening of the first conference in 1920,
various events occurred that further accelerated the Union’s
growing momentum. Invited to address the Third World’s
Christian Citizenship Conference in Pittsburgh during No-
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vember 1919 (an invitation that in itself was an indication of
the Union’s new stature76), Ford used the trip as an opportunity
to extend his contacts with government leaders which were
limited at this point to his friendships with Harding and Lane.77
Traveling to Washington following the talk, he arranged a
meeting of senators and representatives where he showed pro-
motional movies on Hawaii and the Union.78 He staged similar
meetings for a group of Pacific Basin diplomatic officials and
obtained their pledge of support for the pending conference.79
He even managed to persuade President Wilson, ill though
he was, to view the promotional materials.80 Following these
meetings, he created something of a sensation by publicly of-
fering the presidency and the executive directorship of the
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Union to Wilson and Lane, respectively, following their de-
parture from office. While some were offended by the audacity
of this act, others defended it.81 Although it produced no new
slate of officers, it did result in still more publicity for the Union
and, not incidentally, Ford.
Buoyed by success, Ford embarked upon another venture
that, if his recollection of it is in any fashion correct, must count
as one of the more remarkable Capitol Hill episodes. Desiring
federal assistance for the pending conference to supplement
the funds already appropriated by the territory, he asked Lane
to draft an amendment to the Diplomatic and Consular Act of
1919 then under consideration. Accompanied by Prince Kuhio
and several other officials from Hawaii, he approached Senator
Henry Cabot Lodge who, as chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, would have to support the amendment if it
were to pass. As might have been expected given the ongoing
struggle over the League of Nations, Lodge was simply not in-
terested in appropriating funds for such activities. Leaving the
senator’s office, Ford decided to make a final attempt. As he re-
calls it:
I left my colleagues and walked up to the Senator. “Mr. Lodge,” I
said, as I brought my fist down on his desk, “you may not be in-
terested in helping to bring together the leaders in Pacific lands
for better understanding, but up there in the White House lies a
man crucified to a bed of suffering, and even in his agony he is at
this moment gazing on moving pictures of a pageant of all Pacific
peoples who have brought the flags of their countries to Hawaii to
be sent to the martyr at the White House in token of their fealty to
the ideals of better understanding among the peoples about our
great ocean.” I got no further. Senator Lodge sprang to his feet
and exclaimed, “Yes! That man at the White House has time to
look at your Pan-Pacific films, but he hasn’t a moment to receive
us Senators.”
I beamed on the Senator. “Now, Mr. Lodge,” I said, “that your
interest is aroused, will you listen to our plan for a Pan-Pacific
League of Nations?” Senator Lodge, for once not only smiled,
but he gave vent to a hearty laugh and put out his hand. “Sit
down,” he said, “let’s talk it over.” And we did. In five minutes
Senator Lodge was an enthusiastic supporter of the Union. “I
don’t believe we can ever have a League of Nations composed
of the countries around the Atlantic,” he said, “for the traditions
there have always been traditions of envy and hatred, thousands
of years in Europe of war, envy and hatred. A world league of
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nations is a mad dream for the present, but out there in the Pa-
cific, where you have never had a serious quarrel, your traditions
are predominantly traditions of peace; there is the place to begin
the work of a real League of Nations. You may do it there, and
I am for such a League. How much do you want?” “Only nine
thousand dollars.” Again the Senator smiled. “Very well, my com-
mittee meets in five minutes, I will tack this on as an amendment.
Come back in an hour.”82
The appropriation was obtained and the Pacific Commercial Ad-
vertiser spoke for everyone when it editorialized that Ford had
succeeded “in doing what everybody here considered the impos-
sible.”83
Ford brought his stay in Washington to an end with another
grand gesture. He proposed a congressional junket to Hawaii
and on to the Orient following the Democratic party convention
in San Francisco during June 1920.84 Whether or not it was
Ford’s doing, such a trip was announced early in April, and
he immediately hosted a luncheon for all participants at the
Cosmos Club.85 It is of more than passing interest to note that
he attached himself to this group once it arrived in Hawaii and
remained with it during its travels in Asia despite the fact that
this forced him to bypass the long-awaited 1920 conference.86
Clearly he was more interested in politics and promotion than
administration, at once a strength basic to the Union’s initial
success and a weakness that would contribute to its eventual
ruin.
Supported by both the federal and territorial governments,
the Union entered upon a period of unbounded optimism and
enthusiasm. For the first time, it had the means of translating its
rhetoric into action. Further and more important, believing that
it was operating under formal government sanction, it began to
anticipate the day when governments would assume full respon-
sibility for its operation under arrangements similar to those en-
joyed by the Pan-American Union and thus bring to pass what
Ford, at least, always felt was its ultimate destiny.87 The crucial
breakthrough was in the offing.
Success bred success. With one international conference
underway, a long list of subsequent gatherings and a host of re-
lated activities were discussed before an increasingly interested
audience of government officials, businessmen, educators, and
scientists from numerous Pacific Basin countries. Their enthu-
siasm encouraged still others to pledge support. For example,
Representative Stephen G. Porter, chairman of the House Com-
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mittee on Foreign Affairs, wrote Ford of his belief “that the Pan-
Pacific Union … [would] be productive of beneficial results as
great as these now flowing from the Pan-American Union.”88
Representative Louis B. Goodall of Maine wrote, “Perhaps the
Pan-Pacific Union is the beginning of something that may grow
into a real practical world League of Nations.”89 Even the White
House entered the act. In accepting an honorary presidency
within the organization and continuing the practice established
earlier by Hughes, Massey, and Wilson, President Harding
stated the hope that the Union would “become an instrumental-
ity of progress and development, and an inspiration to peace
and cooperation, such as the Pan American Union has been
in the relations among the states of the Western Continent.”90
Presidents Coolidge and Hoover would express similar sen-
timents as they accepted the same position following their
election to office. Nor were such comments limited to Amer-
icans. Among others, Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie-King of
Canada wrote Ford praising “the worthy aims and aspirations
of the Pan-Pacific Union … [which are of great] patriotic …
[and] international value … [in the] promotion of peace and
progress.”91 Finally, increasing numbers of newspapers gave
the Union their editorial endorsement during these years.92
The leaders of the Union responded to this onslaught of
praise and publicity with predictable enthusiasm. Ford, con-
vinced that his fondest hopes for the Union were soon to be re-
alized, wrote Governor McCarthy shortly after Congress agreed
to support the 1920 conference that the Pacific governments
would probably assume responsibility for the organization
within the next eighteen months.93 A year later, the group was
discussing an even more ambitious vision which had the Union
evolving into a Pacific-based League of Nations. With character-
istic hyperbole, Ford explained this possibility in a paper he pre-
pared for the National Council for the Limitation of Armament
in 1922. “The idea of a world league of nations was born in
a manger in Bethlehem,” he proclaimed, “[and] is now coming
true at last … for in the Pacific will be born a league of nations
that will lighten and illuminate the whole world.”94
The Union was not alone in its enthusiasm. The Star-Bul-
letin, previously less than enthusiastic, reversed itself and ob-
served that “Hawaii is destined to become the ‘Hague of the
Pacific’—but with a name and fame not borrowed but all its
own—a center where representatives of all nations bordering
the western ocean may meet in conference to discuss and solve
their individual and joint problems…. To some this may seem a
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chimerical dream, but who knows but that some day an area of
ground on one of the Hawaiian islands may be set aside with
its independence guaranteed by all nations, as the Hague of the
Pacific, perhaps the Hague of the World?”95 Not to be outdone,
the territorial government lent further endorsement by adding a
section on the Union in its annual report to the Secretary of the
Interior beginning in 1921 and, more significantly, continued
appropriating funds for the group’s activities.96
In some instances, excitement over the Union’s new-found
acceptance developed into sheer giddiness. In 1921, for ex-
ample, Ford suggested to President Harding that Honolulu be
made the “summer capital” of the country as it “is the central
city of the United States … halfway between Maine and Manila,
and Alaska and Samoa.”97 He went on to argue that if the pres-
ident were to spend his summers in Hawaii, leaders of other Pa-
cific nations would be more likely to visit him and the creation
of a “Pan-Pacific League of Nations” would thus be facilitated.98
When an even more fanciful proposal to rebuild Honolulu as the
“spiritual capital of the world … [and] a forum of the nations”
came from the World Conscious Society in 1922, Ford endorsed
it outright in Mid-Pacific Magazine.99
It goes without saying that much of the rhetoric of this
period was something less than sensible. Remote and relatively
unimportant, Hawaii was simply not a practical site for such
developments, and, in all likelihood, most speakers in fact rec-
ognized this. Sifting the general rhetoric from the actual com-
mitments of support, it is clear that meaningful backing for
the Union was limited almost solely to particular conferences.
Comments about more ambitious undertakings were seldom
more than well-meant but idle musings. However, while all this
would later become evident and eventually prove to be a major
factor in the Union’s collapse, it is understandable that Ford
and his colleagues did not detect it at the time. The success
that the movement was enjoying and the barrage of encour-
agement it was receiving created an atmosphere of incredible
optimism that actively discouraged such pessimistic analysis
and reflection. On the contrary, it inspired the belief that the
movement’s ultimate objectives were verging on realization and
that the support necessary to propel Hawaii into its long-des-
tined role as a Pacific regional leader had finally developed. As
Seward had earlier prophesied, the Pacific was soon to be the
“chief theatre” of global affairs, and Hawaii, they were quick
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to note, would be on center stage.100 Such ideas, unrealistic as
they may be in historical perspective, were clearly in command
of events.
UNION SPONSORED CONFERENCES
The Union’s programmatic zenith also came during the 1920s.
Believing sponsorship of international gatherings to be the most
effective means of transforming the Union into a government-
sponsored organization and thereby assuring Hawaii its des-
tined place in world affairs, Ford and his colleagues arranged
ten major conferences in Honolulu, one elsewhere, and partici-
pated in several others during these years.101 In addition, they
played key roles in the formation of several new groups which
embarked upon conference programs of their own, and, as in
the past, supported a variety of other activities less directly re-
lated to the conference program.
The Union’s first conference in 1920 grew from the Hands-
Around-the-Pacific Club’s desire to sponsor an exposition in
Honolulu on the order of those held in San Francisco and San
Diego in 1915 and 1916. World War I disrupted plans for the
exposition, but the general concept was retained and ultimately
became a part of the Union’s programming effort. By the end of
the war, Union leaders had revised the original plans into a pro-
posal for a “Pan-Pacific Commercial and Educational Congress”
to be held during 1920 or 1921. The territorial legislature, as
noted, funded this proposal in 1919, adding the proviso that
at least three other Pacific nations must also contribute funds
before the appropriation would be made available and that the
funds must be used to support more than one gathering.102
Following the action of the legislature, Governor McCarthy
appointed a planning committee under the chairmanship of G.
P. Denison, a Union activist. Ford, always more concerned with
proposing than planning, was in Washington and Asia during
most of this period and was not directly involved. Denison’s
group changed the subject of the conference to science and in-
vited H. E. Gregory, director of Honolulu’s respected Bishop
Museum, to direct it.103 Working with the Committee on Pacific
Exploration of the National Research Council, Gregory put to-
gether an agenda dealing with anthropology, biology, botany,
entomology, geography, geology, and seismology/volcanology in
the Pacific and renamed the gathering the “First Pan-Pacific
Science Congress.”104 Apparently impressed by the prepara-
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tions, Australia and New Zealand contributed a total of $3,000
to support the gathering.105 A subsequent contribution of
$1,000 by China satisfied the legislature’s conditions and the
planners were free to call the conference. This occurred in
April when the Department of State issued official invitations on
behalf of the Union.106
Response to the invitations was good. When the meeting
convened on August 2, 1920, 103 delegates from Australia,
Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United
Kingdom, and the United States were present. Joined by forty
observers from Hawaii, they spent eighteen days presenting
138 papers on the seven topics of the conference and passing
forty resolutions concerning Pacific scientific and instructional
needs.107 More important, they voted to form a steering com-
mittee independent of the Union to plan for a subsequent gath-
ering.108 The Union, perceiving itself as a catalyst, did not
object. Working diligently, the steering committee organized the
Second Pan-Pacific Science Congress which met in Melbourne
and Sydney during the summer of 1923 where, among other
things, the delegates voted to create a separate organization
for Pacific scientists. Known as the Pacific Science Association,
this group is still active and has conducted a long succession
of conferences for Pacific scientists.109 Ford, who was in Asia at
the time and attended the meeting, was pleased by the group’s
initiative and would have been even happier if he could have
foreseen the ultimate outcome.110
The Union’s next major gathering occurred in 1921 when
the First Pan-Pacific Educational Conference met in Honolulu
during August. Although made possible in part by the territorial
legislature’s original grant, the immediate impetus for this
meeting came when the federal government indicated an in-
terest in a conference dealing with comparative educational
conditions in the Pacific and asked the Union to undertake the
task. Assistance from the Bureau of Education in the Depart-
ment of Interior and government-issued invitations were
promised as incentives.111 The Union, predictably, was inter-
ested. As a consequence, F. F. Bunker from the Bureau of Ed-
ucation (who was subsequently hired for a brief period as the
Union’s executive secretary) was appointed to direct the
meeting, and David Starr Jordan, the outspoken Progressive
party leader, former president of Stanford University, and long-
time Union supporter, was selected as its presiding officer.112
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Eighty-six delegates representing seventeen Pacific Basin
countries as well as representatives from numerous private
organizations attended. Following opening ceremonies high-
lighted by a letter of greeting from President Harding, the del-
egates attended a variety of workshops and enjoyed a lively
entertainment schedule. Their most significant activity involved
resolutions. Largely ignoring educational topics, they concen-
trated upon such issues as peace, disarmament, and race rela-
tions, thus indicating their belief that these matters were of
paramount importance in the Pacific. It is also worth noting that
the local community, increasingly caught up in the enthusiasm
generated by the Union, provided considerable assistance with
conference arrangements.113 In the balance, however, the gath-
ering accomplished little. No organization similar to the Pacific
Science Association grew from it nor did it inspire any subse-
quent activity of note.
With three exceptions, much the same can be said of the
remainder of the Union’s conferences. Despite considerable
publicity and various forms of government involvement, the only
substantial outcome of most of these gatherings was the oppor-
tunity they provided for regional consultation. Worthwhile as
this may have been, their lack of more precisely envisioned ends
rendered them less consequential than might otherwise have
been the case. Gatherings that fall into this category are the
Pan-Pacific Press Conference of October 1921 which was held
in conjunction with the World’s Press Congress then meeting
in Honolulu; the First Pan-Pacific Commercial Conference of
October-November 1922; a “sub-conference” on Pacific edu-
cation which was an adjunct to the National Education As-
sociation’s World Conference on Education which met in San
Francisco in June-July 1923; the First Pan-Pacific Food Conser-
vation Congress of August 1924; and the Pan-Pacific Education,
Recreation, Rehabilitation and Reclamation Conference (often
cited simply as the Pan-Pacific Educational Conference, which
is confusing as this is also the title of the Union’s second gath-
ering) of April 1926.114 However, as formal government recog-
nition was the Union’s real goal, all its conferences were seen
primarily as vehicles for achieving this end, and it was less than
totally concerned about their actual substance.
If little came of most of these conferences, three others
held during the same period—the First Pan-Pacific Women’s
Conference of August 1928, the Second Pan-Pacific Women’s
Conference of August 1930, and the Pan-Pacific Surgical Con-
ference of August 1929—did produce results of lasting signifi-
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cance. Although the Union intitiated these conferences much as
it had the other gatherings and apparently had no precise ob-
jectives in mind, both groups responded in the same fashion as
the scientists and created their own independent organizations
which are likewise still active. Delegates to the two women’s
conferences formed the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association (now
the Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women’s Association), and
those attending the surgeons’ meeting organized the Pan-Pa-
cific Surgical Congress (now the Pan-Pacific Surgical Associ-
ation).
The origins of the women’s organization lie in a statement
by a delegate to the 1924 conference on food conservation con-
cerning the desirability of a meeting to explore the status of
women in the Pacific.115 Intrigued with the idea, the Union
promptly announced that it would sponsor such a gathering
in 1928 and grandiloquently stated that it would concern “all
matters of interest to women.”116 Preparations were initiated
immediately by a group of Honolulu women who negotiated an
agreement with Ford whereby the Union would provide funding
for the conference but leave all decisions to the planners.117
This proved to be a good arrangement. Driven by enthusiasm
and feminist conviction, the planners arranged for Jane
Addams, then perhaps the best-known woman in America, to
chair the meeting, overcame serious obstacles regarding the
agenda and the choice of delegates, and prevailed upon Gov-
ernor Wallace R. Farrington to persuade the Department of
State to issue formal invitations to the various Pacific countries
despite the fact that the conference was in no sense a govern-
mental undertaking.118 As a result, when the 338 delegates and
observers assembled at Punahou School in Honolulu on August
9, 1928, for the ten-day gathering, they were treated to what
was probably the best prepared and publicized gathering yet to
occur under Union auspices.
In addition to presenting the usual papers and addresses,
the delegates adopted a series of resolutions mandating further
research on a variety of topics pertaining to women in the
Pacific and established working committees to accomplish the
tasks.119 Tackling their assignments with enthusiasm, these
committees completed their work during the following year.
However, noteworthy as this effort may be, it is less important
than the delegates’ decision to create a planning task group
charged with arranging a subsequent gathering in 1930. In-
spired by praise from a wide variety of other organizations
and the Union’s continuing financial support, this group pre-
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Jane Addams at the first Pan-Pacific
Women’s Association conference. Bishop
Museum
pared an agenda for the meeting that, among other things,
recommended the formation of a separate and independent Pa-
cific women’s association. When the conference convened once
again at Punahou School during August, this recommendation
was endorsed, and the Pan-Pacific Women’s Association—the
first international women’s group in the Pacific and the first
anywhere to be founded upon transcultural premises—came
into being, pledged, in the words of its original constitution,
“to strengthen the bonds of peace among Pacific people by
promoting a better understanding and friendship among the
women of all Pacific countries [and] to initiate and promote co-
operation among the women of the Pacific region for the study
and betterment of existing social conditions.”120
Although the group has subsequently attracted little at-
tention, it has met regularly since 1930 and labored fruitfully if
rather quietly to raise the level of transcultural understanding
among its various Pacific Basin members. Fitting recognition
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of this effort came in 1955 when the United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) extended
“consultative status” to the Association.121 Joining some one
hundred other nongovernmental organizations with special in-
ternational competence, the group has since been a regular par-
ticipant in UNESCO undertakings.122
Prior to the second women’s conference, the Union spon-
sored the Pan-Pacific Surgical Conference during August 1929.
Since the early years of the decade, the Union had talked of
sponsoring a conference on medical issues within the Pacific,
but no action was taken. In 1925, the Hawaiian Medical Society
undertook the organization of such a gathering and proposed
that it be held in conjunction with the anticipated women’s
conference.123 While this proposal attracted some attention, it
failed to arouse sufficient interest and was dropped. A year
later, Nils P. Larsen, medical director of Honolulu’s Queen’s
Hospital and a Union participant, proposed another conference
and suggested that its basic purpose be the formation of a
Pacific-wide medical association.124 This time the response was
more enthusiastic. A conference on surgery was called and 115
doctors from thirteen Pacific countries were present when it
convened.125 Like the second women’s conference, the meeting
itself was interesting, but the more significant development
came when the delegates elected to create the Pan-Pacific Sur-
gical Congress as an independent international organization.
Meeting periodically since its formation, this group has become
one of the Pacific Basin’s principal medical associations as well
as one of the few enduring monuments to the Union’s efforts.
It is reasonably clear that Ford and his colleagues would
be better remembered today had they concentrated simply on
arranging conferences for groups with focused interests and a
need for continuing consultation, like the scientists, the women,
and the surgeons. They were not, however, so inclined. Their
attention was riveted to the task of brokering a leadership
role for Hawaii in Pacific affairs, and almost any proposal that
even hinted at progress toward this end was, in their eyes,
worthy of attention and support. The problem, of course, is
that such tactics were based on unsound premises. Others con-
cerned with Pacific affairs were simply not yet ready to turn the
scepter over to Hawaii, and the Union’s ultimate hopes were
thus doomed from the outset. As had been the case before, the
Union’s enthusiastic internationalism blinded it to geopolitical
realities.
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OTHER UNION PROGRAMS
Sponsorship of international conferences was not the Union’s
sole concern during the 1920s. Attention was also devoted to
the definition of objectives, the revision of institutional arrange-
ments, and the development of special programs. In the first in-
stance, the Union prepared a new statement of goals in 1925
that acknowledged its increasing concern for transnational and
transcultural issues at the expense of commercial matters and,
in less direct fashion, its hopes with respect to obtaining formal
governmental recognition and sponsorship. The full text is as
follows:
From year to year the scope of the work before the Pan-Pacific
Union has broadened, until today it assumes some of the aspects
of a friendly unofficial Pan-Pacific League of Nations, a destiny
that both the late Franklin K. Lane and Henry Cabot Lodge pre-
dicted for it.
The Pan-Pacific Union has conducted a number of successful
conferences; scientific, educational, journalistic, commercial, and
lastly and most vital of all, that on the conservation of food and
food products in the Pacific area, for the Pacific regions from now
on must insure the world against the horrors of food shortage and
its inevitable conclusion.
The real serious human action of the Pan-Pacific Union
begins. It is following up the work of the Pan-Pacific Food Conser-
vation Conference by the establishment of a Pan-Pacific Research
Institution where primarily the study and work will be along the
lines necessary in solving the problems of food production and
conservation in the Pacific area—land and sea. Added to this, will
be the study of race and population problems that so vitally affect
our vast area of the Pacific, the home of more than half of the
peoples who inhabit this planet. The thoughts and actions of these
peoples and races toward each other as they are today, and as
they should be, for the welfare of all, will be a most important
problem before the Union, as well as the problem of feeding in
the future those teeming swarms of races, that must be well fed
to preserve a peaceful attitude toward each other.
The Pan-Pacific Union is an organization in no way the agency
of any Pacific Government, yet having the goodwill of all, with the
Presidents and Premiers of Pacific lands as its honorary heads.
Affiliated and working with the Pan-Pacific Union are Chambers
of Commerce, educational, scientific and other bodies. It is sup-
ported in part by government and private appropriations and sub-
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scriptions. Its central office is in Honolulu, because of its location
at the ocean’s crossroads. Its management is under an interna-
tional board.
The following are the chief aims and objects of the Pan-Pacific
Union:
1. To bring together from time to time, in friendly conference,
leaders in all lines of thought and action in the Pacific area, that
they may become better acquainted; to assist in pointing them
toward cooperative effort for the advancement of those interests
that are common to all the peoples.
2. To bring together ethical leaders from every Pacific land
who will meet for the study of problems of fair dealings and ways
to advance international justice in the Pacific area, that misunder-
standing may be cleared.
3. To bring together from time to time scientific and other
leaders from Pacific lands who will present the great vital Pan-Pa-
cific scientific problems including those of race and population,
that must be confronted, and if possible, solved by the present
generation of Pacific peoples and those to follow.
4. To follow out the recommendations of the scientific and
other leaders in the encouragement of all scientific research of
value to Pacific peoples; in the establishment of a Research Insti-
tution where such need seems to exist, or in aiding in the estab-
lishment of such institutions.
5. To secure and collate accurate information concerning the
material resources of Pacific lands; to study the ideas and
opinions that mould public opinion among the peoples of the
several Pacific races, and to bring men together who can under-
standingly discuss these in a spirit of fairness that they may point
out a true course of justice in dealing with them internationally.
6. To bring together in round table discussion in every Pacific
land those of all races resident therein who desire to bring about
better understanding and cooperative effort among the peoples
and races of the Pacific for their common advancement, material
and spiritual.
7. To bring all nations and peoples about the Pacific Ocean
into closer friendly commercial contact and relationship. To aid
and assist those in all Pacific communities to better understand
each other, and through them, spread abroad about the Pacific the
friendly spirit of interracial cooperation.126
Apparently satisfied with this document, the Union never again
revised it.
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The Union’s growing concern for international peace and
understanding is also evident in a number of the more specific
activities it sponsored during the 1920s. For example, both
Mid-Pacific Magazine and the Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union
addressed the issue with increasing intensity throughout the
period.127 In 1922 a “Minister of Friendship” award was created
to honor outstanding contributions to the betterment of Pacific
Basin relationships. Chonosuke Yada, a former Japanese consul
general in Honolulu, was the first recipient, while his successor,
Keiichi Yamasaki, Prince Chandaburi of Siam, and David Starr
Jordan were among the subsequent recipients.128 Further, the
earlier suggestion that an area in Hawaii might somehow be
designated as an international territory where all varieties of in-
ternational organizations could be headquartered was revived
and promoted. Frequent efforts were made to persuade Wash-
ington of the wisdom of such a move. The volcano region on
the island of Hawaii and Palmyra Island south of Hawaii were
frequently mentioned as possible sites, but the Department of
State refused to take the proposals seriously.129 Ford remained
optimistic about the possibility, however, and in a burst of en-
thusiasm once declared that the process was all but complete
and that henceforth Hawaii should be considered “our new
Geneva.”130
The Union’s structure was also modified during this period.
The early practice of involving various national political figures
as honorary officers and Hawaiian political and business leaders
as active officers was continued, but most other aspects of
the original organizational structure were modified.131 Non-
functioning affiliate organizations such as the Pan-Pacific As-
sociation were simply dropped. The effort to foster Pan-Pacific
Clubs in cities around the Pacific was continued, but with-
out great success.132 Little was accomplished except in Hon-
olulu and Tokyo, and even these clubs seldom attempted to do
more than schedule luncheon meetings whenever an impressive
guest was available.133 Hence, partly by design and partly by de-
fault, the effort to federalize the Union never materialized and
it became instead increasingly centralized.
The Union also sponsored a number of more specific ac-
tivities during these years. Some were carried over from the
program of the Hands-Around-the-Pacific Club. In this regard,
the Balboa Day/Pacific Day festivities and the 12–12–12 sessions
are most noteworthy. The festival continued for a number of
years before finally fading into obscurity during the 1930s. The
12–12–12 group followed a similar course. It met on a regular
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Alexander Hume Ford at Pan-Pacific Union headquarters. Bishop
Museum
basis until 1923 when Ford restructured it into several different
ethnic subsections (Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Filipino, and
Caucasian) called Good Relations Clubs.134 The intent of the re-
organization was to reach a greater number of participants, and
the new groups, with Governor Farrington as an active member,
attracted considerable initial attention. However, when little
of consequence occurred during the first few years, they too
drifted into inactivity.135
In addition to continuing certain older programs, the Union
initiated a variety of new “Pan-Pacific” projects. Ford had
spoken of organizing an international commercial college at
the time the Union was incorporated in 1917. He remained
interested in the idea and actually prepared articles of incor-
poration during 1920.136 Nothing further transpired, however,
and, with the exception of a brief flurry of renewed interest
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in 1931, the project was dropped. Similarly, a Pan-Pacific Pub-
licity Council was formed in 1920 to disseminate international
news items throughout the Pacific and a Pan-Pacific Information
Bureau was created the following year to serve Pacific ed-
ucators’ needs, but neither functioned effectively or long.137
Attempts to form a Pan-Pacific chamber of commerce and a
Pan-Pacific bar association during the early 1920s were even
less successful, although a Pan-Pacific Union Women’s Auxiliary
was established in 1926 and functioned briefly during the two
women’s conferences.138
Union leaders were also concerned with programs for youth.
A Junior Pan-Pacific Union was organized in 1922 and a group
of Georgetown University students was encouraged to form a
Pan-Pacific Students’ Association in 1923. Although these un-
dertakings failed, the effort was revived early in 1926 when the
Union hired a YMCA staff worker to establish a youth program
and began publishing a youth-oriented bulletin, Pan-Pacific
Youth, composed largely of articles on world peace, student
ideals, and various student movements.139 At the same time,
it also established a Cosmopolitan Club at the University of
Hawaii.140 Created to foster interracial amity within the student
community, the club functioned until the early 1960s. An effort
was made to create a network of similar clubs around the
Pacific and join them with a revived Junior Pan-Pacific Union,
but it was unsuccessful.141 Only one chapter was actually orga-
nized.142 In fact, with the exception of the Cosmopolitan Club
and some periodic essay contests for public school children,
the Union’s entire youth program collapsed by the end of the
decade. Pan-Pacific Youth was dropped, the youth director left,
and the various other youth-oriented proposals were quietly
shelved. Despite the many expressions of interest, participation
was simply not sufficient.
Other auxiliary projects attempted during these years were
even less successful. A Pan-Pacific Olympiad, a Honolulu “free
port” movement, an international radio program, a textbook
preparation project, a shipboard study program, a revival of
Hawaiian music, a businessmen’s “commercial esperanto”
program, and a reconstruction project for traditional Hawaiian
villages are among the many projects the Union endorsed but
was unable to organize.143 Indeed, of all the efforts the Union
made to establish complementary programs during these years,
only one, the scientific research center mentioned in the 1925
statement of goals, met with any measure of success.
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This project began at the turn of the decade. Following
the First Pan-Pacific Science Congress in 1920, Ford, perhaps
inspired by an earlier attempt to create a scientific research
center in the Islands, organized a Pan-Pacific Research Council
to facilitate communication among Pacific scientists and to draw
local agricultural scientists into a dialogue with their colleagues
elsewhere.144 Little came of the effort until mid-1924 when the
Castle family offered its estate in Manoa valley near central
Honolulu to the Union. The availability of extensive facilities (a
large house, numerous outbuildings, and space for further con-
struction) presented Ford with an opportunity to at once revive
the languishing scientific council and lay the foundations for his
long-planned international college.145 Moving quickly, he trans-
formed the council into a resident research center for scientists
called the Pan-Pacific Research Institution which, he believed,
would expand with time into a full-scale academic center.
Although the college failed to materialize, the Institution
itself thrived for a number of years.146 Within six months of its
founding, a board of supervisors called the Pan-Pacific Science
Council was formed, David Starr Jordan was appointed to direct
the enterprise, and a decision was made to concentrate efforts
on food production—particularly aqua-culture—in an attempt
to relieve what was perceived as a primary source of world
tension.147 As a Union publication put it, “a well-fed world will
not care to fight, and the Pacific can feed the world.”148 Addi-
tionally, the new organization adopted the egalitarian motto
“science without snobbery.”149
The Institution experienced considerable initial success. In
August 1925, it sponsored a conference on aquatic re-
sources—the Pan-Pacific Fisheries Conference—which in turn
led to a pioneering Pacific fish classification project. In January
1926, it began publication of a quarterly newsletter and
scholarly review, the Journal of the Pan-Pacific Research Insti-
tution, and established a public lecture series, a student schol-
arship program, and a botanic research garden.150 An emphasis
on student programs during the following year led to the cre-
ation of the Junior Pan-Pacific Science Council. Thereafter,
student participants distinguished themselves by developing an
elementary oceanographic research facility, perfecting a new
strain of okra, and building a sophisticated photography labo-
ratory.151 Buoyed by these developments, the Institution estab-
lished affiliate research centers in Tokyo and Manchuria during
1926 and 1927. However, they survived only briefly.152
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These and similar activities continued throughout the re-
mainder of the decade and into the 1930s until the depression
forced a retrenchment. Ford tried desperately to raise addi-
tional funds, but he was unsuccessful and the organization
began to crumble. Publication of the review ceased in 1936 and
four years later the Castle property, which had merely been on
loan, was taken back. Attempts to relocate failed, and the orga-
nization was dissolved shortly before World War II. The grand
scientific and educational visions of Ford and his colleagues
thus came to an end.
COLLAPSE OF THE UNION
At the end of the 1920s, Union officials reviewed the decade
with satisfaction and looked to the future with confidence.
While they had failed in their attempts to establish a number of
auxiliary projects, other programs such as the research center
appeared to be on a satisfactory course and the conference
program was generally acknowledged to be an enormous
success. They had sponsored numerous international gath-
erings and inspired the formation of three separate organiza-
tions that had in turn embarked on international programs of
their own. In the process, they had involved governments, pres-
idents, prime ministers, governors, royalty, and a host of out-
standing professional and civic leaders from all areas of the
Pacific. As a consequence, they felt that there was reason to
continue in their belief that the Union would soon be trans-
formed into an instrument of Pacific governments and that their
ultimate objective would thus be accomplished. Hence, they
looked forward to the 1930s with undisguised enthusiasm, be-
lieving, as Ford once put it in remarkably Gibsonesque terms,
that Hawaii is “the center from which radiates the newer civi-
lization of the Pacific.”153
In retrospect, their enthusiasm could not have been more
misplaced. The depression and the rise of Japanese-American
tensions were destined to so severely affect economies and so
thoroughly poison international relations in the Pacific that the
Union and all of its various programs would wane and finally
collapse. Ironically, the Union actually hastened its demise by
the manner in which it responded to these developments. While
it is understandable that the organization did not initially
foresee the ultimate consequences of these specters, it is not
unreasonable to expect that it would react in a realistic fashion
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once they became clear. Unfortunately it did not. Rather, it at-
tempted to ignore the depression and refused to believe that
Japanese-American tensions were much more than an American
failure to properly understand legitimate Japanese aspirations.
Compounding its judgmental errors, it launched a major orga-
nizational drive in Asia during the early 1930s and endeavored
to explain Japanese perspectives in a series of articles and com-
ments that many took to be little more than crude propaganda.
As a consequence, it ruined its financial base while destroying
its once remarkable credibility.
The Union’s effort to expand its program in Asia began in
February 1931, when Ford embarked upon a three-year visit
where he worked strenuously in Japan, China, Korea, the Philip-
pines, French Indo-China, and Siam attempting to arouse in-
terest in various internationalist endeavors. Although he suc-
ceeded in creating new organizations in several locations and
once reported back enthusiastically that the Pacific govern-
ments were ready to “fall in line and make the Pan-Pacific
Union an official sister of the Pan-American Union,” he in fact
accomplished nothing of lasting significance.154 Quite simply,
there was no longer the money nor the energy for what he pro-
posed. Perhaps in belated recognition of this, Ford, in contrast
to his every action in the past, simply gave up. Without prior
warning, he issued an announcement from Tokyo on November
9, 1934, that he was resigning his position with the Union so
that he might have time to put his papers in order and write his
memoirs before dying.155 He departed for the United States via
Europe, apparently without even consulting his staff colleagues
in Hawaii.
If the Union was myopic in ignoring economic realities and
attempting to expand its program during the depression, it was
blind in its effort to rationalize the whole of Japanese policy
in the years preceding the war. Given its long-standing ties
with Japan, perhaps the Union understood better than most
in the West that at least certain aspects of prewar Japanese
policy were defensible and, indeed, enjoyed some popularity
throughout colonial Asia, but, in a move particularly ques-
tionable for an organization devoted to world peace, it over-re-
acted with a comprehensive and totally uncritical defense. To
illustrate, shortly after the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in
1931, the Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union published a comment
by an American teacher in Japan who enthused about “the fact
that today that same spirit [as existed during the 1904–1905
Russian War], still at great cost and sacrifice, at heavy ex-
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penditure of money and time and effort, is striving, not to
carry on war, but to attain World Peace and to improve the
economic conditions of the whole world.”156 Thereafter similar
comments were published with some regularity, and as late as
1939, well after Japan had provoked outright war with China,
an entire issue of Pan-Pacific, a short-lived successor to Mid-Pa-
cific Magazine, was devoted to “Manchukuo” without raising a
single question about the legitimacy of the puppet state or the
more general problem of Japanese expansionism.157 Although
this created a tremendous outcry that led to the resignation
of a number of Union leaders including that year’s president,
those who remained were undaunted.158 The following year,
they wrote the Department of State requesting that the United
States, New Zealand, Australia, and Mexico petition Japan and
China to cease hostilities and negotiate a settlement.159 Sec-
retary of State Hull dismissed the request with the terse com-
ment, “It is not the practice of this government to act as in-
termediary between private organizations and foreign govern-
ments.”160 Hull’s rebuff ended the Union’s efforts on behalf of
Japan, but even then it was not able to bring itself to admit to
any Japanese culpability in the deterioration of peaceful rela-
tions in the Pacific.
While the Union’s response to the depression and Japanese-
American tensions clearly hastened its decline, still other
factors rendered the collapse inevitable. There was, for in-
stance, no one of Ford’s stature to provide leadership after
he resigned in 1934.161 Ann Y. Satterthwaite, a longtime staff
member under Ford, assumed his position and held it thereafter,
but neither she nor the group’s elected officers were able to
arouse the interest and support Ford had inspired. He had been
effective despite his unorthodox methods, although it is likely
that he too would have failed under the circumstances of the
times. In any event, the Union suffered from a lack of leadership
during its most crucial period.
A lack of adequate funding posed similarly debilitating
problems. Short of funds even during the best of times, the
group was simply unable to raise the money necessary for
any meaningful programming effort during the more difficult
1930s. Annual budgets of some $20,000 during the 1920s fell
to under $5,000 during the latter period.162 Once again, the
problem was as much within the Union as in external devel-
opments. In this instance, it involved Ford’s tendency to rely
on government funds rather than private sources. While the
arrangement worked well enough during the prosperous 1920s,
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it created a sense of security that discouraged the group from
seeking alternative funding arrangements. Hence, with the
coming of the depression and the corresponding retrenchment
in government spending, the Union found itself with neither
government funds nor the ability to raise them from other
sources.163 It was a double bind from which there was no
escape.
Mid-Pacific Magazine, originally a profitable venture, de-
clined in circulation and advertising over the years to the point
where it merely added to the Union’s financial woes. As near
as can be determined, its circulation reached a high point of
some five thousand copies in 1915 and remained around that
level during most of the 1920s, but plummeted to a mere several
hundred copies after 1930.164 As a consequence, advertising
revenues dropped and debts mounted. An effort was made to
reduce costs by changing from a monthly to a quarterly pub-
lishing schedule, but the problems continued. Publication
arrangements were further altered in 1935 but the deterio-
ration continued and publication ceased the following year. Pan
Pacific, a short-lived successor, appeared in 1937 and lasted
until 1941 when it too failed for lack of readers and adver-
tisers.165
Following the collapse of Mid-Pacific Magazine, the re-
maining vestiges of the Union’s program simply expired. Pub-
lication of the Journal of the Pan-Pacific Research Institution
ceased as noted and the Bulletin of the Pan-Pacific Union suf-
fered the same fate. Late in 1934, the Union, no longer able
to meet the $500 monthly rental charges on its longtime head-
quarters in the University Club, gave up its lease and moved to
a small office in the central business district.166 Shortly there-
after, this office was vacated for even more modest quarters.
Despite the fact that the Union’s circumstances had become
virtually hopeless, the remaining leaders refused to admit to
the inevitable. They struggled to keep the old issues before the
public, and, with an energy born of desperation, attempted to
initiate new projects in hopes of reviving some of the former
exhilaration and support. Throughout these years a flurry of
proposals concerning such matters as diversified agriculture,
cultured pearl production, and ornamental horticulture were
put forth.167 Earlier hopes of promoting a Pacific-wide athletic
meet were revived as Los Angeles prepared to host the Olympic
Games in 1932.168 A variety of new international organizations
were proposed, and an effort was made to share in the spon-
sorship of several international conferences arranged by other
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groups.169 The results, however, came to naught. The proposals
were generally ignored, the projects failed to materialize, and
public interest in internationalism continued to decline. Symp-
tomatic of the latter circumstance, Governor Lawrence Judd
broke the long-standing relationship between the Union and the
territory by refusing to serve as the organization’s president
when he took office in 1929. Although former Governor Frear
temporarily resolved the problem by accepting the position
once again, he resigned in 1936 and was succeeded by a
member of the University of Hawaii faculty. Thereafter, no high
government official ever again held the position. Leadership,
money, programs, and, finally, public sympathy evaporated.
In the midst of all this, Ford suddenly returned to Hawaii.170
It is sad that he did so. Old, tired, and sick, he returned to find
his once proud dream in its final throes. Unable to admit that
he had outlived his labors, he plunged into a pathetic round of
activity in an attempt to revive the movement and recapture
some of the prominence it had once enjoyed. Exhausted and
most likely unbalanced by the effort, he was put in a rest home
on the island of Maui in 1939.171 Four years later, supposedly re-
covered, he returned to Honolulu where he wandered about the
town, attempting first to build a display facility for some large
dioramas he owned, then writing a rambling series of reminis-
cences for a newspaper, and finally just sitting at the Outrigger
Canoe Club he had founded so long before.172 Like the Union,
his last years were bitter and hopeless.
Mercifully, these circumstances were not prolonged. On Oc-
tober 14, 1945, he died at the Territorial Hospital at the age
of seventy-seven.173 Reflective of his frequently chaotic life, he
left an estate consisting of seven dioramas and $299 in cash.174
Largely forgotten by the time of his death, he would have been
especially pleased to know that his few remaining friends con-
ducted a well-publicized funeral service at the Outrigger Canoe
Club and that the obituaries generously recalled his more glo-
rious past. As one newspaper put it, he was a man “who did
more than any other one man to acquaint the whole wide world
with the importance of Hawaii in the Pacific theater.”175
Final assessments are especially difficult in Ford’s case.
There is no denying that he was often as much the huckster as
the visionary, that he was at best a poor administrator, and that
he persistently confused grand aspiration and political ambition
for geo-political realism and institutional philosophy. In short,
it cannot be denied that he and, by extension, the Union might
well have contributed much more than they actually did.176
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In the same breath, there is likewise no denying that Ford is
without question the central figure behind the Union, and, in
turn, the entire turn-of-the-century revival of the internation-
alist movement. More than anyone else, he is responsible for
establishing the Islands’ modern role and reputation in interna-
tional affairs. In view of what this has come to mean, surely his
accomplishments must be accorded greater significance than
his failings.
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V
The Will to Good Relations
INTERNATIONAL ACTIVISM SPREADS
Despite the Pan-Pacific Union’s persistently haphazard institu-
tional arrangements and generally naïve objectives, no one as-
sociated with the organization during the 1920s foresaw its
ultimate fate. On the contrary, most observers believed that its
initial achievements foretold an even more spectacular future
and that the long-sought millennium in Pacific Basin relations
was at hand. Such a view was not without justification. Even
before the effusive press notices on one conference began to
fade, there were announcements that preparations for another
and more significant gathering were underway. Statesmen from
around the Pacific created at least the illusion of massive
support for its programs through their quick acceptance of prof-
fered positions of honorary leadership. Financial support from
both the territorial and federal governments was forthcoming,
in some instances even in the absence of prior request. In
short, it seemed that the Union had generated an irreversible
momentum toward a new international order in the Pacific,
and this in turn generated enormous excitement and optimism
among its supporters.
Against this background, it is almost axiomatic that still
others would be drawn into the internationalist milieu and that
a range of new international activities would come to the fore.
Predictably, then, this is exactly what happened. To illustrate,
in 1928, Theodore and Mary Atherton Richards, prominent
missionary-educators from Hawaii, revamped a scholarship
program they had organized some twenty years earlier for
Japanese youth studying at local high schools into an East-West
educational exchange that provided both Asian and American
students with grants for study abroad. Known as the Friend
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Peace Scholarships, these grants have since provided scores of
students with an international education experience. Although
never massive in scope, the Richards’ program is nonetheless
significant as both a pioneering effort in international education
and an example of the expansion of local international activism
during this period.1
There are still other examples. In 1926, for instance, a group
of local residents, interested in Lions Club activities and in-
spired by the Union’s transcultural activities, petitioned na-
tional Lions Club officials for permission to undertake the then
unorthodox project of forming an interracial club. Granted ap-
proval and assisted by Ford, they established one of the national
organization’s first integrated groups.2 Similarly, in July 1930,
local Buddhists hosted the Pan-Pacific Young Men’s Buddhist
Association Conference. The first gathering of its kind anywhere
in the world, it attracted 170 delegates from Hawaii and the Pa-
cific Basin who explored the problems of carrying the Buddhist
message to youth outside Asia and discussed methods of healing
sectarian cleavages within the movement. One scholar, perhaps
somewhat enthusiastically, described the gathering as “one of
the most significant events in the annals of Buddhism.”3
Significant as these and a number of related undertakings
doubtless are, a considerably more important development oc-
curred during the summer of 1925 when, due largely to the
leadership of local international activists, the Institute of Pacific
Relations was formed. In all probability, the creation of this or-
ganization ranks as the most consequential single event in the
history of the local internationalist movement. While it is dif-
ficult to make such judgments with precision, it can be said with
reasonable assurance that no other organization or activity that
grew out of this movement fostered more international under-
standing, exercized greater influence in international political
circles, or enjoyed higher standing in the public mind.
The Institute’s stature came as the result of a most im-
pressive series of organizational and programmatic accomplish-
ments over the years. Starting with an international decision-
making body called the Pacific Council, it developed national
councils in Australia, Canada, China, France, Great Britain,
Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, the
Soviet Union (briefly), the United States, and, later, India and
Pakistan. The various national councils in turn established a
host of regional and metropolitan chapters. While the level of
activity in these councils and chapters varied, ongoing partic-
ipation was sufficient to enable the Institute to meet regularly
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in a series of well-attended international conferences, sponsor a
sophisticated research and publication program, and raise mil-
lions of dollars in support of its programs. Thirteen major in-
ternational conferences between 1925 and 1948 brought thou-
sands of civic, political, and academic leaders from the Pacific
and Europe together for consultations that often influenced gov-
ernmental decisions pertinent to the region. An extensive re-
search program involving vast numbers of scholars resulted in
the publication of hundreds of serious studies as well as the
development of two respected academic journals. In all proba-
bility, the Institute contributed more to Asian, Pacific, and East-
West scholarship through this program than any other single
institution of the modern era. Finally, a continuing effort to in-
volve leading local citizens in all locales in its programs created
a reservoir of interest and goodwill that enabled it to with-
stand all but the most intense of the challenges it faced over
the years. Hence, despite the fact that many of its achieve-
ments came after it relocated from Hawaii to New York during
the mid-1930s, the Institute stands as a most substantial mon-
ument to the vision and determination of the local international-
ist movement.4
ORIGINS OF THE INSTITUTE OF PACIFIC
RELATIONS
The origins of the Institute date to 1919 when national officials
of the American YMCA designated Honolulu as the site for a
Pacific Basin YMCA leadership conference on the “fundamental
and universal” elements of Christianity and how these elements
might form “a common basis of understanding and motivation
for the Pacific peoples.”5 Planning for the event languished until
December 1922, when a new arrangement committee under
the direction of Frank C. Atherton, an influential Honolulu busi-
nessman and civic leader as well as active YMCA lay official,
was appointed in an effort to revitalize the project.
The selection of Atherton was propitious. Long a pillar
within the Island establishment, he found time in a pressing
schedule of major business and social responsibilities to
compile an impressive record of civic leadership. Although so
reserved that little is generally known of his personal dispo-
sition, it is clear that he rarely undertook a task without first de-
veloping a firm sense of what he considered the proper course
of action, and that he was not reluctant to use his considerable
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energy and influence to complete it. He was, in short, precisely
the kind of concerned but tough individual the YMCA needed to
untrack its planning efforts and organize the conference.
Born July 1, 1877, of wealthy and prominent parents (his
father, Joseph Ballard Atherton, long headed Castle and Cooke,
one of Hawaii’s oldest and most important business firms, while
his mother, Juliette Montague Cooke, was from the Cooke family
of local missionary and commercial fame), Atherton grew up in
an environment that provided him with the advantages of good
schools and travel, a high regard for sound business practices,
and a thorough appreciation of the Island missionary families’
long-standing devotion to a mix of Christian commitment and
paternal duty. The influence of these factors is readily appar-
ent in all that he undertook. Returning to Hawaii after college
in 1896, he immediately entered the business world.6 Although
hampered by a nagging health problem that forced his with-
drawal from several earlier ventures, he joined his father’s firm
in 1916 and thereafter moved rapidly toward the top ranks.7 In
1925 he was named manager of the corporation and a decade
later moved on to the chairmanship of its Board of Directors.
During this time, he also served as president of the local cham-
ber of commerce, as head of the Hawaiian Sugar Planters’ Asso-
ciation, and as a board member for nearly a score of other local
companies.8
Atherton was similarly active on the civic front. He served
as a volunteer official with numerous civic organizations (in-
cluding the Pan-Pacific Union) and earned a reputation as one of
Hawaii’s leading philanthropists. In the latter role, he directed a
series of family trusts started by his mother that supported such
institutions as Punahou School, Mid-Pacific Institute, Central
Union Church, Kapiolani Maternity Hospital, the YMCA, and the
YWCA. He also provided scholarship assistance for numerous
college students and research scholars.9 Characteristic of his
own personal habits, he was reluctant to see money spent in a
wasteful or ostentatious fashion but was generous with “prac-
tical” projects likely to achieve “worthwhile” ends.10 Finally, de-
spite his crowded schedule, Atherton devoted considerable time
to his family and his famous orchid and stamp collections. A self-
trained horticulturist and philatelist, he was widely known in
both fields.11
Of Atherton’s various civic undertakings, none appears to
have been more important to him than a long-time involvement
with the local and national YMCA. Following in the footsteps of
his father, who helped found the organization in Hawaii in 1869
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“Frank C. Atherton.” Oil by Arthur Cahill. Hon-
olulu Star-Bulletin Collection
and subsequently served as its lay president, he became active
in the organization at the turn of the century and was soon el-
evated to its presidency, a position his son, J. Ballard Atherton,
would likewise hold in years to come.12
Atherton was an active leader rather than a figurehead. He
was instrumental in establishing YMCAs on the other islands of
the Hawaiian chain and played a key role in the formation of the
racially integrated Nuuanu YMCA in Honolulu in 1917, an un-
dertaking of some consequence, as there was but one other in-
tegrated YMCA anywhere in the United States at the time.13 In
1916, he became a member of a national YMCA committee re-
sponsible for directing the organization’s international program
and remained a member until his death in 1945.14 The exposure
to global issues gained through service on this committee ap-
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Founders of the Nuuanu YMCA. Left to right: Frank C. Atherton, Iga
Mori, William D. Westervelt, Chung K. Ai, Syngman Rhee. YMCA
photo
parently combined with his own elitist perception of Hawaii as a
uniquely cosmopolitan society to generate a commitment to in-
ternational activism that marked the remainder of his career.
Whatever the proper conclusions about the sources of
Atherton’s internationalist enthusiasm, the leaders of the na-
tional YMCA felt he was the right person to assume responsi-
bility for the proposed conference, and they were correct. Trav-
eling to the American mainland for meetings with leading YMCA
officials and corresponding with others, he argued that the con-
ference should be postponed until 1925 to provide time for a
restructuring that would allow discussion of the full range of Pa-
cific problems rather than simply those of immediate concern
to the YMCA.15 It should be noted, however, that he did not
seek a change of venue. Citing the familiar arguments about
the special characteristics of Island life, he urged that the con-
ference site remain as originally fixed and prepared a prelim-
inary brochure in support of his position. Describing Hawaii
not only as the “center of the Pacific” but as a society which
has long promoted a “community of interest among the peoples
of the Pacific basin,” and which has achieved progress in the
“development of inter-racial understanding and good will,” the
booklet concluded that the Islands would be an “eminently
fitting place” to hold the meeting.16
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The decision to broaden the focus of the conference was
made in principle at a conference of international YMCA leaders
in Austria during 1923. Following a long series of discussions,
a meeting was held at Atlantic City on September 21, 1924,
where it was declared that the proposed conference would seek
to raise the level of mutual understanding in the Pacific through
round table discussions based upon in-depth background
papers and that the participants would be prominent citizens
from all Pacific countries who employed a “Christian approach”
but who were not necessarily Christians or YMCA members.17
Despite the acceptance of his suggested changes, Atherton
remained unsatisfied with the envisioned results of the con-
ference. Advised by J. Merle Davis of the American national
YMCA and Charles F. Loomis of the Honolulu YMCA, who had
been added to his planning committee as paid staff members,
he finally arrived at the conclusion that what the Pacific really
needed was not another conference but an independent organi-
zation dedicated to international consultation and research on
regional issues. Broaching this idea at a fund-raising meeting
at the Yale Club in New York during February 1925 which was
attended by men of national prominence in business and educa-
tional circles, he was able to arouse considerable enthusiasm.18
This, in turn, led to the formation of a new planning com-
mittee under the leadership of Stanford University president
(and later Secretary of the Interior) Ray Lyman Wilbur which,
aided by hastily formed subcommittees in Australia, Canada,
China, Japan, and the United States, developed a proposal
calling for the creation of a new organization to be known as the
Institute of Pacific Relations organized in accordance with the
following objectives and procedures:
The Institute of Pacific Relations is [to be] a body of men and
women deeply interested in the Pacific area, who meet and work,
not as representatives of their Governments, or of any other orga-
nizations, but as individuals in order to promote the well-being of
the peoples concerned.
The scope of the work of the Institute and the means to be
employed in that work will be determined largely by its form of
organization and the extent of its financial support.
Its main efforts will be devoted to collecting and elucidating
the facts of international significance, which, by their influence
in guiding public opinion, may assist constructively, the devel-
opment of the countries concerned; to urging the improvement of
legal and administrative procedure where present methods tend
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to hinder international harmony and good feeling; and directly to
promoting international friendship by personal association and by
the study of economic, educational, social, political, moral and re-
ligious conditions with a view to their improvement.
The Institute aims to keep its work practical, so that it may
be of direct service in the removal of difficulties in international
relations and in the promotion of constructive measures of assis-
tance.
Scientific investigations of questions that may be purely aca-
demic for the present, although ultimately of vital importance, as
for example, the biological and social effects of race intermixture
or the best means of financing countries in need, are to be under-
taken so far as financial resources permit. In all of its work, the In-
stitute will cooperate with other organizations of similar purpose,
so as to achieve the best and most far-reaching results.19
Arthur L. Dean, then president of the University of Hawaii and
one of those active in preconference planning, explained the ra-
tionale behind the proposal in more conversational terms:
We might ask a good many questions about an Institute of this
sort. One may ask what sort of things we propose to take up and
in what spirit we propose to go into them. The situation is that
the people around the Pacific have not known very much about
one another until recent times. In the early days the Pacific was
one of the world’s great barriers. Its width and rather meager
methods of transportation and communication meant that … [it]
was somewhat to be dreaded. With the development of modern
improvements, the Pacific becomes a highway rather than a bar-
rier and communication has become instantaneous instead of a
matter of weeks and months. There is a drawing together of the
people who live about it. We used to look at one another through
somewhat tinted glasses; there was sort of a feeling of romance
about the countries of the Orient—an aroma of incense as it were
(they needed it in some places), but the contacts of the modern
world have destroyed a good deal of this glamour. The Easterners
have discovered that along with our control of science and com-
merce there seems to be a certain hardness about the Anglo-
Saxon that was not expected. They have noted that for some
reason or another, and they have noted it with considerable ap-
prehension, soil seems to stick to our fingers once we have put
our hands on it, and that there is not always apparent a harmony
between our provocations and the things we seem to want…. They
begin to substitute a feeling of fear and dislike for one of admi-
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ration, so that we are beginning to be irritated with each other.
However, the situation is so now that we have not a great deal
to undo. We do not have to deal with the results of generations
of hatred and strife as those in Europe and the Near East do. We
have almost a clean sheet upon which to write, and it would seem
a shame … in these days when we suppose that intelligence and
reason prevail if it should not be possible for reasonable men with
unselfish aims to get together and to prevent the development of
those prejudices and hatreds which, once they are rooted in the
minds of men are so hard to eradicate.20
While the Institute’s founding assumptions and objectives
may appear somewhat naïve in light of subsequent develop-
ments, YMCA leaders found them impressive and willingly relin-
quished all control over the planned conference in order that it
might pursue an independent course.21 The planners were not
hesitant in accepting the opportunity. When the long-awaited
meeting was finally convened at Punahou School during the
first two weeks of July in 1925, the main order of business for
the 143 delegates and observers (109 national delegates from
Australia, Canada, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand,
the Philippines, and the United States, three at-large delegates,
and thirty-one observers) was the formation of the Institute.22
Following a series of “frank and free” round table discussions
on such issues as discriminatory immigration policies, interna-
tional monetary issues, extraterritoriality, and industrial devel-
opment, the delegates approved Wilbur’s proposal and the In-
stitute came into being.23 General officers were elected (Wilbur,
chairman; Atherton, vice chairman; and L. Tenny Peck of Hon-
olulu, treasurer); a secretariat headed by Davis and Loomis was
established in Honolulu (as the group perceived Hawaii as a
model for the kind of racial and transcultural understanding
it hoped to nurture throughout the Pacific Basin24); and del-
egates were directed to create national councils within their
respective countries upon return to their homelands.25 A de-
cision was made to reconvene two years later on the assumption
that the organizational issues would be resolved and the group
would be ready to undertake the more substantial tasks outlined
in Wilbur’s proposal and the other formative documents.
The 1925 meeting was more than simply an organizational
success. From a financial perspective, for example, although the
conference cost approximately $50,000, Atherton, who was re-
sponsible for arranging funding, was able to raise over $72,000,
all from private sources, even before it convened.26 Considering
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Local delegates to the first Institute of Pacific Relations conference.
First row (left to right): George R. Carter, Mrs. I. M. Cox, A. L. Dean,
Frank C. Atherton, Romanzo Adams; second row: Charles F. Loomis,
Herbert E. Gregory, Grace Channon, Elsie Wilcox, Mrs. Arthur With-
ington; third row: Riley H. Allen, K. C. Leebrick, Arthur F. Judd, Henry
B. Schwartz, Arthur A. Hauck, unknown, David Tokimasa; fourth row:
Andrew Westervelt, Norman C. Schenck, Lloyd Killam, George
Sakamaki, Charles Wong, Galen R. Weaver. University of Hawaii
Archives
the Pan-Pacific Union’s persistent financial dilemma, this
achievement was a particularly good omen. The meeting was
equally successful from the standpoint of publicity. With a few
exceptions (most notably Japanese unhappiness with Korean
participation, and Philippine displeasure at being represented
largely by American colonial officials27), events proceeded
smoothly and with considerable enthusiasm. This sparked a re-
markable volume of complimentary press coverage from the re-
porters present, including one from the Chicago Daily News
sent specifically to cover the event.28 A Star-Bulletin editorial
summarized the general opinion of the press when it concluded
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that the “groups here from various countries … can develop out
of this first Institute a real step toward international harmony
and cooperation in the Pacific”29 Most of those attending would
have agreed with Atherton when he wrote to an acquaintance
that “The Institute passed off very well indeed, and we feel
more than repaid for the effort put forth and the results accom-
plished. There was a splendid spirit throughout the conference
and we all feel that we have laid the foundation for something
worthwhile”30
It should be noted at this juncture that Ford and the Pan-Pa-
cific Union played no significant role—positive or negative—in
the formation of the Institute. Despite an earlier suggestion that
the YMCA host an international conference in Hawaii, Ford ap-
pears to have taken little interest in this particular event. He
mentioned it in passing in several of his various publications,
but never became involved in its planning and promotion.31
Indeed, he once even stated that he would not be taking an ac-
tive part in the affair.32 Establishment of this point is of some
importance, as one of the few secondary sources to discuss the
initial steps in the formation of the Institute makes the obser-
vation that Ford “persuaded the YMCA to plan a Pan-Pacific
YMCA secretaries’ conference in Honolulu in 1923 … [and] the
idea grew to consideration of the moral, economic, and political
backgrounds in which men and boys [of the Pacific] lived, and
the Institute of Pacific Relations was born”33 Although Ford had
indeed urged the YMCA to host a conference for its Pacific
Basin leaders, it was only a casual suggestion and of little direct
relationship to what eventually transpired.
None of this is to suggest, however, that there was any
unpleasantness in the relationship between Ford and the YMCA
and, later, the Institute. On the contrary, relations appear to
have been entirely cordial if not particularly close. To illustrate,
when the 1925 conference convened, Ford was invited to ad-
dress it and he did so in a thoroughly pleasant fashion, noting
that the “Union realizes that a large part of its mission is being
fulfilled in the formation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It
rejoices in the wonderful success that has attended the first ses-
sions of the Institute and earnestly hopes that these may in-
crease in strength and force.”34 Moments later he added that
while the “Union has no part in the deliberations of the In-
stitute, it sincerely welcomes this new sister organization that
promises to play a prominent and distinguished part in the
bringing about of better understanding among the peoples of
the Pacific”35
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The Institute responded in kind, thanking Ford for his
inspirational example and acknowledging his earlier suggestion
that the YMCA convene a Pacific-wide gathering.36 Subse-
quently, Ford issued a statement explaining that the two orga-
nizations were separate and distinct but that their relationship
would be based upon mutual respect and close cooperation.37
Although no close cooperation ever developed, both organiza-
tions periodically publicized the other’s activities in their own
publications and managed to work side by side in essential
harmony.38
Launched on such an enthusiastic and successful note, the
Institute plunged into a round of organizing activities in prepa-
ration for its second meeting in 1927. Davis and Loomis, general
secretary and assistant general secretary respectively, spent
most of the period traveling throughout Asia and North America
assisting with the organization of national councils and met-
ropolitan chapters. Due in part to their efforts and in part to
the enthusiasm in all quarters, six national councils (Australia,
Canada, China, Japan, New Zealand, and the United States) and
eleven metropolitan chapters (Auckland, Christchurch, Hon-
olulu, Manila, Melbourne, Montreal, Seoul, Sydney, Toronto,
Vancouver, and Wellington) were formed by 1927.39 In most in-
stances, these groups immediately initiated substantial activ-
ities of their own. Research projects concentrating upon the
collection of data pertinent to matters of race, culture, popu-
lation, food, industry, natural resources, extraterritoriality, and
immigration were undertaken by most of the national councils
and some of the metropolitan chapters. Publicity drives and
educational programs, usually in the form of miniconferences
modeled after the 1925 event, were likewise common.40
Within the administrative sphere, Davis and Loomis molded
the Pacific Council into a central headquarters unit composed
of the Institute’s elected officials, a representative from each
national council, and a secretariat. Thereafter, policy decisions
were made by the Pacific Council during its periodic meetings
while the secretariat, the only professionally-staffed unit within
the central core of the Institute, was responsible for ongoing
administrative decisions concerning such things as recruitment
drives, fiscal management, program development, and relations
with other organizations.41 This is not to suggest, however, that
all Institute activities were directed solely by the Pacific Council
and its staff. The various national councils and metropolitan
chapters, some with their own professional staffs but most with
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volunteer assistance, administered separate, although comple-
mentary, programs in accordance with general guidelines estab-
lished by the Pacific Council.
Considerable emphasis was placed on fund raising during
this period. In 1926 some $34,000 was subscribed, which was
sufficient to cover that year’s lower costs, and in 1927 the
figure rose to approximately $80,000, due in no small part to
grants of $25,000 from the Carnegie Endowment for Interna-
tional Peace and $15,000 from the Laura Spelman Rockefeller
Memorial.42 These grants made it possible to initiate a research
program within the secretariat, retain a research secretary—J.
B. Condliffe of New Zealand—to direct it, and begin issuing the
Institute News Bulletin, the group’s first formal publication.43
The Institute’s long and distinguished record in research and
publication was thus underway.
The initial organizational details were largely completed
when the second conference convened at Punahou School
during the summer of 1927, and the participants—delegates
from the same countries present in 1925 with the addition of
Great Britain and observers from the League of Nations and
the International Labor Office—concentrated almost exclusively
upon round table discussions of issues akin to those debated
at the earlier gathering.44 On this occasion, however, the back-
ground papers were more numerous and much more carefully
prepared.45 Once these discussions were concluded, the dele-
gates voted to accept a constitution embracing the original ob-
jectives presented in 1925 and the organizational arrangements
worked out over the 1925–1927 period. According to the new
document, various local and national activities were to result
in a continuing series of international gatherings where partic-
ipants would “study the conditions of the Pacific peoples with a
view to the improvement of their mutual relations.”46 With this
rather ambiguous charge as guidance, the group set forth to
change the Pacific.47
STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL
The 1927 conference signaled the end of the Institute’s for-
mative period and the beginning of a new era which saw the or-
ganization evolve from a discussion-oriented consultative body
essentially under the sway of Hawaiian internationalists into
a research-and advocacy-oriented group controlled largely by
foreign policy activists from the American mainland. This
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change, supported principally by the American Council and
strenuously resisted by the Hawaii group under Atherton’s lead-
ership, affected virtually every facet of Institute activity during
the late 1920s and the first half of the 1930s.
With respect to research and publication, the group’s
original intent was simply to prepare background studies and
informational bulletins to assist conference participants in con-
ducting more informed and meaningful discussions. This began
to change when Condliffe was hired as research secretary. He
established the practice of raising funds to encourage and
support academic research on selected Asian, Pacific, and East-
West topics, frequently with little direct connection to con-
ference agendas. He also encouraged the national councils and
metropolitan chapters to do likewise. By expending research
funds in this fashion rather than developing an in-house capa-
bility (although an internal research unit of considerable pro-
portions was established later), he stimulated a broad array of
scholarship which, as noted, contributed mightily to the body
of modern knowledge on the Pacific area. Between 1925 and
1935, the Pacific Council raised some $360,000 for research
while the American Council, always the most active of the na-
tional councils, raised another $400,000 for the same purpose.
By 1950 when the organization became embroiled in the Mc-
Carthy controversy and began to lose its effectiveness, these
sums had risen to approximately $800,000 and $765,000 re-
spectively. These figures are part of an overall Pacific Council
budget of some $2,700,000 and an American Council budget of
over $3,100,000 for the 1927–1950 period.48 It should be noted,
however, that this remarkable financial achievement came to
an abrupt halt with the McCarthy period, thus precipitating a
fiscal crisis that was a major factor in the organization’s disin-
tegration during the 1950s.49
The end result of Condliffe’s research policy is likewise
impressive. As early as 1930, twenty-three different projects
ranging from a survey of Malaysian emigration to an analysis of
Chinese industrialism were underway, one of which was George
B. Cressey’s landmark study of Chinese geography.50 This was
but the beginning. Thereafter the number of projects and publi-
cations expanded rapidly and by 1952 the Institute could claim
responsibility for approximately fifteen hundred titles (including
periodicals and pamphlets) and count among those whose work
it sponsored such eminent scholars as Hugh Borton, Vera
Micheles Dean, John King Fairbank, Hu Shih, Owen Lattimore,
Walter Lippman, Edwin O. Reischauer, and Arnold Toynbee.51
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While it is necessary to include certain unimpressive studies
in this total, the vast majority of the work was prepared by
scholars of considerable repute and is of high quality.
This achievement did not come easily, however. Condliffe’s
desire to emphasize academic research resulted in a decision
during 1930 to move the research headquarters from Honolulu
to the University of Michigan at Ann Arbor and, thus, closer to
existing centers of scholarly activity. This decision caused great
unhappiness among those from Hawaii and elsewhere who felt
that the original intent of the research program was being
eroded. They had a point. Although the shift in emphasis was
ultimately of great significance from an academic perspective,
there is no doubt that it did weaken the operational tie between
research endeavors and conference discussion. Nonetheless,
the decision was made, and thereafter the research program
was headquartered at various academic centers in both America
and Asia.52 Condliffe escaped most of this controversy by re-
signing his position in 1931, and he was replaced by William L.
Holland who implemented the decision.53
The Institute’s publication program followed a similar
course. In 1928 the Institute News Bulletin was replaced by
Pacific Affairs, a combination monthly newsletter and semi-
scholarly journal under the editorial direction of Elizabeth
Green.54 Beginning as a booklet of some forty pages with an ap-
proximate circulation of twelve hundred, it grew to an average
of eighty pages per issue with a circulation of roughly two thou-
sand by the end of the decade.55 In 1933 Green was replaced
as editor by Owen Lattimore, later to gain renown as a China
scholar and notoriety as a chief target of the McCarthyites.56
Like Condliffe, Lattimore also felt that Hawaii was too far re-
moved from the centers of international activity and that the
journal should be headquartered elsewhere. Following still an-
other struggle, his view prevailed and the publication was relo-
cated to New York, where its casual format was scrapped and it
was remolded into a peppery academic journal which frequently
published controversial and unpopular points of view. Accepted
and respected by at least the scholarly community, it became
the Institute’s principal publication and retained this status
until the organization collapsed.57 At that time, the University
of British Columbia assumed responsibility for the journal and
has since issued it regularly. Its circulation has averaged around
thirty-three hundred copies over the years since World War II.58
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In the administrative realm, Davis and Loomis expanded the
secretariat staff to include Hawkling Yen and Keichi Yamasaki
as associate general secretaries during the late 1920s.59 Trav-
eling regularly in Europe (including the Soviet Union), North
America, Asia, and the Pacific in an effort to generate interest
in the organization and to gain new members, the four officers
succeeded in persuading Great Britain and France to join prior
to the end of the decade, and laid groundwork for the affiliation
of the Netherlands, the Philippines, and the Soviet Union during
the 1930s.60 Although the Netherlands, the Soviet Union, and
China later dropped their membership, India and Pakistan
joined following World War II, leaving Australia, Canada,
France, Great Britain, India, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, the
Philippines, and the United States as members when the organi-
zation was finally dissolved in 1961.61 Davis and his colleagues
also arranged for the Institute’s third conference to be held in
Japan during 1929 and thereby inaugurated the practice of ro-
tating meetings among the member nations.62 Unlike Ford, they
had no intention of centering all activities in Hawaii.
Despite the drastic changes, the secretariat’s Honolulu
office remained busy during these years. Although the removal
of the research and publication programs reduced the level
of activity, regular administrative business was sufficient to
occupy a substantial office staff, and library materials accumu-
lated so rapidly that a regular librarian had to be retained.
Indeed, when this collection was donated to the University of
Hawaii following the Institute’s move to New York, it nearly
doubled the school’s holdings on Asia and the Pacific.63
Busyness, however, did not prevent the secretariat from be-
coming embroiled in the raging argument over procedures and
objectives. Its officials were split from the time the debate first
arose. Some wanted to take the organization more directly into
the political arena while others insisted that its original con-
sultative format be maintained. As early as 1929 it became ap-
parent that the advocates of change were gaining the upper
hand. In that year Davis took the podium during the organiza-
tion’s third conference in Japan to announce that he was re-
signing as general secretary because of disagreements over in-
stitutional philosophy. In the process, he denounced those who
wanted to revamp the organization and warned that a shift away
from economic and cultural issues toward political topics would
turn participants into mere “mouthpieces” for their respective
governments and destroy the founders’ hopes of creating a
forum for “frank and free” discussions among the peoples of
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the Pacific. He also expressed the view that his warning would
go unheeded so long as the influence of the activist American
Council remained paramount.64 His resignation was accepted,
and Loomis was appointed acting general secretary.
Davis, it turns out, was at least partially correct. Except for
a small group led by Atherton, his warning did go unheeded,
and in 1933 Edward C. Carter, once a high-ranking American
YMCA official who was chosen to lead the Institute’s American
Council in 1926, was selected as the new general secretary. As
might be expected, he accelerated the change in institutional
focus that Davis, Atherton, and others felt was so mistaken. In
1936 he brought the issue to a head by simply moving the sec-
retariat—the last major vestige of the original Institute still in
Hawaii—from Honolulu to New York. Little was left behind save
a few files pertaining to local activities and the library which,
as noted, was donated to the University of Hawaii. Thereafter
the organization was only distantly associated with the local in-
ternationalist movement and the people who first conceived and
formed it.
Clearly, then, the signal characteristic of the Institute during
the late 1920s and the first half of the following decade was
the controversy over its form and function. This dispute, in
many respects more akin to a bareknuckled political donny-
brook than a refined debate among concerned internationalists,
ranged far beyond the central issue of institutional philosophy.
Although this question always remained at the core, intense and
seemingly irreconcilable disagreement over its proper resolu-
tion generated frequent and often bitter ancillary confronta-
tions. Charges that certain councils and chapters were inter-
ested only in self-aggrandizement were recklessly hurled about
as were counterclaims that still other councils and chapters
were hopelessly parochial. Similarly unpleasant charges and
counter-charges were directed at various individuals. It was, to
say the least, an unpleasant spectacle, and the fact that the In-
stitute was able to survive it at all is of some significance.
Although others were involved, the principal antagonists in
this dispute were the American Council and the Hawaii group.65
The former, always on the offensive and, one suspects fre-
quently correct, was also consistently heavy-handed. In blunt
language, it charged that Hawaii, far from being an inspira-
tional social model as the local internationalists believed, was
much too provincial to play host to such an organization. As
Carter put it at the Institute’s fourth conference in China during
1931, “Honolulu has no culture; no facilities for world news; and
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is so tropical that no one can think of do[ing] serious work.”66
Others making similar arguments called Hawaii a “fairyland.”67
Local activists responded by collecting data from the University
of Hawaii, various agricultural research centers, the news-
papers, and even the Hawaii Tourist Bureau, to show that se-
rious research was indeed possible in the Islands.68 When this
tactic proved ineffective, they resorted to equally heavy-handed
techniques, charging the Hawaii Tourist Bureau with promoting
a frivolous image of Hawaii and sneeringly referring to Ameri-
can Council personnel as the “young professionals.”69 Later,
some members of this group went so far as to suggest that
Hawaii withdraw from the Institute and affiliate with the Pan-
Pacific Union.70
To be certain, there were others who contributed to the
dispute in a more refined fashion. Owen Lattimore, for example,
supported the American Council’s position by arguing that “if
the I.P.R. can demonstrate that the Pacific is a World question,
it should demonstrate its own organizational strength, as well
as the importance of the questions it studies, by carrying its ac-
tivities into localities that cannot be accused of local exagger-
ation of Pacific questions.” Still, caught up in the intensity of the
dispute and very much opposed to the position of the Hawaii
group, he apparently could not resist the sarcastic conclusion
that if Pacific questions are indeed world questions, “then it
should be a challenge to the Branches actually within the Pacific
area not to let Pacific provincialism allow the world to drop out
of the sight of the Pacific.”71
Lattimore’s emphasis upon the global dimensions of Pacific
problems illustrates still another aspect of the dispute. The
Hawaii group was inclined to view Pacific issues in essentially
technical terms and believed they were subject to negotiated
settlement on a case-by-case basis so long as sufficient data
were available.72 To American Council leaders who generally
saw the same issues in geo-political terms, the Hawaii position
was both narrow and naive. They believed that any effort to
focus on certain specific issues was unrealistic and, more to
the point, that a fact gathering approach was doomed to fail,
as all of the issues in question ultimately involved value judge-
ments—choices—beyond the pale of mere data. In their view,
the Institute could be effective only if it engaged in research on
a wide range of issues, conducted the research in a fashion cal-
culated to facilitate the making of often controversial choices,
and was willing to support its choices within the political
arena.73 These people could not, therefore, agree with charges
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from Hawaii that their approach to research was overly aca-
demic and that their willingness to engage in political debate
was a dangerous mistake. On the contrary, they felt their ap-
proach was absolutely fundamental to any hope of achieving the
Institute’s original goals and that anything less direct was des-
tined to failure. It is evident, then, that the two factions were as
widely split on methodological grounds as they were over per-
sonal and organizational issues.
Although the dispute raged on, it became increasingly a
matter of sound and fury. The American Council activists had
in fact carried the day and were in firm control of the orga-
nization. They had succeeded in forcing through the turn-of-
the-decade changes in the research and publication programs,
selecting Carter as the new general secretary, and removing the
secretariat from Honolulu. They had, in other words, prevailed
in every instance. Finally recognizing this, Atherton gave up the
fight late in 1935, resigned his position as treasurer of the Pa-
cific Council, and withdrew from all participation in the orga-
nization save the activities of the Hawaii chapter. His last act
was to address a long letter to the Pacific Council in which he
made a final plea for a return to the original procedures of the
Institute. While it is not clear what he hoped to accomplish with
this letter—perhaps he simply wished to demonstrate that while
beaten he was not persuaded—it outlines the main arguments
of both groups, in the process summarizing the central issue:
We believe … that the original primary purpose of the Institute
needs more emphasis in the future than it has received in recent
years. The Founders of the IPR desired that there should be de-
veloped in the various peoples of the Pacific area the will to good
relations and an intelligent basis therefor.
The will to good relations has in part an ethical basis; in part
it rests on the belief that harmonious contacts are advantageous.
At no time has the Institute emphasized the emotional appeal.
We have doubted the wisdom of such appeals and recognized the
ease with which they get out of hand. Our emphasis has been ra-
tional. Nevertheless the great bulk of human actions are not ra-
tional, they arise from our desires and antipathies. It would be
a mistake wholly to ignore the promotion of good will as an es-
sential feature of ethical, altruistic and religious conduct.
We have proceeded on the assumption that our chief task was
to overcome ignorance. In part this means general illumination; in
part it means throwing light on specific problems, situations and
issues. This has led us into fact finding enterprises.
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Many of our research projects are concerned with tendencies
and trends which look to the future rather than the immediate
present. Undoubtedly they are of value, but on the other hand we
feel not enough attention has been given to matters and problems
that are causing friction now and ill will among the peoples of
some of the Pacific countries. We also feel that little attention has
been given to popular opinion and motivation. They are of the
greatest importance. It is not enough to know the facts of a given
situation, but we must know what the parties thereto think of the
facts and how they feel about them.
If the IPR is to have influence in the direction of good rela-
tions between Pacific peoples, it must reach a much larger and
more diverse group. Following the first two conferences held in
Honolulu, there was considerable interest in widespread educa-
tional effort. This has not been sufficiently developed. As it now
stands the membership of the IPR embraces but a small number
of persons. No matter how much they know or how well dis-
posed they may be, little can be accomplished unless a substantial
number … [of civic leaders] can be reached.
It is time to decide just what we are driving at. If we are not
trying merely to enlighten the small group comprised in our mem-
bership, but to accomplish something of broad inter-racial and
international scope we would do well to shape our program ac-
cordingly. Most of us shy off from propaganda, so let us call it ed-
ucation. It is well to get knowledge, but there comes a time when
something needs to be done about it.
The present trend seems to be to transform the IPR into too
much of a pure research organization without due regard for
the practical application of the results…. To prevent the Institute
from becoming “too academic” we must secure more active par-
ticipation on the part of … [labor, journalistic, educational, and
especially commercial] leaders in all countries.
[Finally], the Institute must be on guard against any tendency
to be too much of an Occidental institution rather than an Inter-
national organization of and for the Pacific Region.74
As suggested, Atherton’s letter changed nothing so far as
the Institute’s new leaders were concerned. Their triumph was
secure.75 However, whether their victory was in the long-term
interests of the organization remains a question. Clearly, their
more ambitious perception of the Institute’s proper role is re-
sponsible for virtually all of the organization’s notable achieve-
ments, but just as clearly it is also responsible for leading the
Institute into the political arena where it eventually ran afoul
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of the McCarthy movement and was destroyed.76 Still, if the
Pan-Pacific Union is any measure, perhaps it is better to have
taken an effective if controversial stance and have been de-
stroyed than to have simply wasted away in benign neutrality,
hoping always for a measure of meaningful recognition from
some quarter.
Atherton and the other Island activists accepted their defeat
with remarkable grace. Although convinced that the parent or-
ganization had gravely erred, they accepted the decision and
returned to the task of expanding the program of the Hawaii
chapter. There was no more petulant talk of disaffiliation from
the Institute, and neither Atherton nor any other local partic-
ipant of stature quit the group. Loomis, to be certain, resigned
his secretariat position but only in order to assume the chief
administrative post with the local chapter. Relations with the
Pacific Council and the American Council were maintained in
a thoroughly proper, if sometimes strained, fashion. Indeed, on
numerous occasions Carter, Lattimore, and other former adver-
saries were hosted by local leaders as they passed through Hon-
olulu on business. Finally, Hawaii continued to send at least a
few delegates to the Institute’s periodic international confer-
ences.
Nonetheless, things had changed. Their spirit apparently
sapped by the long and acrimonious struggle, local activists
seemed to forget their once soaring vision of the role the Islands
might play in Pacific and world affairs. Virtually all talk of
Hawaii’s special destiny as a model and a leader ceased after
the mid-1930s and was never again revived. From that time
onward, they were content simply to sponsor various research
and educational programs designed to encourage internation-
alist perspectives within the community, particularly among
high school and college students. The era of great hope and ex-
citement had passed.
LOCAL PROGRAMS AND PROBLEMS
Expanding its local program was a relatively easy task for the
Hawaii chapter as it had been meeting informally since shortly
after the 1927 conference and on a formal basis since late in
1928. In fact, it was the first local chapter to formally organize
and affiliate with any national council.77 The original members
and those who subsequently joined were almost without ex-
ception from the elite segment of local society, and they used
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their influence to assure that the organization was adequately
funded and properly active.78 From the outset, the group’s ac-
tivities were focused on research and education in an effort, as
stated in its 1929 constitution, to “study … the conditions of the
Pacific peoples with a view to the improvement of their mutual
relations and otherwise to aid in the work and purposes of the
Institute of Pacific Relations.”79 Research activities, organized
and directed for a number of years by University of Hawaii pres-
ident A. L. Dean, were concentrated upon the study of local
issues bearing some connection with international problems,
while the educational program, long under the supervision of
Punahou School president Oscar F. Shepard, was built around a
seemingly endless series of round table discussion forums on a
great variety of international topics.80
These programs produced certain noteworthy results and,
on several occasions, considerable controversy. With respect to
research, one of the initial projects was a symposium on tradi-
tional Hawaiian culture involving authorities in the field as well
as interested Institute members. The papers presented were
thorough enough that they were subsequently published as a
high school textbook entitled Ancient Hawaiian Civilization.81 A
revised edition of the text is still in use.
This sparked an interest in schoolbooks which, with the
encouragement of the American Council, resulted in the prepa-
ration of several other texts. In 1930, for example, it was de-
cided that a more balanced and sensitive high school level text
on China was needed. With financial assistance from the local
school system and the proceeds of a special fund-raising drive,
local Institute leaders hired Helen Gay Pratt, a then unknown
schoolteacher who later gained some repute as a historian, to
undertake the task.82 Working with Peng-chun Chang, she com-
pleted the text in 1934 and published it under the title China:
Whence and Whither.83 The Hawaii school system purchased
approximately a thousand copies of the volume and numerous
other school systems subsequently adopted it.84 In addition, it
was well received by prominent China scholars.85
A second project on Japan was not so successful. Pratt and
Masamichi Royama drafted what they termed a “sympathetic,
adequate, graphic, and relevant” treatment of Japan.86 Others,
citing its uncritical treatment of Japan’s actions in China, found
it little more than pro-Japanese propaganda and suggested that
it be either redone or withdrawn.87 Still others reacted even
more stridently. The Sino-Korean Peoples’ League, for example,
presented a fifteen-page petition to the Hawaii Territorial Leg-
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islature charging that the pro-Japanese bias of the text was
proof that Japan had infiltrated the local educational system.88
This inflated charge attracted the attention of V. S. McClatchy, a
well-known California newspaper publisher and outspoken op-
ponent of Asian immigration, who subsequently attempted to
turn the matter into a national issue. Local school authorities
were thus forced into supporting a flawed product in order to
defend the integrity of the school system. They were no doubt
relieved when the American Council assumed responsibility for
the project, rewrote the book with a much harsher interpre-
tation of Japanese actions, and published it as Japan: Where
Ancient Loyalties Survive.89 In the confusion of charges and
countercharges, it is unlikely that many were aware of an ironic
development in the case. When copies of the original manu-
script reached Japan, a cry arose accusing Royama of having
helped author an anti-Japanese book.90
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Still another textbook project initiated at the same time
raised a similar controversy which, before it was finally over, re-
vealed a darker side of the men who ran the Institute. In 1933
the research committee formed a “standard of living” task force
under the direction of Royal N. Chapman, a long-time Institute
activist who was also an official of the Pineapple Producers’
Cooperative Association as well as dean of the University of
Hawaii’s School of Tropical Agriculture, to explore the ramifi-
cations of the idea, then current in Institute circles, that there
could be no lasting world peace so long as domestic social and
economic injustices existed.91 Impressed by this argument, the
task force decided to study living conditions among Filipino
laborers working at one of the Islands’ principal sugar plan-
tations. On the recommendation of American Council leaders,
local officials hired Edna C. Wentworth, a University of Chicago-
trained social worker with a special interest in labor problems,
to direct the project.92 She began work early in 1934 and com-
pleted a first draft of the study in August 1935. It was criticized
only on technical grounds, and a revised version was well re-
ceived by the American Council later that year.93 With the ex-
ception of Loomis, the Institute’s local leaders apparently saw
the report for the first time at this point, and they were, to
put it mildly, less than favorably impressed. They flatly rejected
it, ostensibly upon the grounds that it was more detailed than
necessary and not particularly well written but in fact because
it was much too sympathetic to the plight of the laborers and
too critical of the plantation management.94 One of these men,
putting it ever so gently but with unmistakable intent, com-
mented that the “paper is a valuable contribution but there ap-
pears to be a somewhat antagonistic undercurrent toward the
plantation, to which I object.”95
Facing such objections, Loomis and his staff decided that the
study should be redone to eliminate the objectionable material.
Frederick Simpich, Jr., was hired for the task and one of his
earlier memorandums indicates that he clearly understood his
assignment The manuscript was to be “tempered,” he wrote, so
that it would be “approved by the sugar people”96 Simpich did
as he was told, but even his “tempered” version did not satisfy
the critics. They felt it was still an incitement to labor agitation
and feared that it contained information useful to their rivals
in the sugar beet industry on the American mainland.97 Led by
Atherton, they demanded that it be shelved.98
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A lengthy argument ensued involving most of the Hawaii
group as well as many from the American Council. Officials from
the latter organization insisted that the report be published,
even if in abridged form, while local leaders (save Loomis who
felt the new report had merit) maintained the position that it
should be withdrawn. The issue was finally resolved in 1937
when the American Council forced the decision and the report
was sent to a Honolulu printer. Local leaders, however, had the
last word. The day the printing was completed, Atherton went
to the printer’s office, purchased the entire press run, and dis-
posed of it!99 Although another printing was sponsored by the
American Council in 1941, other issues had moved to the fore
and the incident passed largely unnoticed.100 To say the least,
this episode raises some doubts about the selflessness that oth-
erwise appears so characteristic of most of the Institute’s local
leaders.
The local chapter undertook a number of other research
activities during this era that resulted in several worthwhile
studies, particularly Jean Hobbs’ well-received Hawaii: A
Pageant of the Soil, but none generated the same interest or
controversy as the Pratt and Wentworth projects.101 Research
was not, however, the group’s only area of endeavor.
Throughout this period, Shepard’s education committee was ac-
tively engaged in sponsoring an extensive series of round table
discussion forums that were open to both Institute members
and other interested persons. As a consequence, many people
from the community had the opportunity to hear a multitude of
topics discussed by such speakers as Hu Shih, the distinguished
Chinese scholar-diplomat, Karl Wittfogel, later to become a
prominent if controversial figure in Chinese studies, Alexander
A. Troyanovsky, the Soviet Union’s first ambassador to the
United States, and Henry Luce, the Time-Life publisher.102
Besides the round table series, more specialized gatherings
were periodically organized to explore matters of current in-
terest. Of these undertakings, a news analysis series conducted
during the late 1930s and early 1940s by Klaus Mehnert, a
prominent member of the University of Hawaii faculty whose al-
leged pro-Nazi views had aroused some controversy, attracted
the most attention.103 In addition, a series of local conferences
dealing with questions of war and postwar national security was
sponsored prior to and after World War II. The Schofield Confer-
ences of 1939, 1940, 1949, and 1950; the Seminar on America
and the World at War held between November 19, 1940, and
January 21, 1941; and the Japan-America Conference of 1953
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are the most significant examples. All were modeled after the
original Institute conferences and involved discussion sessions
based upon in-depth research papers. Also of interest in this
respect are conferences held in 1947 and 1951 on the role of
Christianity in the modernization of Asia and Micronesia.104
Of all the special functions organized by the local chapter
of the Institute, the most noteworthy was a student-oriented
program initiated during the early 1930s. Inspired by an inter-
national organization for students formed in the San Francisco
area during 1926, local leaders created the Student Institute
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of International Relations in 1931 and used it to sponsor nu-
merous mock international conferences and round table dis-
cussion forums over the following years.105 Directed first at
college students and later at high school students, this organi-
zation introduced thousands of local youths to serious discus-
sions on international issues. Many of those who later became
important civic leaders in Hawaii were participants. Among
the names appearing from time to time are Abraham Akaka,
Hung Wo Ching, Hung Wai Ching, Herbert Choy, Jack Mizuha,
Hebden Porteus, Minoru Shinoda, Arthur Trask, and Douglas
Yamamura.106 No doubt others equally prominent also partici-
pated. Although no direct connection has been established, it is
a reasonable assumption that much of the concern for interna-
tional affairs characteristic of Hawaii’s present leadership can
be traced to this program.
While research and educational activities were central to
the Institute’s program during the years preceding World War
II, the group was involved with still other undertakings. There
were, for example, periodic attempts after 1931 to conduct in-
ternationally oriented radio programs.107 Scholars connected
with the Institute were encouraged to come to the Islands and
assist the University of Hawaii with the expansion of its Asian
studies program.108 Still other related exercises were proposed
if never implemented. Among the more interesting of these ac-
tivities was an effort during 1940 and 1941 to bring Japan and
the United States together in negotiations that would at once
remove the growing acrimony from the relationship between
the two nations and keep World War II from spreading to the Pa-
cific.
Akin to ongoing efforts in the diplomatic realm, this under-
taking began in 1940 when David L. Crawford, then president
of the University of Hawaii and an Institute activist, wrote a
brief memorandum suggesting that Japan and the United States
might resolve their differences and prevent the otherwise
certain outbreak of war if Japan would withdraw its armies
from China, if the United States would recognize Japan’s con-
quest of Manchuria and pull its own forces back to the West
Coast, and if both would negotiate a treaty of commerce and
nonaggression. He argued that the Institute should promote ne-
gotiations based on this formula.109 Debatable as Crawford’s
particular suggestions may have been, they inspired Frank E.
Midkiff, then chairman of the local chapter of the Institute,
to draft a similar proposal late in 1941. Save for a more de-
tailed discussion of economic concessions to Japan and elimi-
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nation of the suggestion that the United States withdraw from
the mid-Pacific, Midkiff’s document was essentially the same as
Crawford’s.110
While it may be that the substance of this document reflects
a certain naïveté, there is little doubt that its sponsors were
well prepared with respect to the politics of submitting it to
higher authorities. Midkiff had previously consulted General
Walter C. Short, the commander of all army forces in Hawaii,
and found that he was willing to see that the proposal reached
the White House providing the Institute was able to agree on
a final version.111 A rushed week of meetings ensued, ending
with a Friday afternoon session where a finished document
was finally approved.112 Unfortunately, what might have hap-
pened next will never be known. By incredible coincidence, that
particular Friday was December 5, and Vice Admiral Chuichi
Nagumo’s Pearl Harbor Striking Force was moving into attack
position north of the Hawaiian chain. The “day of infamy” was
at hand and the Institute’s proposal was to be among the casu-
alties.
Regrettably, the incident did not end on this tragi-comic
note. In 1949, Admiral Peyton Harrison, an occasional partic-
ipant in Institute programs during the prewar years and at
the time a naval aide to the governor of Hawaii, wrote an un-
addressed memorandum charging that the entire venture had
been instigated by the “Jap War Lords” and that the participants
were guilty of indirectly aiding the enemy and being at least ac-
cessories to treason.113 Although his proof was nonexistent (he
offered no supporting evidence and none had been presented
during the numerous investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack)
and he seems to have been more interested in arousing interest
in the general question of enemy subversion than in the par-
ticulars of this case, Midkiff was alarmed enough to attempt a
suppression of the charges and a cover-up of all related mate-
rials. He instructed the Institute’s staff to file the material away
forever so as not to “reopen this old wound.”114 For whatever
the reasons—lack of evidence or suppression of evidence—the
episode ground to a halt on this unsavory note.115 As in the
Wentworth case, a project inspired by thoroughly decent mo-
tives degenerated into a malevolent squabble that served only
to expose the worst sides of all concerned.
When war finally came, the Institute’s program was rapidly
and almost totally curtailed. In the first instance, the imposition
of martial law between 1941 and 1944 made it difficult to
conduct any activity. In addition, most of the leaders undertook
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new responsibilities with the military government or the mil-
itary forces and were no longer available. Even Loomis put
aside his administrative duties and joined the military gov-
ernment as head of the Morale Section where he was respon-
sible for maintaining racial tranquility throughout the Territory
and, with the aid of a multiracial staff, did an outstanding job.116
A few minor discussion sessions were conducted during the
latter years of the war, but nothing of major importance was
even attempted.
With the end of the war at hand, local members of the In-
stitute began planning for the resumption of activities. Unfor-
tunately, they were to be disappointed. Even before the war
ended, certain critics of the American Council charged that
its officials harbored pro-Communist sentiments. The charge
had enough validity to arouse doubts, as at least one acknowl-
edged Communist—Frederick Vanderbilt Field—had long been
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an American Council staff member, and by the end of the decade
the organization had become one of the chief targets of the Mc-
Carthy campaign. The McCarthyites developed the charge that
the Institute had provided information to the government which
in turn abetted the victory of communism in China. As one of
McCarthy’s sympathetic colleagues put it, “But for the machi-
nations of the small group that controlled and activated … [the
Institute], China today would be free and a bulwark against the
further advance of the Red hordes into the Far East.”117 Al-
though the American Council fought these largely groundless
charges, its credibility was so badly impugned in the process
that it was no longer able to perform effectively and it collapsed
during the latter years of the decade.118 This was a fatal blow so
far as the Pacific Council and the other national councils were
concerned, as they had long been heavily dependent upon the
Americans for funds and leadership. By the end of the decade
they too collapsed and the McCarthyites added another victim
to their appalling score.
The effect of this struggle upon the local chapter of the
Institute was profound. Although activities in the immediate
postwar period followed much the same pattern as those of the
late 1930s with periodic radio programs, specialized discussion
groups, fetes for visiting Institute dignitaries, and occasional
special projects (one of note concerned an abortive effort to
establish an “international university” as a living memorial to
Hawaii’s war dead119), only the student program operated in
any consequential fashion. The reason is simple. Despite earlier
differences with the American Council activists, the local group
energetically rallied to the defense of the national organization
once the McCarthyist attack began to gather momentum, and it
exhausted itself in the process. There was no time or energy left
for the full-scale resumption of its own program.
Letters denying the charges were drafted and sent to all
local Institute members.120 Similar letters were addressed to
public leaders across the country.121 Walter F. Dillingham,
perhaps Hawaii’s most prominent business leader and a well-
known opponent of communism, agreed to serve on the
American Council’s board of trustees in 1948 in an effort to
help reestablish its credibility.122 When these tactics failed to
stem the tide, resolutions adamantly rejecting the charges were
adopted by the local group and passed on for public con-
sumption.123 These were followed by still other resolutions con-
demning McCarthyism and all related tactics.124 Finally, during
1952 and 1953 when all else appeared to have failed, a move
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was initiated to bring the entire organization back to Honolulu
and thereby remove it from the spotlight.125 Despite consider-
able support, this too failed when local leaders concluded, on
second thought, that they might not be able to finance the move
and that they were not certain they could adequately defend the
tainted organization.126 All came to naught when the American
Council finally collapsed, and the local group, in response, gave
up the fight and reorganized itself as the Pacific and Asian Af-
fairs Council late in 1953.127
Perhaps the struggle had been doomed from the outset. The
national organization was vulnerable to the kinds of charges
that can be supported in a witch hunt if not in a court of law
and was thus destined to be found guilty. As witch hunting
was as much a vogue in Hawaii as on the American mainland
during these years, the efforts of the local branch to rally solid
support for the Institute were similarly doomed to failure. The
community grew increasingly willing to accept the McCarthyist
viewpoint, and in time even certain members of the Institute ac-
cepted it. In doing so, they destroyed any semblance of unity
within the group and weakened the leaders’ determination to
maintain a defiant posture.
Most of the local opposition to the Institute appears to have
originated with K. C. Leebrick, a University of Hawaii instructor
who was in close contact with Alfred Kohlberg, one of the In-
stitute’s original critics and the person largely responsible for
bringing the organization to the attention of the anti-Communist
movement.128 The two men corresponded regularly, and Lee-
brick was one of four local members who supported Kohlberg
in an unsuccessful attempt in 1947 to gain control over the
national organization through proxy votes.129 Coupled with the
Institute’s increasingly negative press, such opposition led to
a rash of resignations during this period that made it increas-
ingly difficult for the leaders to maintain their adamant stance.
In mid-1947, St. Louis College, a local parochial school, an-
nounced that it was severing all connections with the Institute
because of the Communist issue.130 Early in the following year,
the Hawaiian Pineapple Company, a subsidiary of the Castle and
Cooke Company which F. C. Atherton headed for so long, stated
that it would no longer support the Institute, and its president,
Henry A. White, circulated an anonymous flyer purporting to
prove the organization’s leftist connections.131 Four years later,
James D. Dole, the original founder of the pineapple company
and a member of the Institute since its formation, resigned
because of the charges.132 The following year Riley Allen and
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Midkiff, both key leaders of the group, submitted their resigna-
tions for the same reasons.133 Pressure to give up the struggle
was mounting.
J. Ballard Atherton, F. C. Atherton’s son and the dominant
figure in the local organization in the years after his father’s
death in 1945, resisted these pressures as best he could, but
the tide was running against him. In 1950, the FBI investigated
the group. Although it found nothing of substance to criticize,
the fact that the investigation had even occurred caused some
members to withdraw their support.134 Complicating matters,
Loomis retired in 1952 after twenty-eight years with the In-
stitute, and Atherton was burdened with the additional
handicap of recruiting and training a replacement, something
that became a regular occurrence thereafter, as few of the
subsequent administrators remained for any length of time.135
Hence, as the American Council lost its effectiveness, Atherton
and his supporters had no real alternative but to give up the
struggle and try to fashion an independent organization capable
of carrying on the local program. This, as noted, led to the for-
mation of the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council.136 It is to their
credit, however, that they struggled to the very end. Even after
the American Council had made the decision to fold, they wrote
urging a reconsideration lest “McCarthy, McCarran, et al…. at-
tempt to chalk this up as a victory for their point of view.”137
The end of the old era came on December 15, 1953, when
a special meeting was called to dissolve the local chapter of
the Institute and create a successor organization.138 Although
Atherton explained in a general membership letter that the
purpose of the meeting was simply to acknowledge the local
group’s long-time independence from the national organization,
few could have failed to recognize the real significance of the
gathering.139 It was an admission of the fact that they, too, had
fallen victim to McCarthyism.
Although the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council has been
active since its formation, it has generated none of the ex-
citement and controversy that so frequently characterized its
predecessor. To be certain, during its earlier years efforts were
made to sponsor programs of far-reaching impact generally akin
to the old Institute’s programs, but little came of them. Shortly
after the changeover, for example, there was an attempt to es-
tablish a link with the Council on Foreign Relations but this was
ultimately discouraged by the latter group.140 In 1955, there
was an effort to interest a number of world statesmen in es-
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tablishing an organization in the Pacific similar to the original
Institute.141 Again, the proposal was shunned and such dreams
subsequently faded away.
Thereafter the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council directed its
energies at student-related issues. The high school program,
which had been started by the Institute and had attracted some
eight hundred participants annually during the 1950s, received
most attention, although certain projects related to the Uni-
versity of Hawaii were also undertaken.142 In the latter respect,
two activities are most noteworthy. The organization supported
a drive to build an international student residence that finally
succeeded during the early 1960s when the “Gateway House”
dormitory was constructed.143 Similarly, the group assisted with
the lobbying effort on behalf of the East-West Center which
ultimately brought that institution into being.144 These are,
however, something less than overwhelming achievements
when measured against the old record.
Perhaps the future holds better prospects for the Council.
Although plagued by a debilitating financial crisis during most
of the 1970s, the organization still survives, due in no small part
to emergency financial assistance from the state government,
and is presently struggling to revitalize its staff and program.
Should it succeed, it will have preserved not only its own
program but also the last vestige of the original Institute.
LEGACY OF THE INSTITUTE
Conclusions about the Institute must be mixed. Without
question, this organization contributed more toward interna-
tionalist ends than any other activity inspired by the local in-
ternationalist tradition. Hence, in general terms, its record is
clearly the most significant chapter to date in the history of local
internationalism. This said, it must also be added that Hawaii’s
direct contribution to internationalism through the Institute
amounts to surprisingly little. While the Institute’s contribution
is obvious, it is true if not always so obvious that local leaders
contributed little to this process after the formative period. It
was internationalists from the American mainland—not local ac-
tivists—who set the organization upon its permanent course,
and it is they who must be given most of the credit for whatever
the Institute may have contributed to a better understanding
among the nations and peoples of the Pacific. While local inter-
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nationalists of course laid the groundwork for all of this, the fact
remains that their subsequent role within the group was not of
great consequence.
Similar things must be said of the local chapter of the In-
stitute during the period following the removal of the central
headquarters to New York. Although it remained active to the
end and its successor organization is still active, the scope of
its operations was so drastically reduced over the years that it
ceased to be of any great significance. To be certain, it did spark
its share of controversy, sponsor certain worthwhile projects,
and above all contribute to the development of an international
consciousness among Island youth, but, in scaling down its ob-
jectives and attempting to cope with its increasingly difficult po-
litical circumstances, it also lost touch with the reforming vision
that was the basis of its original uniqueness. The key loss in this
respect concerns the gradual disappearance of its perception
of Hawaii as a social model. Whatever the shortcomings of this
notion, it is clearly the generative power behind all Island in-
ternationalist ventures, and, as seen time and again, it provided
the essential initiative and creativity that made these ventures
noteworthy. Without it, the movement lacks a raison d’être.
This, in short, is what the local chapter of the Institute and its
successor came to. As a consequence, their only lasting signifi-
cance is as a reminder of what once was and what again might
be.
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VI
A Duty to Perform
POSTWAR PUBLIC SECTOR ACTIVISM
As seen, the advent of World War II put a halt to virtually
all internationalist activity in the Islands. It drew most of the
leaders into war-related tasks, forced the organizations they di-
rected into a period of suspension, and actually destroyed such
faltering efforts as the Pan-Pacific Union. This was, of course,
predictable. With war at hand, the general response to the con-
tinuing call for international peace and understanding was at
best phlegmatic.
The more significant fact is that the movement survived
the war and became active once again following its conclusion.
There were changes, however. Where prewar activities had cen-
tered around several organizations, the postwar era was a time
of burgeoning international activism that saw new groups and a
seemingly endless stream of new activities and new participants
appear at a dizzying rate.
The most striking new feature of the movement during this
period was its spread into the realms of education and gov-
ernment. Although people from both arenas had been involved
during the prewar era, the incentive had clearly come from the
private sector. With the end of the war, the balance shifted.
While privately sponsored undertakings remained important,
educators and government officials took the initiative and
pushed publicly sponsored endeavors to center stage. This did
not change the elitist nature of Island internationalism—in no
sense did it become a truly popular movement—but it did open
the movement to more than the original handful of socially and
economically prominent activists.
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While the reasons for this change are not entirely clear, it
is evident that at least two important factors are involved. In
the first instance, it is clearly due in part to the passing of
Alexander Hume Ford and Frank C. Atherton, men who were
influential enough to assure that the organizations they domi-
nated in turn dominated the movement. In the second case, al-
though the precise connections are more difficult to ascertain,
it is likewise clear that it is also due in part to the postwar
emergence of a generation of new leaders, active largely in the
educational and governmental arenas, who authored the po-
litical reforms of those years that ended the dominance of the
old elite and who, perhaps in reflection of the fact that many of
them had been youthful participants in the movement prior to
the war, took up the internationalist cause once in power. It was,
it appears, a way of symbolizing their cosmopolitan triumph.
EDUCATION AND INTERNATIONALISM
Whatever the proper explanation for the postwar surge of inter-
national activism, the fact remains that the movement spread
outward from the private sector to the educational and govern-
mental sectors in the years following the war and the process is
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still underway. While it is as yet too early to draw conclusions
about the relative significance of these sectors, it is clear that
the level of activity within the educational arena has consis-
tently been higher and that the University of Hawaii has been
the prime generator of this action. It has sponsored an immense
variety of endeavors including international studies programs,
Pacific-wide research and development consortiums, the
nation’s major Peace Corps training project, and the world’s
only international educational satellite network. Some forty
percent of its present curriculum is international in nature, its
foreign student enrollment is among the largest in the nation,
its faculty is composed of people from approximately fifty dif-
ferent nations, its language departments provide an estimated
thirty percent of the nation’s total instruction in East Asian lan-
guages, and its campus is the site of the East-West Center, the
nation’s most noteworthy single experiment in international ed-
ucation.1 In short, the University has become an international
institution of considerable stature.
The University’s international roots date from the time of
its formation and early development in the period between the
world wars. Superseding the College of Hawaii, an agricultural
and mechanical school established in 1907, the new institution
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came into being at least in part as the result of a drive led by
several prominent citizens and educators who, inspired by the
local internationalist movement, felt that the primary focus of
public higher education in Hawaii should be upon regional and
international matters rather than on vocational subjects as was
then the case.2 William Kwai Fong Yap, one of the leaders of
this drive, subsequently wrote a book about the effort, in which
he summarized his (and presumably his colleagues’) hopes as
follows:
It is the writer’s sincere belief that our local University will …
stand as a beacon of enlightenment that will draw people from all
the countries bordering this great Pacific Ocean to the Paradise
of the Pacific…. It is my hope for the future that our University
will be the means of establishing a better understanding between
the peoples of the Orient and the Occident and thus be a real
factor in bringing about international good-will and the estab-
lishment of permanent world peace, and that our young people of
Oriental parentage will carry back to the lands of their ancestors
the ideals and practical knowledge that will aid those countries
in their struggle for development to a state of ideal culture com-
bined with efficiency.3
The very existence of the present institution is, thus, due in
large part to the Island internationalist tradition.
Leaders of the new school moved quickly to restructure it
along more ambitious lines. A Japanese studies program was
established under the direction of Tasuku Harada, a former
president of Japan’s Doshisha University, at the same time the
school’s title was changed. Two years later a Chinese studies
program was initiated under the leadership of Shao Chang Lee.
By 1930 these programs were offering such an array of courses
and attracting such numbers of students that the Institute of
Pacific Relations ranked the University as the nation’s third
leading school for Asian studies.4
Buoyed by success, University officials formed a School of
Pacific and Asian Affairs in 1931 to offer special summer pro-
grams on interracial and international issues in the Pacific. This
venture proved so successful that it was quickly integrated with
the existing Japanese and Chinese programs and made a part
of the institution’s regular curriculum.5 Still not satisfied, Uni-
versity leaders undertook a more complete reorganization of
the Asian-related curriculum during the 1935–1936 academic
year. Aided by grants from various local trusts and families as
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well as a small legislative appropriation, they formed a separate
institute—the Oriental Institute—within the University and
made it responsible for all undergraduate and graduate pro-
grams relative to Japan, China, and India. Under the leadership
of Gregg M. Sinclair, an able scholar and imaginative inter-
nationalist who later became president of the University, the
Institute began with a small full-time faculty and a larger col-
lateral faculty drawn from throughout the campus. Within a
short period, Sinclair and his associates established a bulletin
called the Oriental Institute Journal‚ created a graduate schol-
arship program, initiated a series of scholarly publications,
started a separate Asian library collection that grew to some
forty-five thousand volumes by 1941, and, most important, at-
tracted significant enrollments in their classes.6 Considering
the fact that it came in the midst of the depression, the Institute
enjoyed a most auspicious inception.7
As in so many previous instances, notions about the special
characteristics of Hawaii were a factor in the formation of the
Institute. As University president David L. Crawford put it in
an early publication explaining the organization, “Hawaii is in
a very strategical position to serve both the Occident and the
Orient as an interpreter of each to the other. Realizing that
there is a great need for such service … the University of Hawaii
is establishing its Oriental Institute and dedicating it to the high
purpose of bringing about a more nearly adequate understand-
ing and appreciation of Oriental civilizations and cultures on the
part of Occidental peoples.”8 A few years later, Sinclair made
the same point more directly. Commenting upon the Islands’
physical beauty and cosmopolitan society, he proclaimed that
“Hawaii is a living environment for the study of the East. We
have something essential to the real study of the Orient which
other universities do not possess.”9 It should also be noted that
this sentiment was not restricted solely to those from Hawaii.
Upon learning of the founding of the Institute, the famed Indian
poet Rabindranath Tagore observed that nothing is so important
for the modern world as transcultural understanding and that
“Hawaii, situated as it is in the midst of the seas that separate
the East from the West, is preeminently fitted to be the center
of such an institute.”10
Similar convictions led to the organization of the East-West
Philosophers’ Conference, another important internationalist
venture initiated by the University prior to World War II. En-
couraged by Sinclair, Charles A. Moore, a young philosopher
on the University faculty, arranged a gathering of prominent
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thinkers from various nations in 1939 to explore “the possibility
of a world philosophy through a synthesis of the ideas and ideals
of East and West.”11 The Hawaiian socio-cultural experience
was a factor in both the conception of the event and the decision
to convene it in the Islands. As Moore later observed, Hawaii’s
“cosmopolitan population, predominantly Asian but also thor-
oughly Westernized in education, institutions, etc., presents an
ideal location between East and West where racial prejudice is
relatively unknown and where both Easterner and Westerner
may feel fully at home, neither an ‘outsider’.”12
Although Moore was later forced to redefine his extremely
ambitious goals along somewhat narrower and more technical
lines, his dream of an international philosophers’ conference
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was realized. With support from the University and a number
of local families, the first meeting was held during the summer
of 1939 and attracted some twenty philosophers. Among them
were such prominent scholars as D. T. Suzuki and F. S. C.
Northrop. Subsequent gatherings in the summers of 1949,
1959, 1964, and 1969 were supported by national foundations
and international organizations (including UNESCO) as well
as local sources, and they attracted numerous eminent partic-
ipants.13 These gatherings, centered around the presentation
of papers addressing particular issues in East-West under-
standing, sparked sufficient interest to warrant the publication
of the proceedings of each conference and to sustain a scholarly
periodical entitled Issues in East-West Philosophy.14 In addition,
they are credited with inspiring a number of texts in philosophy
including Northrop’s pioneering attempt at a global philosophic
synthesis entitled The Meeting of East and West.15
Like all other varieties of local internationalism, the Uni-
versity’s burgeoning activism came to an abrupt halt with the
outbreak of World War II. Plans for a second philosophers’ con-
ference were shelved until the conclusion of the war, while the
Oriental Institute, not able simply to suspend its activities, suf-
fered a harsher fate. Lacking sufficient funds after 1940, the
University was forced to dissolve it during the 1941–1942 aca-
demic year. An effort was made to integrate its faculty and
courses into the regular academic structure, but the school
was too involved with the war effort—conducting research on
foodstuffs, providing special courses for military personnel, and
monitoring local social tensions—to devote significant re-
sources to an Asian studies program.16 Ironically, Sinclair, the
man primarily responsible for establishing the Institute and the
one who believed most strongly in its potential, became pres-
ident of the University at precisely the time it failed and was
thus responsible for formally reporting its demise.17 It should be
noted, however, that he couched his report in defiant terms that
portended things to come. Refusing to concede final defeat, he
declared that the University “has a duty to perform in making
clear to our world the real significance of Pacific and Asiatic
civilizations,” and he pledged to revive the effort once the war
passed.18
Sinclair’s assessment of the University’s commitment to
internationalism was accurate. The postwar years proved to be
a time of pronounced activity on many fronts that led to the
host of international programs, perspectives, and linkages now
characteristic of the school. Still under Sinclair’s leadership,
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the school signaled its reembarkation upon this course in 1948
during the celebration of its fortieth anniversary when it in-
vited the leaders of a number of outstanding American and Eu-
ropean universities to lecture in the Islands on the future role
of the Pacific and, not incidentally, Hawaii in world affairs.19
More concretely, it also used the occasion to announce that
it had formed a Graduate School of Pacific and Asiatic Affairs
and was, hence, returning to its prewar concern for Pacific
and Asian studies.20 In the planning stages since the end of
the war, the new program was modeled after the Oriental In-
stitute but offered only an advanced degree.21 The University’s
present graduate program in Asian studies, while subsequently
renamed, evolved from this beginning.
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An end-of-the-decade movement on behalf of foreign stu-
dents likewise helped revive international activism on the
campus. Although approximately seventy students from abroad
were enrolled at the time, the University had no formal program
for providing assistance with such matters as visas, housing,
community visitations, and financial support. Distressed by
these circumstances, a group of students and faculty organized
a drive to create a foreign student office with an appropriate
staff. Composed largely of students from the long-active Cos-
mopolitan Club, the group was led by Agnes Niyekawa from
Japan and Lorrin Gill from Hawaii. Advised by a number of sym-
pathetic members of the academic community including Paul
Miho of the campus YMCA and John Stalker of the Department
of History, a veteran of the Pacific war who emerged from the
conflict committed to a cosmopolitan perspective and deter-
mined to advance it through international activism, the students
based their arguments largely on the grounds that the Uni-
versity had already compiled an enviable internationalist record
and was therefore obligated to continue it. In 1952 the Uni-
versity responded by establishing and staffing a foreign student
office.22 With time, this office became an integral part of the
school, just as foreign students became an integral part of its
student body. During the 1975–1976 academic year, for ex-
ample, the University enrolled approximately thirteen hundred
students from abroad, more than all but nine other colleges
and universities in the nation.23 For at least some of those who
participated in the original effort, however, the subsequent sta-
tistics are less important than the original act. It is their con-
viction that the undertaking was basic to the general postwar
revival of internationalism on the campus and throughout the
Islands.24
Whether or not this effort sparked the renaissance of
internationalism at the University, the tempo of activities in-
creased dramatically in the following years. In 1952, for in-
stance, the University joined the American Universities Field
Staff, a consortium of eight universities formed the previous
year to provide the American academic community with a better
source of information and analysis on foreign affairs. The Uni-
versity was one of the first schools other than the original
founders to join the organization and, with the exception of a
brief hiatus during the late 1960s, remained one of its active
supporters until the relationship was again severed during a fi-
nancial crisis in 1977.25 Although nothing of great significance
developed from the University’s membership in the organi-
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zation, the decision to participate was one more signal of the
school’s determination to reestablish an international orien-
tation in the years after the war.
A related venture began in 1954 when the United States
International Cooperation Administration (the predecessor of
the current Agency for International Development) and the Ter-
ritory of Hawaii jointly established the International Cooper-
ation Center of Hawaii to provide transcultural and technical
training for government employees from nations receiving
American foreign aid. While not a University project, the Center
drew heavily on faculty resources to provide courses for the ap-
proximately eleven hundred trainees who attended courses be-
tween the time the facility was opened and 1960 when it was ab-
sorbed by the new East-West Center. During this period, people
from thirty-three different countries were trained in fields as di-
verse as banking, education, medicine, and city planning.26 The
lasting significance of this endeavor with respect to the Uni-
versity is that it aroused the interest of certain faculty members
and administrators in transcultural training and education and
led to an involvement in a series of even more ambitious
training programs in the 1960s.
There are numerous other examples of the revival of
internationalism on the campus during the years after the war.
As noted, the East-West Philosophers’ Conference reconvened
in 1949 and met on numerous occasions thereafter. Plans for
research institutes in such areas as public health, marine bi-
ology, and geophysics were initiated. In addition, student ex-
change programs, foreign teacher training projects, and lan-
guage training programs for American government personnel
were undertaken.27 In 1959 the legislature passed a measure
that restructured and refinanced the Asian studies program and
created a new enterprise known as the Overseas Operations
Program.28 The new program was an especially imaginative de-
velopment in international education. Headed by John Stalker,
by this time a well-established figure in local internationalist
circles, it was built around a combination of formal course
work and practical overseas experience designed to prepare its
graduates for careers in the foreign service, in foreign assis-
tance programs, and in any number of other internationally ori-
ented endeavors. Regrettably, problems with the experiential
side of the program led to its deemphasis during the mid-1960s
and elimination in 1974. Hence, throughout the 1950s, the
University was remarkably successful in reviving its com-
mitment—performing its “duty” as Sinclair had put it—to
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international activism. In the process, it also laid the
groundwork for its emergence during the following decade as
one of the world’s major institutions for international education.
Whatever the importance of particular events during the
1950s, none contributed as much to the University’s interna-
tional image and, most likely, substance as the creation of the
East-West Center in 1959. This event focused worldwide at-
tention on the school, produced a host of significant ancillary
effects, reinforced the institution’s own perception of itself as
a leader in international education, and led many elsewhere to
adopt a similar view. In short, it precipitated an institutional
coming of age for the University.
In theory, there is nothing particularly surprising about a
decision to establish an experiment in East-West international
education at the University given its mid-Pacific location, cos-
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mopolitan student body, and long-standing concern for inter-
national education. In fact, however, the decision came as an
almost total surprise. On April 16, 1959, Lyndon B. Johnson,
then Senate Majority Leader, addressed a banquet of the
Women’s National Press Club in Washington and proposed,
without advance notice, that the federal government establish
an international university in Hawaii “as a meeting place for the
intellectuals of the East and the West.” He went on to note that
“for too many years, we have neglected the simple things that
would break down the barriers between ourselves and people
who should be our friends.”29 The creation of such an insti-
tution, Johnson believed, was the proper way to break down
those barriers.
Johnson’s proposal surprised Hawaii as much as it did
Washington. So far as can be determined, he consulted no one
in Island educational circles and discussed the concept only
generally with his good friend John A. Burns, then the Territory
of Hawaii’s delegate to Congress. As recounted by Dan Aoki, a
long-time Burns’ aide, one evening in early April Johnson tele-
phoned Burns, suggesting that they meet at the Senate later
that night for a chat. Happy to oblige, Burns walked over to
the Majority Leader’s office and joined in a casual discussion
with Johnson and some of his aides. In the course of the con-
versation, Johnson remarked that he was scheduled to deliver
an address and that he wanted some additional information on
social and cultural issues in Hawaii, as he intended to make
that the subject of his talk. As the two men had discussed the
question before, Burns knew Johnson was interested in the Is-
lands and his request did not, thus, seem unusual. Burns left
Johnson’s office several hours later, happy that Hawaii would re-
ceive a bit more publicity but expecting nothing more.30
There was, of course, considerably more. Johnson’s speech
caused great excitement in the Islands and more followed in
June and July when measures were introduced and passed in
Congress establishing a “Center for Technical and Cultural In-
terchange Between East and West in Hawaii.” Local news-
papers vigorously promoted the concept while University and
government officials hastily convened planning task forces.
Working in consultation, the planners drafted a proposal for an
international college within the University’s existing structure
built around a scholarship program for students from Pacific
Basin countries and a new operational training facility to re-
place the old International Cooperation Center. Department of
State officials, also involved as the new institution was to come
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under their jurisdiction, agreed with most of these suggestions
and incorporated them in their final report, taking exception
only on the issue of autonomy. They proposed that the insti-
tution be made semi-independent rather than placed directly
under the University’s control.31 Congress agreed and passed
the necessary appropriation measure. Late in October final de-
tails were arranged, and the East-West Center was formally
established as a federally sponsored program in international
education operating under the broad supervision of the Univer-
sity.32
Over the years following its creation, the East-West Center
has generated worldwide attention—partly negative but largely
favorable—through its various scholarship, applied research,
and operational training programs. Most significant, during the
1960–1975 period it provided scholarships and research grants
in all fields of study for approximately twenty-five thousand
degree candidates, research scholars, and technical trainees
from forty-one Asian and Pacific countries and the United
States.33 Less important, perhaps, but more apparent, the
establishment of the Center also resulted in the construction
of an architectually pleasing complex of student dormitories,
research facilities, and administrative buildings on a site ad-
jacent to the University campus. Approximately $90,000,000
was invested in these programs and facilities between 1960
and 1975. In addition, during recent years, the Center has re-
ceived significant supplemental funding from numerous Asian
and Pacific nations. There have been two major programmatic
and administrative changes at the Center since 1960. In 1970 it
shifted its program focus from what was basically a traditional
academic orientation to one emphasizing the solution of tech-
nical problems in such areas as population growth and food pro-
duction. In 1975 it was incorporated as an independent entity
and thus set apart—and free—from the University.34
Clearly the institutional history of the Center is a topic of
great importance and one that warrants more concentrated
study than it has received to date.35 Within the broader context
of the local internationalist movement, however, the more sig-
nificant aspect of its history concerns the manner in which
Island leaders have responded to it and the extent to which their
response further illustrates the perspectives of the movement.
Once recovered from the shock of Johnson’s unexpected pro-
posal, the local establishment waxed eloquent in support of the
idea, drawing heavily on familiar internationalist arguments.
Newly elected United States Senator Hiram L. Fong capsulized
A Duty to Perform
158
Lyndon B. Johnson, John A. Burns, and others break ground for the
East-West Center. East-West Center photo
the essence of this response in floor debate early in 1960 when
he argued that “it is important to recognize that an interna-
tional culture center in Hawaii is neither a vague dream nor a
new idea. The proposal is the culmination of a long history of
ethnic integration, cultural interchange, and dynamic growth,
all of which mark Hawaii’s emergence into the modern world.
Thus Hawaii is, in a sense, already an international center for
cultural and technical interchange, which makes her unique in
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the world and which at the same time charges her with deep
responsibility to the world.” Buttressing his point, he concluded
by quoting President Eisenhower who had earlier observed that
“Hawaii cries insistently to a divided world that all our differ-
ences of race and origin are less than the grand and indestruc-
tible unity of our common brotherhood. The world should take
time to listen with attentive ear to Hawaii.”36
Others from Hawaii made similar statements in Congress, to
the media, at public gatherings, and wherever else an audience
was available. These arguments and assumptions are neatly ab-
stracted in the Center’s first annual report to Congress. Under
the heading “Uniqueness of Hawaii,” it states:
The creation of a Center in Hawaii, the crossroads of the Pacific,
to facilitate the interchange of knowledge and ideas between the
peoples of the countries of Asia and of both the United States
and of the rest of the occidental world has been advocated in a
number of forms over the years.
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Hawaii stands as a symbol of the day-by-day success of the
democratic processes as they respond to the creative impact of
varied cultural and racial groups. Our newest State provides a
tangible demonstration of the cooperative accomplishments of
peoples of diverse origins, working together as free men, with
mutual respect and consideration. It represents the reality of the
American dream, not as a bland assimilation of differences, but
as a fulfilled promise in the useful employment of diversities for
mutual good. Indeed, Hawaii’s people constitute a visible proof
that men can live together in harmony. Against this background,
and with the knowledge that contact under favorable circum-
stances between people of different nationalities aids in bring
[sic] about understanding, Hawaii is uniquely appropriate as the
site of a center to facilitate the interchange of ideas between the
countries of the Pacific area and the United States. Establishment
of the Center in the Hawaiian Islands permits utilizing, for the
benefit of the entire Nation, the unusual resources of the Uni-
versity of Hawaii, the several agencies of the State, the schools,
museums, private institutions, and the innumerable services of an
alert, informed, and active citizenry.
The promise of the Center for Cultural and Technical Inter-
change Between East and West is not formed on idle speculation
or casual good will, but grows naturally out of Hawaii’s geo-
graphic location and its combination of an innately friendly people
and an extraordinary social mixture of nationalities, the majority
of them Asian in origin. In this setting, the State university has
taken advantage of challenges and opportunities provided by its
living community laboratory to play an active role in the devel-
opment of the democratic society which is its base and its sup-
port.
When the opportunity was presented to prepare a program
for a Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East
and West, the university was ready, on the strength of its expe-
rience and the enthusiasm of its interests, to assist in the planning
of a series of proposals to achieve the purposes of the act, and
subsequently to effectuate them by assuming responsibility for
the State of Hawaii to carry out the establishment and operation
of the Center.37
Despite such discourse, from time to time critics have
passed off the creation of the Center as little more than part
of Johnson’s 1960 campaign for the presidency. They claim that
he succeeded because he was able to manipulate Cold War
fears (the Soviet Union was then in the process of opening a
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well-publicized international university of its own) and force the
measure through an otherwise disinterested Congress. There
is a kernel of truth in these claims. Burns recognized from the
outset that the proposal would at least do no harm to Johnson’s
candidacy, and a portion of the related congressional debate
rather pointedly noted that the institution would strengthen
America’s hand in the “struggle for men’s minds.”38
In the balance, however, these claims are unpersuasive.
There is little question that Johnson was truly fascinated with
Burns’ acclamatory portrayal of Hawaiian society and his vision
of the Islands’ potential contribution to transcultural relations
throughout the world. In this instance, at least, the available
evidence suggests that Johnson was genuinely concerned with
promoting better world understanding and that he felt Hawaii
was an ideal place to initiate an experiment in that direction.39
If he could accomplish this while boosting his own campaign, so
much the better.
Much the same can be said of the Cold War issue. While
there were references to the Center as a factor in the compe-
tition between the Soviet Union and the United States, most
of the debate relative to its establishment addressed more al-
truistic concerns. The language of Johnson’s original bill illus-
trates. It stated simply that the fundamental purpose of the
Center was “to promote better relations and understanding be-
tween the United States and the nations of Asia and the Pacific
through cooperative study and research … [by establishing a
Center] where scholars and students in various fields from the
nations of the East and the West may study, give and receive
training [and] exchange ideas and views.”40 Congress accepted
Johnson’s rationale. A subsequent conference report listed the
various educational advantages of the proposal without men-
tioning Soviet-American relations and concluded that “Hawaii
is the crossroads of the East and the West. Here the cultures
of Asia and of Europe and of the Americas have met and have
learned to live together. Consequently, it is most appropriate
that a center such as this should be established in Hawaii
where cooperation has been the rule for many years.”41 The
Department of State took a similar position in its study of the
original proposal. It noted that such a center would “make a
valuable contribution to the programs of the United States for
the promotion of international educational, cultural, and related
activities.”42 In sum, unless there is some as yet undisclosed ev-
idence that these statements of intent were in fact contrived
to cloak a different purpose, it is clear that the government
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viewed the Center as an essentially idealistic experiment based
upon much the same perception of Hawaiian society as Island
internationalists themselves held. Assuming this to be the case,
the creation of the Center ranks as an achievement of immense
proportions in the history of local internationalism. It is the
modern era’s greatest single triumph in a continuing effort to
popularize an idea which, despite tremendous publicity over the
years, has attracted discouragingly few adherents beyond the
bounds of the Islands.
By both coincidence and design, the establishment of the
Center marked a decided upsurge of international activity at the
University. Under the vigorous leadership of President Thomas
H. Hamilton, the school embarked on a period of rapid general
expansion. Many new ventures were initiated during this era in-
cluding a variety of internationally oriented programs.43 Among
the more noteworthy of these undertakings was a training
program for Peace Corps personnel that began in 1962 under
terms of a contract between the University and the federal
government. Conceived in large part and directed for a number
of years by the ever-active Stalker, this program broke new
ground in language, trans-cultural, and technical training
methods. By the time it was phased out during 1970 in favor
of “in-country” training, more Peace Corps members had been
trained in Hawaii than at any other single location in the nation.
In all, some five thousand people—the majority of those who
served in East Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific during these
years—passed through the program, most of them gaining re-
markable language skills as well as the ability to live and work
effectively in a foreign cultural environment.44 University of-
ficials were pleased with the program, and the Peace Corps
hierarchy apparently felt likewise. Sargeant Shriver, the orga-
nization’s original director, frequently praised the operation, as
did most of the members of his field staff.45
Encouraged by the success of the Peace Corps program, the
University and the government entered into another contract in
1966 to provide similar training for Agency for International De-
velopment personnel assigned to Vietnam and other Asian na-
tions. Again Stalker was the driving force behind the project.
A training center, known first as the Far East Training Center
and later as the Asia Training Center, was established in Hon-
olulu, and a program modeled after the Peace Corps experience
was initiated. Unfortunately, the effort foundered upon a com-
Elusive Destiny
163
Thomas H. Hamilton. University of Hawaii
photo
bination of University politics and Washington’s decision to de-
emphasize the role of developmental assistance in the Vietnam
conflict and it was quietly dropped in 1969.46
In response to a desire for more applied exercises in the
Peace Corps and Agency for International Development pro-
grams, a rice production training center was also established
during this period. Known as the Tropical Rice Production
Center and once again principally the work of Stalker, it was uti-
lized for several years to introduce trainees to the complexities
of rice culture. However, when strategic changes in Vietnam re-
sulted in declining use after 1968, it was turned over to the Uni-
versity’s School of Tropical Agriculture.47
When support for its various training programs suddenly
disappeared at the end of the decade, the University made an
effort to consolidate these programs under a single institution
called the Center for Cross-Cultural Training and Research.48
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Regrettably, this too failed, and the entire training endeavor
came to an end. There simply were no longer enough clients
to support the operation. Not all was lost, however, as the Uni-
versity gained and has since retained a level of expertise in tran-
scultural training that few institutions anywhere can equal.
While transcultural training activities have been among the
most visible of the University’s international activities in recent
years, the decade of the 1960s was a time of intense activity
on many fronts, and numerous other projects of consequence
were also undertaken. A recent survey of University-sanctioned
international projects inventories approximately three hundred
separate activities involving some forty different nations.49 The
College of Business Administration, for example, offers travel
industry management programs in cooperation with various na-
tional and international tourist bureaus and conducts a joint
academic program in business administration with Aoyama
Gakuin, a major Japanese university. In addition, it has em-
barked on an internationalization of its curriculum that will
make it the Pacific Basin’s leading business education and re-
search center.50 The School of Public Health is engaged in nu-
merous health development programs ranging from the organi-
zation of an integrated health delivery system for a community
in Thailand to the training of physician assistants for the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. Among the various international
projects of the College of Tropical Agriculture are training pro-
grams for Asian farmers, comparative research in international
crop production and soil capability, and an inter-university re-
search program in tropical soil science. Elsewhere within the
University are such undertakings as the PEACESAT Project’s
Pacific-wide information sharing system which is based upon
satellite communication, the Institute of Astronomy’s multina-
tional telescopic project which involves Canada and France,
the Population Genetics Laboratory which serves as the World
Health Organization’s International Reference Center for
human genetics data, and the University Press of Hawaii which
is one of the world’s leading publishers and distributors of ma-
terials on Asia and the Pacific.51
As a consequence of its programmatic expansion during
the 1960s, the University developed linkages with a host of
other institutions and projects throughout Asia and the Pacific
and, to a lesser degree, the world. This in turn led to the cre-
ation of a separate administrative unit within the institution
to provide managerial oversight. In 1965 the Office of Inter-
national Programs was formed for this purpose, predictably
Elusive Destiny
165
Stuart Gerry Brown. University of Hawaii photo
enough under Stalker’s direction. In 1970 it was replaced by
the Advisory Council on the International Relations of the Uni-
versity of Hawaii under the chairmanship of Stuart Gerry
Brown, a long-time international scholar and activist. Charged
with facilitating consultation on international issues among the
faculty and providing advice on international decisions for the
administration—then headed by scholar-diplomat Harlan
Cleveland—the Council remained active until it was dissolved in
1977 during the same retrenchment that led to the severance of
ties with the American Universities Field Staff.52
While there is no guarantee that all the accomplishments
of the past will be preserved—recent developments are a case
in point—it is nonetheless clear that the University moved to
the center of the internationalist stage during the 1960s and
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can remain there if it so chooses.53 Although the propitious mix
of personalities, national legislation, momentum from the past,
and availability of state and federal funds may not always be
present as during the 1960s, there is reason to believe that the
urge to pursue an internationalist course remains, and this, as
should be evident, is the truly crucial ingredient.54
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POLITICS AND INTERNATIONALISM
While the University has been the center of substantive inter-
nationalist activity in Hawaii during the postwar period, Island
governors, in particular William F. Quinn (1957–1962) and John
A. Burns (1962–1974), have been the leading spokesmen for
the concept. Both men frequently addressed the topic, usually
with soaring and visionary rhetoric. Of the two, Burns was the
more vocal and, in fact, is generally recognized as the modern
prophet of the movement.55 His advocacy of internationalism
was a consuming passion that found expression throughout his
years in public office, both in official statements and in private
conversations. Beginning with his election as Hawaii’s delegate
to Congress in 1956, he spoke with increasing frequency on the
point, first in an effort to convince Congress that Island people
were indeed fit subjects for full citizenship and later in a general
attempt to persuade all categories of audiences that Hawaii was
a unique land with a special destiny.56 His inaugural address fol-
lowing his election as governor in 1962 set the theme for many
other talks that would follow, including the 1969 “State of the
State” address cited at the outset. Summarizing his view of the
essential elements of the internationalist argument, he spoke
of Hawaii as “the hub of the great wheel of the Pacific,” how
Island people are “the greatest ambassadors on the face of the
earth,” and how a “dramatic upsurge in Pacific trade … com-
merce … understanding … trust… [and] good intent” would be
spearheaded by people from the Islands.57
Burns founded his internationalist arguments on both prac-
tical and philosophic grounds and presented them before
groups as diverse as the Pacific Trade and Development Con-
ference and the 41st Annual Propeller Club Convention.58 For
the most part, he cast his remarks in practical terms, tieing
Hawaii’s international destiny to the development of an ever-
stronger Pacific Basin commercial community. A talk delivered
before a group of local businessmen in 1970 illustrates:
A good deal hinges on the initiative of Hawaii’s business
community—on what you do, for it is increasingly clear that
Hawaii’s economic prosperity is inextricably tied to commerce
in the Pacific. It is estimated that Hawaii’s volume of business
in the Pacific-Asia region in 1968 alone amounted to approxi-
mately $500 million. That represents a significant proportion of
our gross domestic product and in the years ahead it should be
even greater. But the question is—how much greater?
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To put it another way, will Hawaii’s businessmen look for
opportunities westward, the Pacific Basin and in Asia? Will they
expand in the Pacific-Asia region? Or will they ignore the oppor-
tunities and challenges beyond for the relative comfort at home?
If Hawaii businessmen need a slogan for the 70’s, let me
suggest “Go west and grow up with the Pacific.”
There’s a sign-post out there in the Pacific that says “Oppor-
tunities Unlimited,” and it points to our neighbors in the Pacific
and in Asia. It is the world’s largest market, economically one
of the world’s fastest growing regions, and it probably has the
greatest potential in both human and natural resources for long-
time growth than any comparable area of the world.59
Elusive Destiny
169
Burns was not, however, unmindful of the fact that Hawaii’s
effort to forge closer economic and technical ties in the Pacific
required a reasonably sophisticated rationale as well as simply
a vision. Hence, on other occasions he, like so many before him,
spoke of Hawaii’s unique historical experience and how that ex-
perience must inevitably lead to new and even more ambitious
roles for the Islands. Speaking to this point in a talk delivered
before an American Bankers Association Convention in 1969, he
declared:
We in Hawaii are in the Center of the Sea, in the quiet vastness of
the awesome Pacific, geographically unique, like no other State in
the Nation. It is most logical, therefore, that our outlook, our po-
litical and social philosophy, our culture, our thinking, our habits
of work, and recreation will, in many ways, be refreshingly dif-
ferent to those of you who may not be familiar with our history
and our special place in this world.
We are more than a collection of Islands; we are an Island
people—a free people—of all races, colors, creeds, and cultures.
We are an amalgamation, a fusion, of East and West. We are not
a collection of differences; rather, we are a melding of differ-
ences, forming what some have called—in their enthusiasm for
the process and the product—a Golden People.
Because we are different, although still thoroughly American,
we view the world with an outlook different from that of our fellow
citizens of our Mainland Sister-States….
Here in Hawaii, we developed long ago the profound con-
viction that all mankind is one family; that no man, no State, no
nation, is an Island complete unto itself; that there is no peace for
us when anyone, anywhere, is at war; and that peace, prosperity,
and progress are available to all who will struggle and work to-
gether to gain these gifts offered to us.
We have learned that unity is not achieved by voluntarily
alienating ourselves from others or by withdrawing from regions
of struggle because the effort is extremely difficult.
We in Hawaii yearn for, and work for, the development of
a spirit of community in the Pacific basin. We seek to inspire
and promote a Pacific Community of Nations, a spiritual unity of
peoples of diverse ethnic origins.
We see this as our special role and duty and destiny by reason
of the precious gift of American freedom given to us; by reason of
our unique geographical location; by reason of our total blending
of the cultures of East and West in our interracial unity and
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harmony; by reason of our extraordinary prosperity and attractive
physical and social environment, and by reason of our proven
history of dedication to man’s highest ideals.
Because of these things, he concluded, “Hawaii wants to be of
service to the world. We want to lead by the power of good
example, by the perfecting of our Island society. We want the
shining light of our prosperity, our remarkable social advances
and our compassion for all the lesser developed regions of
the Pacific to inspire others so they will honor and cherish
the basic principles of justice, freedom, and mutual assistance
which have made our country so great.”60
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Burns’ belief in Hawaii’s destiny was expressed privately as
well as in public. While his comments here are more difficult to
document, several examples are a matter of record. His conver-
sations with Lyndon Johnson are best known in this respect but
are by no means the only ones. Former state legislator Toshio
Serizawa, one of the Islands’ more vocal advocates of interna-
tionalism during the 1960s, recalls spending long hours with
Burns and Shelly M. Mark, Burns’ chief economic advisor, dis-
cussing various aspects of the topic.61 Mark himself agrees that
this was clearly one of Burns’ chief concerns throughout his
years as governor.62 Still others who worked closely with Burns
during this period—in particular Myron Thompson, who served
as his administrative assistant and later in his cabinet, and
George Kanahele, who was also a member of his cabinet—recall
that he was as much an advocate of internationalism in private
as in public.63 In short, Burns was a true believer and not, as
some detractors have intimated, simply another politician who
happened to stumble on a good issue. One may dispute the sub-
stance of his views but not the depth of his conviction.64
Although Burns was the most vocal and eloquent spokesman
for the internationalist viewpoint throughout the 1960s and
early 1970s, his assumption of this role could hardly have been
predicted. Unlike the widely traveled Ford or the well-born
Atherton, he grew up in poverty, obtained only a high school ed-
ucation, rarely traveled, and spent almost half his adult life as
a policeman. Born March 30, 1909, of army parents stationed
in Montana, he came to Hawaii at the age of four when his fa-
ther, a sergeant, was transferred to an Island post. His father
deserted the family shortly thereafter and his mother, a postal
clerk, was left with the task of raising him, a younger brother,
and two younger sisters.
The family lived in the economically depressed Kalihi section
of Honolulu and Burns grew up there, becoming wise in the
ways of the street and forming many life-long friendships with
others from the area. He attended St. Louis College, a local
Catholic elementary and secondary institution, through the
tenth grade and then moved to Kansas to live with an uncle.
After another year of school, he quit and joined the army with
dreams of obtaining a West Point appointment. This ambition
faded after a year of strict discipline coupled with ready sup-
plies of liquor, and he returned to the Islands where he com-
pleted high school, studied briefly at the University of Hawaii,
worked at a variety of minor jobs, and then married Beatrice
Majors Van Vleet in 1931. After several more years of assorted
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jobs and a year in California farming his father-in-law’s ranch,
he returned to Honolulu in 1934 and joined the municipal police
force, an occupation he found enjoyable and satisfying.
Burns was a success as a policeman. He held a number of
important positions and rose to the rank of captain, but he re-
signed late in 1945 to undertake the seemingly hopeless task of
building a viable Democratic party in a society totally and com-
pletely dominated by Republicans. So far as can be determined,
his reasons for taking this step were a combination of the simple
and the profound. In part, they stemmed from his dislike of the
paternal and mildly racist form of rule practiced by Hawaii’s
long dominant white elite. Although he was white, most of his
friends were not and he felt they suffered an unjust lot which
should be changed.
In addition, despite a meager education, he read extensively
and was familiar with a number of works that excited him
and provided a rationale for his youthful reformist inclinations.
Works by and on Thomas Jefferson and, particularly, Andrew
Jackson appear to have convinced him that the elite’s rule was
altogether contrary to American tradition, while a highly critical
study of Hawaii and the South Pacific entitled Anatomy of Par-
adise seems to be the source of his internationalist inclina-
tions.65 His reaction to the latter work is interesting. Although
its treatment of Hawaii is restricted largely to domestic politics,
he later recalled that it, more than anything else, caused him
to start thinking in internationalist terms and to associate his
views on local political reform with dreams of a greater inter-
national role for the Islands.66 With this as background—an ide-
alistic response to injustice, an introduction to liberal political
theory, a vision of Hawaii’s internationalist destiny, and, some
say, a taste for political power—Burns and a small group of like-
minded and, for the most part, non-white colleagues set forth to
reform and reshape Island society.67
The rest is largely a matter of record. After a decade of
struggle, the Democrats broke the Republican political mo-
nopoly and, ironically, went on to create one of their own. After
several attempts, Burns himself won election as Hawaii’s del-
egate to Congress in 1956 and proceeded to devise the strategy
that produced statehood for the Islands in 1959. Following an
unsuccessful attempt in 1959, he was elected governor in 1962
and served until 1974. He died of cancer in March of the fol-
lowing year. The eulogies offered on this occasion correctly ob-
served that he, more than anyone, built the movement that
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brought social modernization to Hawaii and, in the process, pro-
duced the broadest ranging surge of international activism yet
seen in the Islands.
As suggested at the outset, there is an element in Burns’
vision of Hawaii’s international destiny that is at best optimism
and, less charitably judged, little more than mysticism.68 As also
suggested, however, this is not really important so far as the
general course of the movement is concerned. What counts is
the extent to which his views were accepted as reasonable ex-
pressions of desirable objectives and, hence, as the inspiration
for substantive action by those in a position to initiate it. In
other words, the reality of his views lies not in the degree to
which they can withstand technical dissection but rather in the
extent to which they encouraged, guided, and ultimately pro-
duced international developments during his years in office. In
this respect, the record speaks for itself.
One unfortunate consequence of the chief executive’s highly
visable internationalist leadership is that it tends to obscure the
significance of a number of other governmental bodies in the
movement. Perhaps the most notable example in this regard is
the territorial, and later state, legislature, the body that trans-
lated gubernatorial rhetoric into actual programs. Urged to
action by the executive branch and such legislative internation-
alists as Serizawa, Island lawmakers considered a broad array
of internationally oriented proposals over the years and adopted
many of them. More specifically, between 1955, the first year of
significant activity, and 1972 approximately one hundred such
bills and resolutions were introduced and twenty were passed.69
These proposals involved a wide spectrum of activities ranging
from transcultural training and Pacific Basin athletics to in-
ternational trade and foreign government loans, and it is re-
markable that a local legislature would even consider—let alone
pass—such measures.
Most remarkable among the various measures passed was
one adopted in 1967 that established an office within the ex-
ecutive branch responsible for developing a state program in
foreign affairs, originally entitled the International Devel-
opment Assistance Program.70 The directors of this venture
interpreted their mandate with considerable exuberance. In ad-
dition to promoting commercial ties between Hawaii and other
Pacific Basin countries, they seriously explored the possibility
of involving the state in developmental assistance—foreign
aid—programs abroad.71 Needless to say, it was soon discovered
that this was well beyond the state’s political and economic
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capabilities, but the fact that it was even considered suggests
something of the enthusiasm for international projects then
current. Bowing to reality, the original program was restruc-
tured in 1968. Renamed the Hawaii International Services
Agency and put under the supervision of George Kanahele, it
concentrated its efforts on the promotion of international invest-
ments and international conferences in the Islands.
While the restructuring may have diminished the program’s
role, it did not noticeably inhibit the enthusiasm of the staff
members. They have since published and distributed an im-
pressive array of research reports and newsletters, sponsored
a variety of conferences and seminars, and energetically so-
licited foreign investment in Hawaii.72 In more recent years
they have concentrated on encouraging Japanese investment in
the Islands and, to the extent that current investment levels
are any indication, they have been immensely successful. While
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this may be less than originally intended, the program is
nonetheless remarkable as both an operational entity and a
symbol of the government’s determination to play a role in Pa-
cific Basin affairs.
Another legislative action that ultimately proved significant
in internationalist terms was a decision to sponsor a conference
during 1970 dealing with long-term planning for the Islands.
Known as the Governor’s Conference on the Year 2000 and
chaired by George Chaplin, the imaginative editor of the Hon-
olulu Advertiser who generated the original proposal, the gath-
ering was structured around various task forces charged with
exploring options in areas ranging from the arts to housing. Pre-
dictably, one of the task forces dealt with the question of the
state’s role in Asia and the Pacific. Among other recommen-
dations in this group’s report was the suggestion that Hawaii
take the lead in generating a sense of community within the
Pacific akin to that among the North Atlantic nations.73 This
suggestion, perhaps inspired by Burns himself who had dis-
cussed the matter on several prior occasions, sparked a series
of discussions that is still underway.74 Largely the result of
encouragement from Kanahele and Chaplin, these talks have
involved a number of prominent individuals from throughout
the Pacific and have provoked considerable interest that may
someday result in closer ties throughout the Pacific.75
There are still other examples of the involvement of local
government in the promotion of internationalism—older pro-
grams such as the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council have been
subsidized, special projects such as the International Cooper-
ation Center and the Overseas Operations Program have been
created, and entirely new undertakings such as the Pacific-
Asian Congress of Municipalities, a group organized largely by
Honolulu Mayor Frank F. Fasi, have been initiated—but further
discussion is unnecessary. It is clear that government has
indeed been part of the internationalist movement. At the same
time, however, it must also be noted that the extent to which
the government has actually been involved with the movement
has frequently been less than the supporting rhetoric would
suggest. This circumstance, despairingly termed “the rhetoric
gap” by some, once again illustrates the elitist nature of the
movement. As in times past, internationalism is a subject that is
more appealing to the elite than to the general public, and the
leaders have not always been successful in rallying the broader
support necessary to translate their oft-times elaborate hopes
into actual programs.
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INTERNATIONALISM IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR
As suggested earlier, during the years following World War II
international activities within the educational and governmental
sectors pushed those sponsored by the private sector from their
accustomed place at center stage. This does not, however, mean
that activism in the private sector has diminished. If anything,
the opposite is true. Although educational and government-re-
lated programs have attracted more attention in this period,
there has been a steady increase, in some instances involving
new ventures and in other instances involving the continuation
of earlier initiatives, in private-sector activism. Only in a relative
sense has there been a decline.
The most significant new developments within this sector
have occurred in the business community. Island businessmen,
once oriented almost exclusively toward local and mainland
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American markets, cast off their insular perspectives during
the 1960s and began investing throughout the Pacific and else-
where around the globe. Conversely, they also began welcoming
(or at least accepting) a similarly global investment in Hawaii.
The related changes are evident in numerous ways.
In the first instance, the major local commercial houses
(the so-called “Big Five” composed of Alexander and Baldwin,
American Factors, C. Brewer and Company, Castle and Cooke,
and Theo. H. Davies and Company) have outgrown their Island
foundations. Their stock, once largely owned by the local fam-
ilies that founded them, is now traded on the major exchanges,
their managers are professionals from the business world
rather than descendants of the founding families, and several
are currently investing larger amounts abroad than in the Is-
lands. With the possible exception of Alexander and Baldwin,
they have ceased to be local companies solely concerned with
the management of the local economy. Instead, they are in the
process of becoming national and even international conglom-
erates.76
More spectacular, a variety of new corporations, some
subsidiaries of the old line firms and others independent ven-
tures, have been organized specifically for international
business. C. Brewer and Company’s Hawaiian Agronomics
Company, for example, was established as a developmental agri-
culture consulting firm and has gained a worldwide reputation
in marginal land reclamation as a result of its projects in some
sixty nations around the globe. Illustrative of the company’s
skills, Iran, the site of one of its major sugar production pro-
jects, once depended almost solely upon imported sugar and
is now approaching self-sufficiency.77 The construction-oriented
Dillingham Corporation, a company formed in 1961 when the
Dillingham family merged its Oahu Railway and Land Company
with its Hawaiian Dredging Company, is another example. The
directors of the new firm initiated a search for business oppor-
tunities abroad and found them. Military construction projects
throughout the Pacific, a subway in Washington, D.C., a “new
town” in the Australian outback, a highrise office building in
San Francisco, an ocean floor mining project in the Bahamas,
and a construction worker training center in Papua New Guinea
are among the international ventures the company has since un-
dertaken.78
Independent companies have also become involved in a
similar array of international projects. Belt, Collins, and Asso-
ciates, a firm of planning and engineering consultants special-
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izing in tourism development, is representative. In addition to
extensive work in Hawaii, the firm has been active in Western
Samoa, Ceylon, Australia, Singapore, American Samoa, Taiwan,
Fiji, and India. As a consequence, it is now recognized by the
World Bank as one of the few firms anywhere in the world
with the capacity and experience necessary to assist developing
nations in planning for tourism. Closely associated with Belt,
Collins, and Associates is the architectural firm of Wimberly,
Whisenand, Allison, Tong, and Goo. Frequently retained to
design physical facilities in accordance with Belt, Collins, and
Associates’ planning studies, the company has also been active
in Japan, Okinawa, Guam, Tahiti, Indonesia, Saipan, and
Malaysia.79 Both firms are widely recognized for their interna-
tional clientele and for their ability to adapt essentially Western
practices to non-Western circumstances.
Still another category of contemporary international
business activity in Hawaii centers around the efforts of the
state government to attract foreign business activity and those
of the semi-public Hawaii Visitors Bureau to promote interna-
tional conferences. Following the lead of others, during the late
1960s the state established a Foreign Trade Zone on the Hon-
olulu waterfront (with a secondary facility at the Campbell In-
dustrial Park on the southwest coast of Oahu) where foreign
corporations may import merchandise and raw materials for
storage or further processing and delay paying duty until the
goods are actually sold on the American market. This program
has made Hawaii an international transshipment point for
products ranging from jet fuel to clothing while generating an
annual average of some $10,000,000 in salaries and business
revenues.80
In a related venture dating from the mid-1970s, the state,
backed by local business leaders and officials from the Uni-
versity’s College of Business Administration, initiated a cam-
paign to encourage multinational corporations to establish re-
gional headquarters facilities in Honolulu. The objective of the
effort is to transform Honolulu into a “regional headquarters
city” for the Pacific Basin akin to such other regiocentric cities
as Paris, Brussels, Coral Gables, and Hong Kong. As a measure
of initial success, some twenty firms, including Sheraton Hotels,
Pan American World Airways, and General Electric, have re-
cently established such facilities and others are expected to do
likewise in the near future.81
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The Hawaii Visitors Bureau envisions similar ends with re-
spect to international conferences. Aided by the Hawaii Inter-
national Services Agency, the Bureau is attempting to establish
the Islands as a conference center serving the Pacific Basin
and, in so far as possible, the world. Citing Honolulu’s mul-
ticultural environment and varied meeting facilities, the orga-
nization has been soliciting conventions since the turn of the
present decade. The effort has been marginally successful. Con-
ventions brought approximately a hundred and twenty thousand
additional visitors to the State in 1972 and it is predicted that
this figure will climb to five-hundred thousand by the late
1970s.82 However, to date most of these gatherings have been
American rather than international in character.
Substantial as the expansion and internationalization of
local business has been, an even more impressive development
has occurred in the area of foreign investment in Hawaii.
Japanese business firms have been most active in this respect.
Motivated by pre-oil crisis prosperity and encouragement from
local governmental agencies, numerous Japanese investors
poured some $200,000,000 into the Islands during the late
1960s and early 1970s. At the end of 1972, approximately eighty
Japanese-owned firms were doing business in the state in such
diverse areas as tourism, recreation, advertising, electronics,
general merchandising, real estate, finance, food distribution,
film processing, fishing, motion pictures, and dry cleaning.83
In fact, the volume of this investment became so great that a
number of people were moved to warn against the possibility of
a “Japanese takeover.”84 While this was never a real possibility
as the number of firms involved and their overall investment
constituted only a small percentage of gross business totals in
the state, the very existence of the outcry serves as a rough in-
dication of the impact of foreign investment in the Islands.
These developments suggest that the internationalist urge
so long influential in local social and political circles has at last
penetrated the commercial realm. Perhaps this is so. The sta-
tistics are self-evident, and more than a few business leaders
have adopted the characteristic rhetoric of the movement. Talk
of Hawaii’s “location between East and West,” its “multicultural
environment,” its “understanding of Asian culture,” and how
these factors are combining to make the Islands the “hub of Pa-
cific commerce” is now common in the business sector.85 There
remains, however, a question as to how much of this talk is in-
spired by a genuine sense of internationalism and how much is
rhetorical flourish used to decorate a more traditional concern
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for ordinary profits. While the two considerations are not nec-
essarily incompatible—the multinational corporations make a
good case in their argument that international business in-
terests constitute a strong incentive for the maintenance of
global peace—episodes such as the outcry against Japanese in-
vestment raise certain doubts.
To the extent that Hawaii’s postwar venture into the interna-
tional business realm can be classified as truly internationalist,
it is a new category of activity in the private sector. Another cat-
egory in this sector that is not new involves the continuation
of activities similar to those initiated earlier by the Pan-Pacific
Union and the Institute of Pacific Relations. As noted, a number
of the organizations that grew from these groups survived the
demise of the parent organizations and are still active today.
The Pacific Science Association, the Pan-Pacific Surgical Associ-
ation, the Pan-Pacific and Southeast Asia Women’s Association,
and the Pacific and Asian Affairs Council are the principal ex-
amples. Other groups inspired by the Union and the Institute
but without direct connections are likewise active. Still other
organizations and activities with similar objectives have been
formed more recently. All, thus, are factors in contemporary
private-sector internationalism.
Enough has been said of the groups spawned by the Union
and the Institute, but further comment on the others is nec-
essary. Of these, the local YMCA is most significant. As dis-
cussed earlier, this group was active on the international front
during the 1920s and is largely responsible for the creation
of the Institute in 1925. This was, however, the apex of its in-
volvement until the late 1960s. Although it was in no sense
inactive during the intervening period, it sponsored no further
projects of such magnitude. Concerned largely with domestic
programs, it restricted its international programming to a few
projects directed at such ends as improving the relationship
among different ethnic groups in the Islands, providing housing
and assistance to foreign students at the University (the cre-
ation of a University YMCA in 1922 and the construction of
an administrative center and dormitory—appropriately enough
named Atherton House—in 1932 are high points in this respect),
encouraging participation in the Institute’s student program,
providing financial support for the national YMCA’s overseas
programs, and promoting international student exchange.86
However, low-keyed as these programs may have been, they
were firmly rooted in the traditional Island internationalist per-
spective. As a YMCA leader from this era once put it, “The
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youth of these cosmopolitan islands perhaps have a deeper
understanding of real world brotherhood than those of any
other community. We pride ourselves in our maximum of races
and minimum of race prejudice … [upon which this deeper un-
derstanding is based].”87
While interesting, YMCA activities during this period are
obviously of less significance than those surrounding the for-
mation of the Institute. Indeed, given the subsequent conse-
quence of the Institute, it is conceivable that the YMCA will
never again achieve a similar level of international accom-
plishment. Should this be so, it will not be for want of trying.
In the late 1960s, the group’s chief staff and lay leaders initiat-
ed a concerted effort to develop closer ties with the various
Asian YMCA movements, provide Micronesia with leadership
and recreational development assistance, encourage a greater
understanding of Asian and Pacific issues within the American
YMCA, and transform the local YMCA into a sort of institutional
consultant for the American movement with respect to decisions
regarding Asia and the Pacific.
The person largely responsible for this resurgence is Masao
Isobe, a California-born Nisei who became a YMCA staff
member following his release from one of the infamous World
War II “relocation centers” for Japanese-Americans. Coming to
Honolulu in 1948 as a YMCA youth worker, he rose through
the ranks to become the organization’s chief executive officer
in 1972. Long concerned with transcultural issues, one of his
first acts in the new position was the creation of a task force
to explore ways of revitalizing the organization’s international
program and strengthening the relationship between the
American and various Pacific Basin movements. The task force,
composed of Isobe, fellow administrators Hisao Nakamura,
Robert K. Masuda, William Suzuki, and several interested lay
leaders, has also considered even more ambitious undertakings
akin to the activities of the 1920s, although nothing has yet ma-
terialized.88
Isobe’s task force is responsible for a number of recent
accomplishments. Among these, the Asia-Pacific YMCA Consul-
tation on International Cooperation which met in the Philip-
pines during the summer of 1974 and an ongoing leadership
and recreation program in Micronesia are perhaps most note-
worthy. The meeting in the Philippines, the outgrowth of a task
force proposal, brought some one hundred major Asian, Pacific,
and American YMCA executives together for a week of discus-
sion on inter-movement cooperation. Quickly developing into
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what one observer called a “transcultural summit conference,”
the participants engaged in an extremely frank review of cul-
tural barriers and found ways of surmounting at least some of
them.89 The Micronesian program, underway since 1972, in-
volves a variety of leadership training and recreational projects
sponsored in collaboration with the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands government. A possible measure of its effectiveness lies
in the fact that a number of the participants have gone on to
assume important social and political positions in Micronesia.90
Predictably, the urge behind the YMCA’s new program is
part of the same sense of uniqueness and mission that is, or
so it appears, basic to all Island internationalist endeavors.
Throughout the documents pertaining to international pro-
grams, YMCA leaders have repeatedly made reference to the
organization’s role as a “bridge” between the Eastern and
Western parts of the movement and just as frequently stated
their conviction that this role is predestined by Hawaii’s pe-
culiar geo-cultural circumstances.91 Hence, despite its global
philosophic and organizational affiliations, the local YMCA is es-
sentially dependent on the Hawaiian experience for its inspi-
ration in the international realm.
The YMCA is by no means the only internationalist organi-
zation currently active within this sphere of the private sector.
For example, the Richards’ Friend Peace Scholarship program
is still in existence, local foundations led by the several
Atherton-related institutions have continued their sponsorship
of a variety of internationally related activities, and new groups
oriented toward more specialized international concerns have
emerged. The Language Bank, operated until recently by the
Hawaii International Community Service Organization, is an
example of the latter case. Drawing upon the language skills
of some five hundred volunteers, the group offers emergency
translation services in approximately ninety-five different
tongues to stranded tourists, immigrants, students, and others
in need.92 Unfortunately, contributions have diminished re-
cently and the group now operates on a vastly reduced scale,
depending largely upon Judith and Guy Kirkendall—its
founders—for funds. In addition, it should be noted that a long-
standing effort to establish an Island “think industry” came a
step closer to reality when the Aspen Institute for Humanistic
Studies opened an international conference and seminar center
on the island of Hawaii late in 1975, Harlan Cleveland, now an
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YMCA international program leaders. Left to right: staff members
Robert K. Masuda, Hisao Nakamura, Masao Isobe and William Suzuki;
lay leader Donald R. Dawson. YMCA photo
Aspen Institute official, is confident that it will bring numerous
“intellectual tourists” to the Islands and, in the process, add still
another dimension to the local internationalist experience.93
There are, of course, still other organizations such as the
military and various service clubs that have contributed to inter-
national consciousness in the Islands despite the fact that they
are largely unrelated to internationalism as discussed here.
While the activities of these groups and no doubt still others
have a bearing on the topic at hand, there is little to be gained
from further exploration. So many groups are presently active
that it is difficult even to survey their general activities and next
to impossible to cite their specific contributions. Perhaps it is
sufficient simply to note that the contemporary era is, at least
to the extent that magnitude of activity is a measure, the zenith
of local internationalist endeavor.
So it is that the internationalist tradition has developed for
over more than a century, in the process surmounting political
revolution, war, jingoism, isolationism, depression, more war,
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and social revolution. Now it remains to be seen how well all
this has prepared it for the new challenges that most assuredly
lie in the future.
Elusive Destiny
185
VII
The Aura of Mystery and
Wishful Thinking
ANOTHER SIDE OF THE MYTH
In discussing the origins and development of the internation-
alist tradition in Hawaii, the preceding chapters have addressed
some of the issues pertinent to this interesting but little-known
aspect of the local historical experience. In the process, they
have also raised some basic questions about the relationship of
myth and reality in Hawaii and, possibly, about the very nature
of Island thought. More specifically, they have indicated the ex-
istence of obvious differences between the paradisal perception
of the Hawaiian experience and the actual record, but, aside
from noting that imaginative and material reality are not always
the same, they have left the contrast unexplained. Further, in
commenting on the almost wholly American origins of the group
most responsible for popularizing this myth, they have inferred,
but again not explored, the existence of a much more direct link
between American and Hawaiian thought than is generally rec-
ognized. As both questions are of elemental significance with
respect to the nature of at least the internationalist movement,
they must be pursued at greater length.
The contrast between perception and fact can best be illus-
trated by simply noting that not all observers, whether members
of the local elite or visitors from abroad, have been so enthusi-
astic about the Island experience as those cited earlier. On the
contrary, there are others who, while usually a minority, have
perceived this experience in largely negative terms, and their
pessimism illustrates something of the darker side of Hawaii,
just as their counterparts’ optimism portrays elements of the
happier side. The task here, however, is more complicated than
merely outlining and then attempting to explicate two differing
sets of perceptions. On a number of occasions, those associated
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with the optimistic interpretation of events abruptly changed
position in the face of unsettling developments and reacted neg-
atively with what appears to be complete disregard for their
original position. This confusing tendency, illustrated by the
earlier-noted propensity of the elite to retract its generally
enthusiastic interpretation when facing unpleasant racial inci-
dents, must also be explored.
As regards differing perceptions, it is evident that most of
the favorable commentary during the nineteenth century con-
cerned the Islands’ physical attributes. There were few sim-
ilarly enthusiastic comments on Island social characteristics.
In fact, throughout this period, most social commentary was
critical and on occasion openly hostile. A case in point is the
missionary Hiram Bingham. Putting aside his previously noted
flirtation with paradisal descriptions and returning to a more
characteristic stance, he declared in his reminiscences that
the Hawaiians were “stupid, unlettered, unsanctified heathen
tribes [and] … a people disposed to indolence and addicted to
falsehood, fraud, and violence.”1 Ironically, Bingham’s remarks
were echoed a few years later in a harsh criticism of the mis-
sionaries themselves by Herman Melville. In a bitter appendix
to Typee, he charged that “the ascendancy of a junto of ig-
norant and designing Methodist [sic] elders in the councils of
a half-civilized king, ruling with absolute sway over a nation
just poised between barbarism and civilization, and exposed by
the peculiarities of its relations with foreign States to unusual
difficulties, was not precisely calculated to impart a healthy
tone to the policy of the government.”2 Developing the attack,
he added, “The history of these ten days [following England’s
renunciation of an earlier attempt at annexation] reveals in
their true colours the character of the Sandwich islanders, and
furnishes an eloquent commentary on the results which have
flowed from the labours of the missionaries. Freed from the
restraints of severe penal laws, the natives almost to a man
had plunged voluntarily into every species of wickedness and
excess, and by their utter disregard of all decency plainly
showed, that although they had been schooled into a seeming
submission to the new order of things, they were in reality as
depraved and vicious as ever.”3 Whatever else they may have
disagreed on, Bingham and Melville clearly shared the view that
Hawaii was something less than a model society.
Other important figures of the times echoed some of
Bingham’s and Melville’s general doubts about Hawaii, if not
their more specific objections. Both Robert Louis Stevenson and
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the American historian Henry Adams spent time in the Islands
during the 1880s and 1890s, and both found them generally un-
exciting and unremarkable. Neither approved of the changes
wrought by westernization nor of the whites they encountered.
Searching for alternatives to modern technological society, both
found less developed islands elsewhere in the Pacific much
more to their liking. As Stevenson put it, “The Sandwich Islands
do not interest us very much; we live here, oppressed with
civilization, and look for good things in the future.”4 Adams
was more direct. “Third rate places,” he said, “seldom attract
even third rate men, but rather ninth-rate samples, and these
are commonly the white men of tropical islands. I prefer the
savages.”5 Adams did like the scenery in Hawaii but Stevenson
found even that wanting.
Additional criticism of Hawaiian society during this era
came from local residents. Both whites and Hawaiians were fre-
quently dissatisfied with the course of events and neither group
was particularly reluctant to say so. This sense of dissatisfaction
was expressed most forcefully as the annexation issue came
to a head at the end of the century. An editorial comment in
The Friend, a sometimes uncharitable publication despite its
missionary origins, encapsulates much of the prevailing white
perspective. “The whole concern [Hawaii],” the editor wrote,
“is like a great steamship, which he [the native Hawaiian] is
incapable of commanding or navigating, but in which he is
welcome as a passenger, and may enjoy every comfort of the
noble ship.”6 Concerned that the point be made clear to all, the
editor continued, observing: “In the nature of things, an abo-
riginal monarchy in a strong commercial center like Honolulu,
was an anomaly. Bishop Willis [who was protesting the growing
white influence] probably thinks it no wrong that whites do the
governing in such British colonies as Natal, Singapore, or Fiji.
He would show more good sense to admit the same necessity
here, and would be more useful by striving to reconcile the
Hawaiians to that obvious necessity, instead of teaching them to
resent it as a wrong.”7
The native Hawaiian community was well aware of such
sentiments and was not optimistic about a future under direct
American rule. Partly for nationalistic reasons and partly for
social reasons (there was a general awareness of then current
American attitudes toward racial minorities, and several
Hawaiian leaders had suffered thoroughly humiliating racial in-
cidents while traveling on the American mainland), there was as
much resistance to the idea of annexation within the Hawaiian
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community as there was support for it within the white com-
munity.8 As an American commissioner sent to investigate the
circumstances of the overthrow of the monarchy in 1893 and
the desirability of American annexation of the Islands reported,
“If the votes of the persons claiming allegiance to foreign coun-
tries [essentially the white community] were excluded, it [an-
nexation] would be defeated by more than five to one.”9 His
assessment is supported by an anti-annexation petition sent to
the United States Congress in 1897 which contained 21,269
signatures or approximately twenty percent of the total popu-
lation—all races and all ages—of the Islands at the time.10
While pessimistic comments on local society decreased as
the years passed and by the decade following the turn of the
century were decidedly in the minority, they did not entirely
disappear from the scene. A number of incidents with pro-
nounced racial overtones occurred during the first half of the
century that regularly elicited an onslaught of deprecatory com-
mentary from the same community leaders who were otherwise
so positive in their remarks about local society.11 The most pro-
nounced cases in this respect involved a series of labor conflicts
lasting until after World War II, the Miles Fukunaga murder
case of the late 1920s, the Massie rape and murder case of the
early 1930s, a dispute over Japanese language schools during
the 1920s, doubts about the loyalty of local Japanese during
World War II, and postwar arguments over the readiness of
Hawaii for statehood.
In the case of labor disputes, every major strike by Hawaii’s
labor force, always composed primarily of nonwhites, generated
a heated and usually racist reaction. In virtually every instance,
newspaper coverage, a reasonably accurate measure of elitist
response, consisted largely of strident criticisms of labor’s mo-
tives, charges that Hawaii’s Japanese (the principal ethnic
group comprising the labor force) were attempting to dominate
the Islands, and calls for the importation of white labor to re-
place the Japanese.12 Further, at least during the earlier years
of the century, these stories were invariably filled with refer-
ences to “little brown men,” “cocky and unreasonable Japs,”
and the need to “save the white man and the native from that
tremendous peril.”13
A series of strikes following World War II, highlighted by a
paralyzing dock strike in 1949, triggered a reaction only slightly
less scurrilous than that aroused during the earlier years of the
century. The following selections from a newspaper editorial,
written in the form of an imaginary letter to Joseph Stalin from
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a semiliterate, pro-Communist and, particularly to the point,
alien labor leader supposedly representative of the local labor
movement, illustrate:
You know Joe, some people are hoping that the Governor will
issue a Proclamation declaring that Hawaii is in a serious State of
Emergency. (Ain’t it the truth!)
Hope he won’t do that ‘cause it would be headline news in
every paper in the country—and that would attract the attention
of too many people as to what a dirty un-American deal we got
going on in Hawaii. That would be bad!
Most of the U.S. press don’t even know we got a strike
on—and care less—SO FAR. That’s what we want.
It would give him the opportunity of really laying all the cards
on the table. And people would read it.
He could comment on how under American law, just a handful
of us (2,000 out of 540,000—and only 500 of us citizens) can mo-
nopolize control, and restrain the entire trade, commerce and
social life of Hawaii—a so-called American community.
He could point out that by a majority vote of guys who aren’t
even citizens of the United States, honest to God, taxpaying law
abiding Americans is tied up (legally of course) like no other
Americans in history has ever been or ever permitted themselves
to be tied up.14
The Fukunaga case occurred during the 1920s when a de-
ranged Japanese youth murdered a Caucasian boy from a
prominent local family. The newspapers quite properly reported
the case as a tragedy but not as a racial incident. They were not,
however, able to maintain this stance for long. Shaded refer-
ences in news stories, editorials, and letters to the editor made
it evident that people of all backgrounds perceived the case in
racial terms. Eventually the newspapers had to admit to this
reality and, hence, the thinness of the Islands’ cosmopolitan
veneer.15
The Massie case of the 1930s involved the alleged rape
of a Caucasian woman by a group of Hawaiian, Chinese, and
Japanese men. Initial reportage was restrained. However, when
mainland American newspapers began reporting on the case
following its initial denouement in a hung jury, they displayed
such racial animus that all further opportunity for dispassionate
public judgment was destroyed. Tensions escalated further
when the Massies themselves kidnapped one of the alleged
rapists and murdered him. When they were charged with this
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crime and found guilty, the reaction among mainland news-
papers and politicians was paroxysmal. Stridency, as exem-
plified by a New York American editorial, was common. “The
situation in Hawaii is deplorable,” it cried. “It is an unsafe place
for white women outside the small cities and towns. The roads
go through jungles and in these remote places bands of degen-
erate natives lie in wait for white women driving by.”16 Others
were plainly rabid, some going as far as the Oregon paper that
inveighed, “The Governor of the islands proposes a law which
will make rape a crime punishable by death. That’s not enough.
It should be death by torture. That’s all that protects white
women in the South—the fear of torture. Burning at the stake
is a horrible thing. So is rape, and the animal that commits it,
if he has sense enough to know what may happen to him, will
not be so much inclined to go out of his way to satisfy his lust
upon a white woman. If you lived in the South, you would be
more charitable toward a white mob, uncivilized as it is, and
you would, perhaps, condone the murder with which a husband
and a mother are charged in Honolulu.”17 When local author-
ities commuted the Massies’ sentence in an effort to defuse the
complicated situation (Congress and the military had become
involved and there was a movement afoot to replace the civilian
government with a military commission), local nonwhites under-
standably reacted in the negative. As a prominent Hawaiian
leader put it, “With this commutation, the verdict of a jury com-
posed of men with intelligence, sound judgment, and good char-
acter, with the facts and the law before them, becomes a farce
and the truth, as brought out by the prosecution, becomes a
travesty. Are we to infer from the Governor’s act that there are
two sets of laws in Hawaii—one for the favored few and one for
the people generally?”18 While the furor eventually receded, its
scars are still evident.
Similar issues arose in the course of a dispute over the regu-
lation of local Japanese language schools during the 1920s and
a debate about the loyalty of the local Japanese community in
the early years of World War II. In both instances, the failure
of the “Japs” to sufficiently “Americanize” themselves was a
common if somewhat strange charge in a community that so fre-
quently advertised itself as an example of interculturation. Un-
dertones of this outlook persisted into the 1950s and became
part of the debate over statehood. “The publicity given [local]
soldiers of Japanese ancestry,” a prominent Hawaiian leader
stated in testifying against statehood, “has inflated the ego of
the same citizenry…. I will not accept as proof of loyalty, war
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service…. I fear Japanese bloc voting and Chinese ‘plugging’
as a reality in the political future of Hawaii.”19 It should be
noted, however, that most of the local opposition to statehood
was founded less on racial grounds than on the assumption that
statehood would give the labor unions, widely believed to be
Communist-led, a greater degree of control over local politics.20
Local observers were not the only ones to note that not
all was well in Hawaii during these years. Outsiders also com-
mented on problems, although with far less frequency than
during the nineteenth century. For example, the prominent
muckraker Ray Stannard Baker visited Hawaii in 1911 and was
concerned by what he discovered. “Whether in the South, in
connection with the Negro,” he reported, “or in Hawaii, in con-
nection with the Oriental people … the note of pessimism is
struck most strongly by the element which has a selfish interest
in keeping the Negro or the Oriental ‘in his place,’ in making
him work at low wages, and in preventing him from securing
adequate education or opportunities to rise.”21 However, Baker
did see the possibility of improvement. “The note of optimism,”
he said, “is struck by those who are in some way trying to serve
or help; teachers and preachers, especially, who are meeting
the other races on terms not of business, but of friendly con-
tact.”22
Later observers found still other things wrong. One person
went so far as to characterize Hawaii as little more than a “he-
donistic … provincial, sugar-coated fortress, an autistic Eden,
a plastic paradise in which the militarism and racism of the
American Empire are cloaked by a deceptive veil of sunshine
and of flowers.”23 Even as enthusiastic an advocate of the Is-
lands as Michener had to acknowledge that the social record
contained blemishes. A passage of dialogue from Hawaii con-
cerning modern race relations illustrates:
“Of course, the other Christians tell us that God loves all men, but
we know that’s bullshit.”
“Kelly!”
“We know it! We know it!” he stormed, “It’s as clear as the
mountains at dawn. God loves first white men, then Chinese, then
Japanese, and after a long pause He accepts Hawaiians.”
“Kelly, my darling boy, please!”
“But do you know the one consolation we got? Can you guess?
We know for goddamn certain that He loves us better than he
loves niggers. God, I’d hate to be a nigger.”24
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IMAGINATIVE AND MATERIAL REALITY
Like its counterpart process on the positive side, the tabulation
of events from the darker side of Hawaii’s past is a process
that could continue indefinitely. There are numerous other his-
torical incidents that could be cited, and the same is true of
literature, religion, education, and, to a lesser extent, even art
and music. In addition, a variety of contemporary developments
could likewise be cited in this context.25 This, however, is un-
necessary. It is sufficiently evident that the paradisal myth does
not present a full and accurate accounting of the Island expe-
rience and that the mythic perception of the experience is often
at odds with the historical record.
As suggested at the outset, such circumstances are not so
much the product of innate contradictions as they are of dif-
ferent ways of reacting to events and, hence, perceiving them.
This distinction, it has been argued, is at least in part a function
of the oft-mentioned difference between imaginative and ma-
terial reality. If it were generally understood that people tend to
respond to events more in terms of value-laden beliefs than with
valueless, objective analysis, it would also be possible to under-
stand how it is that different perceptions of the same events
come to pass. Further, in many instances, it would be possible to
explain these differences without engaging in acrimonious and
often needless debate over motive and intent which invariably
leads to equally inappropriate charges of deception, hypocrisy,
and even conspiracy.
This observation seems particularly true of Hawaii. Different
values have produced different perceptions of the Island expe-
rience, and these perceptions have, in turn, generated different
responses. So it is that some have chosen to view the expe-
rience in paradisal terms and have reacted positively (one mani-
festation of which appears to be the internationalist movement),
while others have interpreted it in anything but paradisal terms
and have generally responded with criticism. While neither re-
action is particularly intelligible from material perspectives,
both are at least understandable in imaginative terms.
Unfortunately, such distinctions have seldom been employed
in the study of Hawaii. Most scholars have utilized an essen-
tially material approach that recognizes only measurable
factors and, when confronted with issues concerning clashing
perspectives, have usually endeavored simply to establish the
material merits and demerits of the respective sides of the ar-
gument. Sociologist Andrew W. Lind’s Hawaii: The Last of the
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Magic Isles is a particularly interesting case in point. Although
written primarily as a discussion of local interethnic relations,
it is one of very few studies that directly addresses the issue
of characterizing the Hawaiian experience. While agreeing that
the experience has been relatively happy and progressive, Lind
finds the paradisal rhetoric frequently employed in explaining
it disturbing. References to the Islands’ unique qualities and
special destiny are obfuscatory, he argues, and “the aura of
mystery and wishful thinking” must be dispelled if the expe-
rience is ever to be properly understood.26 “No experienced
observer of the Island scene,” he concludes, “can fail to rec-
ognize that Hawaiian race relations are the product of those
forces—some of them assuredly shared with other re-
gions—which have operated within the peculiar historical and
geographic circumstances in Hawaii and that Hawaii holds no
magical formula for exorcizing the evil spirits of racial discord
and distrust in other parts of the world. No unique principle
of natural selection has operated in Hawaii to breed a people
without prejudices…. Nor is there reason for believing that a
benign climate can absorb the truculence, pettiness, and self-
ishness in men’s dispositions any more in these Islands than
elsewhere in the world.”27
From a strictly material perspective that recognizes only
measurable factors, Lind is, of course, correct. The various
“magical” notions people have had about race relations in
Hawaii and, more generally, the entire Hawaiian experience,
make very little material sense. Yet, Lind’s effort to be realistic
actually leads him to an entirely unrealistic position. By ac-
cepting only that evidence which lends itself to material
analysis, he effectively declares the entire matter of paradisal
ideas, so obviously a part of local thought, irrelevant. Put oth-
erwise, he is saying that imagination had no role in determining
the course of Island events. This position, as the preceding
chapters should demonstrate, is simply not tenable. There is a
world of the mind as surely as there is one of matter, and a
proper understanding of human events must embrace the real-
ities of both.
While an understanding of imaginative reality may resolve
some of the issues surrounding the relationship of mythic per-
ceptions of the local experience to the actual historical record,
it does not explain the ease with which traditional proponents
of the paradisal view so frequently and quickly abandoned it
in the face of crisis and adopted what would appear to be a
wholly inconsistent position. Although there is no standard ex-
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planation for this tendency, it seems likely that it is a by-product
of the well-developed sense of paternalism which, in concert
with various other traits, characterized the old governing elite.
Members of this group were in general agreement that justice
and decency—matters, to be certain, of genuine concern to
them—could be assured in agrarian Hawaii’s ethnically and eco-
nomically stratified society only so long as they themselves were
recognized as the community’s stewards. As a consequence,
an unwritten paternal code, complete with tacit understand-
ings regarding the expected behavior of all groups and laden
with racial overtones, governed social intercourse in the Islands
during the later part of the nineteenth and the first half of the
twentieth centuries.28
Whatever the strengths or deficiencies of this code, the es-
sential point here is that it, like similar codes elsewhere, defined
acceptable behavior and sanctioned retribution in the event of
violations. Hence, it is understandable that movements sup-
porting such things as labor unionization, greater public po-
litical involvement, and equal treatment for all ethnic groups
were viewed by the elite as violations of the code and therefore
subject to reprisal.29 So it is, provided this speculative anal-
ysis is correct, that the same members of the elite who viewed
the Island experience in paradisal terms during periods of tran-
quility were, without any sense of contradiction, able to switch
to a harsh and frequently racist perspective during times of
tension and confrontation.30
MYTH AND THE AMERICAN-HAWAIIAN
RELATIONSHIP
In addition to the problems of myth and matter in historical
interpretation, the preceding chapters have also raised the
question of whether or not the central role of an essentially
American elite in the popularization of the paradisal myth in
Hawaiian thought suggests a more intimate connection be-
tween American and Hawaiian ways of thinking than is usual-
ly recognized. More explicitly, they have implied that there are
identifiable connections between certain traditional American
myths and the physical, social, and teleological components
of the Hawaiian paradisal myth. The answers here are more
readily apparent than in the previous case. Such connections
do seem to exist, and they suggest that this myth is indeed
more the product of American thought than of the Hawaiian ex-
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perience. Although the myth finds expression in ways that in-
variably suggest its outgrowth from the unique physio-social
character of Hawaii, it is, in all probability, a derivative of
several myths that are clearly a part of earlier American
thought.
To illustrate, the notion of Hawaii as a physical paradise
corresponds rather directly with the European discovery of
America and the subsequent development of a view of the new
land as a “Zion in the wilderness,” a “virgin continent,” and
an ideal setting for utopian experiments in social regeneration.
This view, expressed in innumerable religious and secular
slogans, poems, songs, tracts, and paintings, underlies the set-
tlement of regions ranging from Massachusetts to the western
plains, as well as the creation of hundreds of utopian commu-
nities. It is reasonable to suggest, thus, that the original elite,
grounded as it was in this way of thinking, consciously or oth-
erwise adapted this perception to the Islands, a lush and gentle
land readily associable with prevailing Western notions of par-
adise.31
Similarly, the view of Hawaii as a social paradise imitates
the earlier perception of America as a land free from the op-
pression of Old World prejudices where people of all stations
could live together in essential harmony and decency. As St.
John de Crèvecoeur, the noted French-American agrarian
philosopher of the Revolutionary period, put it, “These
provinces of North America … [are] the asylum of freedom, …
the cradle of future nations, and the refuge of distressed Euro-
peans.”32 Continuing, he observed that America has
no aristocratical families, no courts, no kings, no bishops, no
ecclesiastical dominion, no invisible power giving to a few a very
visible one; no great manufacturers employing thousands, no
great refinements of luxury. The rich and the poor are not so
far removed from each other…. We are a people of cultivators
… united by a … mild government… respecting the laws … be-
cause they are equitable. We are all animated with the spirit of
an industry … [and] a pleasing uniformity of decent competence
appears throughout our habitations…. We have no princes, for
whom we toil, starve, and bleed: we are the most perfect society
now existing in the world.33
Transformed into myth over the years (which in turn gave rise
to such variations as the over-stated but nonetheless attractive
portrayal of America as a “melting pot,” a nation where, as the
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national motto puts it, the many become one), it is reasonable
to assume that this outlook likewise influenced the old elite in
its assessment of a land where people of widely diverse cultures
and backgrounds were able to live together in at least relative
harmony.
The belief that the Islands are destined to assume a special
role in Pacific and global affairs because of a unique physio-
social makeup appears to be a derivative of still another early
American myth. In this instance, the association is with the
notion of “mission,” the belief that Americans, being the sole
discoverers of the great truths necessary to make men truly free
and having developed a superior society based upon them, must
therefore accept the obligation of educating, liberating, and im-
proving the world. As Herman Melville once proclaimed, “We
Americans are peculiar, chosen people, the Israel of our times;
we bear the ark of the liberties of the world.”34 Reaffirmed over
the years through both rhetoric and action, this view is now
recognized as a factor in the origin of policies and practices
ranging from Manifest Destiny and “hemispheric policeman” to
foreign aid and involvement in Vietnam.35 It is plausible, hence,
to surmise that it too found its way into the Hawaiian paradisal
myth, in the process lending dynamism to an otherwise largely
static concept.
These connections, conjectural as they may be, imply that
there is a profound relationship between mainstream American
perspectives and the intellectual outlook of at least the leaders
of Hawaii. While it has long been evident that the Islands’ major
institutions are modeled after their mainland American coun-
terparts, it has generally been assumed that an important dis-
tinction between the two lands has always existed in terms of
underlying values and beliefs. As the frequent use of such ex-
pressions as “the Island way” and “the Hawaiian ethos” sug-
gests, many believe that this distinction not only exists but is
the product of the evolution of a fundamentally new, hybrid way
of Island thought. In fact, to complete the circle, the interna-
tionalist movement itself has often been cited as one of the
principal examples of how this new and special outlook has pro-
duced unique forms of activity. Clearly, however, such assump-
tions must be reexamined. If, as appears to be the case, the
roots of the internationalist tradition are more the product of
mainland American thought than Island thought, then perhaps
the roots of other presumedly characteristic Hawaiian practices
and attitudes are similarly alien. Indeed, allowing for such ob-
vious exceptions as food and dress, is there any part of the
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modern Island cultural experience that could be accurately clas-
sified as unique and free of mainland influences? Perhaps there
is—certainly conjecture based on the internationalist movement
is not grounds for characterizing the entire cultural expe-
rience—but the question deserves more thoughtful attention
than it has so far attracted.
FUTURE HOPES AND WORRIES
The questions raised above are doubtless basic to a proper
analysis of the modern Hawaiian experience. At the same time,
they are also doubtless rather academic. It is readily apparent
that so long as people in Hawaii perceive their experience as
unique, no academic dissertation to the contrary will change
much.
This observation is borne out by practice. Even if it can be
shown that the roots of the mainstream Hawaiian experience
during the past several centuries are not entirely unique, the
experience itself has in fact been unique. Nowhere in the world
have so many markedly different cultures come together with
such a degree of harmony. The result, to be sure, is something
less than total pluralism, but cultures are incredibly complex
mechanisms that in all probability can never exist side by side
without certain trade-offs. In the balance, the Hawaiian
outcome has been remarkable in terms of preserving cultural
integrity while maintaining social accord, and the fundamental
explanation seems to be simply that the people of Hawaii have
wanted it this way. Hence, while questions pertaining to the
origins of this desire are of considerable academic interest and
should be further investigated in an effort to better explicate
Island intellectual roots, the practical point remains that Hawai-
ian society, regardless of the reasons why, has come closer to
realizing its mythic self-perception than most societies, and this,
in the last analysis, is what really matters.
Returning at last to the point of departure, many of the
same things can be said of the internationalist movement itself.
Whatever its actual origins and whatever Hawaii’s eventual
destiny, the movement has justified its existence time and again
simply on the basis of the intrinsic value of its assorted un-
dertakings. Bringing the leading citizens of the Pacific nations
together in consultation, expanding the opportunities for East-
West scholarship, creating an international university staffed
and attended by people from all regions of the earth, and estab-
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lishing a trans-cultural dialogue across the Pacific are matters
that require no external justification. In short, the movement
has long been doing the things that must be done in an interde-
pendent world and this, in practical terms at least, is all that is
truly important.
However, despite the fact that the internationalist
movement has clearly been a positive force both within and
beyond Hawaii, it must also be noted that past success is no
guarantee of future success. While prognosis is not the intent
here, several contemporary tendencies that threaten the future
effectiveness of the movement must at least be acknowledged.
In general terms, the inclination to view the Island experi-
ence in paradisal terms and to act accordingly runs counter
to the twentieth century’s increasingly pessimistic view of man
and society. In a world where terrorism, chauvinism, and he-
donism are accepted and on occasion even praised, interna-
tionalist undertakings in the Hawaiian mode face undeniably
bleak prospects. Indeed, it is likely that this pessimism has
already had an effect. Despite persistent efforts at a serious
portrayal of Hawaii, people elsewhere continue to view the Is-
lands as little more than a glamorous playground. Few are
aware of the deeper issues and fewer still care enough to take
them seriously. Further, it may well be that even the people
of Hawaii are succumbing to this tendency. To cite only the
most obvious examples, building ethnic tensions and a growing
inability to translate paradisal rhetoric into meaningful action
are prominent features of contemporary Island life. What all of
these things actually mean for the future remains to be seen,
but it is clear that they at least pose the threat of less happy
times. Like Shakespeare’s “killing frost,” they lurk in the back-
ground, ever threatening “man’s tender leaves of hope.”
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CHAPTER I
1. Honolulu Advertiser, February 21, 1969.
2. Ibid.
3. This assessment is based upon observations by the author
at the time of the address.
4. HA, February 21, 1969.
5. These activities are discussed in detail in the following
chapters. However, it is important to note at the outset
that they represent but one of modern Hawaii’s many his-
torical trends and are not in any sense the centerpiece of the
modern Island experience.
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CHAPTER II
1. Many would argue that this assessment is erroneous with
respect to at least the military and trans-Pacific commerce.
However, in all likelihood the only time Hawaii served a
truly crucial purpose in this respect was during the brief
period of the early twentieth century when coal-fired naval
ships were the dominant form of strategic weaponry. There-
after oil-fired and atomic-powered ships, strategic aircraft
and missiles, intercontinental jet transportation, and instan-
taneous communications obviated the vital military role that
Mahan and others predicted for the Islands. While different
conclusions might be in order had the military development
of Hawaii occurred sometime during the nineteenth century,
this, of course, was not the case. By the early years of the
twentieth century when it did happen, the strategic signif-
icance of overseas outposts (naval and otherwise) was al-
ready diminishing. Hence, the Islands have been important
but not essential to the military. Much the same can be
said of commerce. While the Islands are often portrayed
as the crossroads of Pacific commerce, in fact they have
never performed a truly essential function in this respect.
Banks, for example, were not even in existence until the
middle of the nineteenth century and the mercantile houses
of the era were created to serve domestic needs and the
short-lived whaling industry rather than international com-
merce. In short, the Islands were a convenient and much
used stopping point but hardly a crucial one. For details on
the earlier years of this period, see Ralph S. Kuykendall,
“Early Hawaiian Commercial Development,” The Pacific His-
torical Review 3, no. 4 (December 1934):365–385. More
recent efforts to attract foreign investment and establish a
transshipment “industry” (see chap. 6) suggest that similar
conclusions are still in order.
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16. Ibid., pp. 30–31. There are various translations of this poem
(which has also been set to music), but the general tone re-
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17. For further examples of his work, see Bradford Smith, “The
Isles Shall Wait for His Law,” American Heritage 9, no. 2
(February 1960): 10–21.
18. For a brief review of these and other artists, see “Art in
Hawaii,” The Sales Builder 9, no. 12 (December 1938):2–14.
For details on Strong, see Edward Joesting, Hawaii: An Un-
common History (New York, 1972), pp. 225–227.
19. Albertine Loomis, Grapes of Canaan: Hawaii 1820 (Hon-
olulu, 1966), pp. 46, 225.
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21. Richard Henry Dana, Jr., “Two Years Before the Mast,” in
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23. Quoted in Ralph S. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom,
vol. 2, 1854–1874: Twenty Critical Years (Honolulu, 1966),
p. 245.
24. Pukui and Korn, Echo of Our Song, pp. 150–155.
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26. Farrington addressed this point in newspaper editorials
from the time he arrived in the Islands prior to the turn of
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1897. Examples of his later work can be found in Honolulu
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which are cited in subsequent chapters. Ford’s career is dis-
cussed in chap. 4.
27. Charmian London, The Book of Jack London, vol. 2 (New
York, 1921), p. 334.
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thesis. For example, see Jack London, Stories of Hawaii, ed.
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42. For a more detailed discussion of this film, see Margaret
J. King and Sheldon J. Hershinow, “Blue Hawaii: The Gilded
Image,” mimeographed (Department of American Studies,
University of Hawaii, n.d.).
43. According to the CBS research division, national viewer sta-
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claimer.
Notes
206
47. None of this, however, is to imply that this theme is re-
stricted to television advertising. Radio and especially the
printed media also utilize it. A recent realtor’s adver-
tisement illustrates:
HAWAII… THE CROSSROADS OF THE PACIFIC
PARADISE … A word that attracts people from the four corners
of the world.
They come to discover its beauty … its history … its climate.
HAWAII’S PEOPLE … A blend of cultures enhancing the Aloha
spirit.
MIKE McCORMACK, REALTORS … Representatives of all these
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CHAPTER III
1. Jason Horn, “Primacy of the Pacific Under the Hawaiian
Kingdom” (M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1951), p. 2.
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